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INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY: CASE OF THE 
INDONESIAN BANKING SECTOR 
 
By: Muhamad Faisal Fariduddin Attar Nasution, Ph.D. 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012 
 
Director: Dr. Gurpreet Dhillon 
Department of Information Systems 
 
This study focuses on the institutionalization of information security in the banking 
sector. This study is important to pursue since it explicates the internalization of 
information security governance and practices and how such internalization develops an 
organizational resistance towards security breach. The study argues that information 
security governance and practices become institutionalized through social integration of 
routines and system integration of relevant technologies. The objective is to develop an 
understanding of how information security governance and practices in the Indonesian 
banking sector become institutionalized. Such objective is built on an argument that 
information security governance and practices become institutionalized through social 
	   xv	  
integration of routines and system integration of relevant technologies. Pursuing this 
study is necessary to conceptualize the incorporation of security governance and practices 
as routines, the impact of security breaches on such routines, and the effects of a central 
governing body on such routines altogether. 
Accordingly, the concept of institutionalization is developed using Barley and 
Tolbert’s (1997) combination of institutional theory and structuration theory to explain 
the internalization of security governance and practices at an organizational level. Scott’s 
(2008) multilevel institutional processes based on institutional theory is needed to 
elaborate security governance and practices in an organization-to-organization context. 
The research design incorporates the interpretive case-study method to capture 
communicative interactions among respondents. Doing so provides answers to the 
following research questions: (1) how institutions internalize information security 
governance and practices, (2) how an external governing body affects the 
institutionalization of information security governance and practices in institutions, and 
(3) how security breaches re-institutionalize information security governance and 
practices in institutions. 
Several important findings include the habitualized security routines, information 
stewardship, and institutional relationship in information-security context. This study 
provides contributions to the body of literature, such as depicting how information 
security becomes internalized in an organization and the interaction among organizations 
engaged in implementing information security. 
 
 	  
1 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Prologue 
This study focuses on information security institutionalization in the banking sector. 
Institutionalization is a process of building a social structure that embodies concepts in 
regulation and change resistance (Burrell and Morgan 1979). Unlike any other concepts, 
institutionalization depicts the dynamic process of creating structure (Barley and Tolbert 1997). 
The use of institutionalization is aimed at depicting how information security is governed and 
practiced as routine and how radical changes or disruptions such as security breach incidents 
have the possibility of disturbing the routine. The radical changes in general are usually 
indicative of a problem with managing of information security in organizations. While studies 
have identified good security policies (Dhillon 1997; Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2006) and 
frameworks for security governance (Brotby 2009; Da Veiga and Eloff 2007; Von Solms and 
Von Solms 2009), there is a lack of understanding about how security breach incidents have the 
potential to impair the implementation of security policies and security governance in the long 
run. 
Individuals, organizations, and businesses use banks to safeguard and secure, lend, or 
invest money. As the economy of a nation progresses, the banking sector and its activities 
become one of the country’s fundamental economic indicators. Any nationwide economic 
turbulence often results in negative impacts (e.g., reputational damage) on commercial banks. 
However, such adverse impacts can be prevented or lessened by governmental intervention and 
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involvement. This can be demonstrated by clearly determining the banks’ permissible activities, 
corporate structure, ownership, and maximum leverage ratios (Flannery 1998). While advances 
in information and communication technologies have created opportunities for growth, 
expansion and myriad other benefits for banks and their customers, such technologies pose 
potential dangers and pitfalls of tremendous significance and staggering proportions.   In fact, 
currently the most prevalent examples of the potentially negative impact of technology 
advancement on the banking sector are electronic-banking transaction sniffing and debit card 
identity theft.  
A simple definition of a bank is “an institution for receiving, lending, exchanging, and 
safeguarding money and, in some cases, issuing notes and transacting other financial business.”1 
Keeping this definition in mind, the perception of a bank as an institution refers to an 
organization with an existing synergy of norms and regulations. Furthermore, these norms and 
regulations are enforced through various methods such as rewards, punishment, or supervision. 
The supervisory function of a central bank ensures systematic stability, as it conducts prudential 
supervision (solvency of banks), monitors transparency, and ensures correct practices (Quaglia 
2008). The prudential banking supervision is a powerful tool that the central bank uses to govern 
and control the functioning of commercial banks and other financial institutions. Any situation 
arising out of the Central bank’s failure to supervise commercial banks or any commercial 
bank’s failure to comply with regulations mandated by the central bank, results in not only 
harming customers but can also trigger off a countrywide economic crisis. An example of such a 
scenario is the plight of Japanese banks in the 1990s. This national crisis in the banking sector 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/bank	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and colossal failure was attributed to the inadequate alignment of the Japanese banks’ 
governance structure to the dynamic nature of business environments in the 1980s (Kawaura 
2004). 
Information security in banking sector is a vibrant and interesting topic that has long been 
under careful investigation by scholars, researchers, and economists alike and continues to be 
pursued rigorously.  The topic is such that it is a major concern for every practitioner, especially 
bank personnel, governmental agencies, law enforcement and prevention agencies and the 
general public alike, which comprise the wide catchment of the banking sector’s stakeholders.  
Information security in the banking sector demands and necessitates one of the most 
highly enforced security governances and control mechanisms due to the nature of bank 
operations. The key factor of information security in banking sector is how central banks govern 
and enforce sets of regulations and policies to minimize information security breaches, and how 
central banks enforce the enhancement of information confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
In this respect, as the initiators, protectors and supervisors of good information security practices, 
central banks should define good practices in information security, which allow commercial 
banks to provide convenient and secured financial transactions and thus maintain the stability of 
a nation’s macroeconomic operations and general welfare. Furthermore, commercial banks need 
to abide by a set of regulations and policies enforced by the central bank which concern their 
information security. A commercial bank may have its own set of standards and policies 
pertaining to information security, reflecting the information security guidelines issued by the 
central bank. Therefore, issues in information security governance in banking sector coincide 
with issues of regulations and governance. 
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1.2. Research Motivation 
The motivation for this study is based on three facets of information security: 1) security 
governance and practices that form routine actions, 2) disturbance of such routines by security 
breaches, and 3) effects of central governing bodies on such routines. As such, there is a gap in 
information security studies. Most studies in information security focus on the first or the second 
facet. Not many studies, however, have  attempted to connect security governance routines with 
the impact of security breaches. The three motivational facets can be linked to the multilevel 
governance in a complex institutional setting through the concept of institutionalization (Hall 
2008). The banking sector provides a perfect empirical scenario, portraying a complex 
institutional setting.  Any activity by a commercial bank is overseen and controlled by the central 
bank. For example, a commercial bank manages its information risk not only to safeguard its 
information assets, but also because this action is compulsorily regulated by the central bank. 
Failure to manage information risks has often caused greater damage than mere privacy 
violation, mostly involving loss of financial assets (Dhillon and Moores 2001).  
Studies in information security have revealed various practices, techniques, and 
frameworks aimed at preserving security from a technical aspect, a behavioral aspect, or a 
combination of both. Studies have also investigated various computer crimes. Most studies, 
however, have not investigated how all these aspects can be intertwined into what would emerge 
as a routine that is unique to one organization.  
This study focuses on conceptualizing the formation of information security in an 
organization as routine security behavior. Institutionalization concept introduced by Barley and 
Tolbert (1997) is borrowed to capture how information security can be delineated as a daily, 
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habitual practice (routine) by members of an organization. This study therefore explores three 
important aspects of information security as proposed by Dhillon and Moores (2001) and by 
Dhillon (2007): technologies and technical procedures, organization and formal regulations, and 
informal communication and security awareness. Extant studies rarely emphasize on combining 
the three aspects. 
Studies in information security have not reflected nor incorporated the idea of a central 
governing body. Governance, control, and supervision by a central governing body draws upon 
the simplification of prudential supervision. This study adopts the prudential banking supervision 
by emphasizing the act to enforce policies, standards, and permissible activities in banks. The 
application of prudential banking supervision can be perceived as a macro-institutional 
phenomenon by which the central bank governs the practice of information security in 
commercial banks. The application of prudential banking supervision can also be perceived as a 
micro-institutional phenomenon wherein such institutionalization can be conceptualized to depict 
information security governance and practices within each individual bank. Prudential banking 
supervision is hence a key factor towards defining and formalizing the institution or 
institutionalizing the phenomena, i.e., enforcing regulations and norms of permissible activities 
in banks. This supervision effort is one such method to safeguard the unsavory impact of bank 
failures, which inflict an open wound leading to severe economic losses and reputational damage 
to a bank (Pennathur 2001). 
Finally, studies in information security focusing on computer crimes often depict only 
types of computer crimes, impacts of such crimes on organizations, and preventive and 
mitigation measures undertaken by organizations. Studies implicitly acknowledge, if not openly 
regard, computer crimes and security breaches as an unsubstantial implementation of information 
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security. Studies often regard computer crimes and security breaches as a separate entity that is 
not integral to security practices. Even when performed by members of an organization (e.g., 
employees), computer crimes are considered subversive acts rather than a regular instantiation of 
information security practices (Dhillon and Moores 2001). 
This study is therefore built upon the incorporation of security governance and practices 
as routines, the impact of security breaches on such routines, and the effects of a central 
governing body on such routines. The fundamental concept of this study lingers between the 
technology/technical aspect, organizational aspect, and informal-communication aspect. Using 
institutionalization allows the viewing of security breaches as an instantiation of information 
security and integration of such a view into routine security governance and practices. Security 
breaches should be viewed as a radical event that provokes change within the institutionalization 
(i.e., re-institutionalization) of information security (Powell and DiMaggio 1991).  
Therefore, this study is developed to achieve the following objective: to develop an 
understanding of how information security governance and practices in the Indonesian banking 
sector become institutionalized. The argument of this study is that information security 
governance and practices become institutionalized through social integration of routines and 
system integration of relevant technologies. To accommodate such an objective, this study seeks 
to answer the following questions: 
• How do institutions internalize information security governance and practices? 
• How does an external governing body impact the institutionalization of information 
security governance and practices in institutions? 
• How do security breaches re-institutionalize information security governance and 
practices in institutions? 
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1.3. Definition 
1.3.1. Information Security 
Cornell University’s Legal Information Institute defines Information Security as a means 
of “protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability”2. Information security breaches in banking sector can be cumbersome and hence are 
viewed as a crucial issue. Since it deals with financial information, a bank becomes a lucrative 
target for data and information thefts. Banks manage information risk through liability transfer, 
indemnification, mitigation, and retention to minimize vulnerabilities, accidents, losses, and 
countermeasure effectiveness (Blakley et al. 2001). Information security practices in general 
comprise of activities that deter, prevent, detect information security breaches (Straub and Welke 
1998), and recover the damages attributed to lack of emphasis on information confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000; Page et al. 2007).  
Most often, researchers focus on the technical aspects of information security such as 
network security (Alfaro et al. 2008), firewall (Finne 1996), and cryptography (Rindfleisch 
1997). Researchers mostly look at the management aspect of information security, focusing on 
the information security policy and the management of information risks. The management 
aspect of information security also deals with issues in upper management’s support, addressing 
the need to support the campaign for certain standards and codes of conduct which are used to 
apply controls based on the organizational and formal regulations aspect. Moreover, researchers 
also agree that establishing and socializing organizational culture and norms is essential for 
employees’ adaptation to attempts that reinforce controls using informal communication and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/44/3542.html  
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security awareness among social agents. Specifically, Straub and Welke (1998) allude to the 
importance of raising security awareness through education and training programs, in order to 
progress toward the development of information systems security through risk analysis, 
countermeasures, and security implementation. 
This study adopts the concept of information security that embodies such concepts as the 
technical aspect, management aspect, and informal communication. Reviewing these concepts in 
totality provides insights into the interaction between controls based on technology and technical 
procedures, formal organization, and informal communication among social agents. These 
interactions provide a fundamental ground for conceptualizing information security governance. 
The minute details and nitty-gritty’s of security governance practices can be explained using 
institutionalization. 
 
1.3.2. Institutionalization 
Institution is defined as “a well-established and structured pattern of behavior or of 
relationships that is accepted as a fundamental part of a culture”3. Examples of an institution 
include marriage, higher education, and banks. Commercial banks along with the central bank 
form an entity of financial institutions that engage in financial activities (Lewis et al. 2008; 
McLaughlin 1999; Shull 2002) and determine the stability of a nation’s macroeconomic welfare 
(Cecchetti and O’Sullivan 2003; Hellier 1999/2000; Quaglia 2008). Bank as an institution 
consists of individuals who are bound under similar regulations and share similar beliefs (Stern 
and Barley 1996). Tsoukas and Chia (2002) define an organization as an abstraction of 
generalizing and institutionalizing human action through cognitive representations and as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Source: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/institution  
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pattern that can be shaped and constituted, and which is evolutionary in nature.  Barley and 
Tolbert (1997) assert that organizations can be viewed as an institution, which leads to the 
conception of it being an organization consisting of a framework of rules and representations of 
symbols derived from cumulative history and interaction. 
The essential concept that distinguishes institution from organization is regulation, which 
refers to governance or supervision. In a practical sense, bank regulations, imposed by the central 
bank, regulate capital requirements, mandatory restrictions on asset choice (e.g., the use of ICT), 
and deposit insurance (John et al. 2000; Laeven and Levine 2009). From a micro-institutional 
perspective, the banking corporate governance body has already defined the concept of banks as 
financial institutions. The board of directors and senior management are responsible for 
corporate governance in a bank (Singh 2006). Hence, policies and regulations are enforced by 
the board of directors and senior management of each bank. Hence, from a macro-institutional 
perspective, the existence of and the supervisory activities of the central bank help refine the 
concept of banks as a notion of financial institution. The policies and regulations of each bank 
are based upon the policies and regulations imposed by the central bank according to the 
demands of a nation’s financial situation. The enforcement of policies and regulations reflects 
the strength of the central bank (Quaglia 2008). 
In order for banks to avoid such malfunctions, banks need to formulate strategic use of 
their information systems and pay attention to their information security. The strategic use of 
information systems can be exercised by the management of information security, through the 
enforcement and supervision of information security policies in banks; hence formulating and 
enforcing the practice of information security governance. There are two views of information 
security governance practice in banking sector: the micro-level practice or the (inter) micro-
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institutional perspective, and the macro-level practice or the (intra) macro-institutional 
perspective. The micro-institutional perspective views the enforcement and supervision of 
information security policies in each individual bank, while the macro-institutional perspective 
looks at such enforcement and supervision in a top-down approach (i.e., the enforcement and 
supervision of such policies by the central bank). 
 
1.4. Structure of Dissertation 
This study is organized as follows: chapter 2 looks at the extant literature in the fields of 
information security, banking regulations, banking business and activities, and prudential 
banking supervision. Points of interest include managing information risks in banking sector, 
managing information security in banking sector, permissible bank activities and bank structures, 
bank regulations, and prudential banking supervision, i.e., the relationship between the central 
bank and commercial banks.  
Chapter 3 covers the philosophical elucidation of institutional theory and structuration 
theory. The institution theory is elaborated using seminal works by S. Barley (1986), W. R. Scott 
(1987, 2008), and P. Selznick (1969) while the structuration theory borrows conceptual 
frameworks offered by A. Giddens (1994), W. J. Orlikowski (1992, 2000), and G. Walsham 
(1993). These theories together have created the concept of institutionalization using the 
approach introduced by S. Barley and P. Tolbert (1997), providing a powerful theoretical 
framework that can be used to explain the practice of information security governance in banking 
sector. This chapter also serves to establish the theoretical framework for this study using the 
institutional theory as well as the proposed research methodology.  
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Chapters 4, 5, and 6 offer the theoretical case studies based on empirical data. Chapter 4 
presents a case study of the institutionalization of information security in the central bank (Earl 
Capita Bank), chapter 5 presents a case study of the same process in a government-owned 
commercial bank (Centro Metropolitan Bank), and chapter 6 provides such case study in a 
private commercial bank (Blue Sequoia Bank). Chapter 7 provides a synthesis and presents a 
thorough discussion of the three case studies.  
This study ends at chapter 8, which provides concluding remarks and implications for 
further research and practice. 
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2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 This study essentially looks at how information security governance and practices are 
internalized in an organization. In doing so, this chapter presents concepts that reflect the socio-
organizational orientation of information security (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001), emphasizing 
on a behavioral perspective of information security. The socio-organizational orientation of 
information security looks at the synergy between technical controls that direct technology use 
and technical procedures, formal controls that focus on formal organizational aspect such as 
policies and regulations, and informal controls that emphasize the importance of informal 
communication  aimed at raising security awareness. These three controls comprise the security-
control dimensions (Dhillon and Moores 2001; Dhillon 2007). Information security governance, 
which is the most important concept in this study, introduces frameworks that direct the 
implementation of information security and incorporates the three security-control dimensions.  
The frameworks in general suggest managing information risk (Blakley et al. 2001; 
Brenner 2007) and information security policy (Herath and Rao 2009; Hong et al. 2006). 
Literatures are selected to cater to information-security studies that focus on behavior and social 
interaction, including those that explore ethics in information security (e.g., Dhillon and 
Backhouse 2000; Workman and Gathegi 2007) and security policy compliance (e.g., Bulgurcu et 
al. 2010; Moulton and Coles 2003). 
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Most literature, however, regard security breach as a menace and an  aberration. Scholars 
do not consider security breach an integral component of information security and often do not 
include breach in theoretical frameworks they develop. In addition, many literatures in 
information security governance confine governance in an internal system and do not recognize 
external formal body that may have significant influence on internal governance. This study 
seeks to bridge such gaps by reviewing and finding connections between security literature and 
other relevant literature. Some literature from banking theories and concepts are revisited to 
provide better understanding of banking governance. 
This chapter aims to revisit literature in information security governance and literatures in 
behavioral information security. Section 2.2 presents various views of information security 
governance. These views focus on the fundamental issues and concepts in information security 
and information risk, information security policy, and information security governance in 
banking sector. These concepts will be formulated as components of the theoretical framework 
that builds the thesis for this study, as depicted in section 2.3 and 2.4 that conclude this chapter. 
 
2.2. Information Security Governance 
Governance is generally “an inherently social, relational phenomenon” (Hall 2008, p. 4). 
Scholars have attempted to define (corporate) governance (Brotby 2009; Hall 2008; Von Solms 
and Von Solms 2009). Brotby (2009, p. 5) defines governance as: 
“The set of responsibilities and practices exercised by the board and executive management with the 
goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks are 
managed appropriately, and verifying that the enterprise’s resources are used responsibly.” 
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A definition by Von Solms and Von Solms (2009, p. 2) depicts governance as a set of 
activities that “(1) direct, or plan, or establish responsibilities, and (2) control outcomes, or 
ensure implementation, or enforce compliance.” They also argue that risk management is one of 
the essential factors to be considered in corporate governance. Schooner and Taylor (2009) 
denote that the corporate governance standard emphasizes that bank management assumes the 
sole responsibility to conduct business, and not the supervisory agencies. Flannery (1998) asserts 
the importance of assessing the institution’s condition and implementing any disciplinary action 
when necessary. 
The concept of governance by an external-central body occurs as a result of a system of 
multilevel governance (Hall 2008). This implies a set of corporate governances within each 
institution governed by a superior institution that assumes higher power. Hall (2008) has 
introduced the deontic power and constitutive power of central bank as a denominator of the 
higher hierarchy in the banking social system. These powers bestow the central bank the capacity 
for macro-prudential supervision, which is “the monitoring and assessment of risks to the 
stability of the financial system as a whole” (Krauskopf and Steven 2009, p. 1174). 
The conceptualization of prudential supervision is dependent upon the existence of the 
central bank. The central bank is a higher, regulatory authority as denoted by Hall (2008): 
“Possession of either or both of these forms of independence leaves the central bank in command of 
enormous authority over, for example, the domestic money supply and the supply and price of short-
term credit to the banking sector, as well as the price of money in the short-term money markets. It 
also permits central banks to delegate authority to other actors, including private sectors in the 
financial markets.” 
                     R. B. Hall (2008, pp. 1-2) 
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The consensus view of the central bank is that this institution is responsible for maintaining 
price stability by keeping inflation low and stable (Ising 2009). Hall (2008) denotes that the 
central bank possesses “deontic powers.” Such possession means that “the powers of central 
banks, in the same fashion, are uniformly deontic powers in the form of rights, duties, 
obligations, authorizations, permissions, empowerments, requirements, and certifications that 
endow the central bank with social and economic power as a result of the collective assignment 
of its status functions” (Hall 2008, p. 57). Hall borrows the concept of deontic power from 
deontology, which is “the science of duty; that branch of knowledge which deals with moral 
obligations; ethics” (Hall 2008, p. 49). Hall further implies that the deontic power of central bank 
is a manifestation of power arising from social relations of a specific form of constitution, which 
is one that results from collective assignment of status functions. Hence the central bank also 
possesses constitutive power resulting from status functions of the bank as a government agency, 
lending it the authority to “(1) socialize risk, (2) determine the level of national wealth held in 
reserves in the form of foreign exchange, and (3) determine how many of these reserves to 
expend to uphold the exchange rate when it comes under pressure” (Hall 2008, p. 96). Quaglia 
(2008) examines the strength of the central bank and measures such strength in terms of tangible 
and intangible resources (e.g., credibility, expertise, and international ties), and existing policy 
competences. In addition to Hall’s (2008) deontic power and constitutive power, Silva and 
Backhouse (2003) introduce two types of power that emerge from social conditioning. The first 
type, dispositional power, resembles Hall’s (2008) deontic power, accumulating from social 
integration. The second type, facilitative power, is a power that endows an entity with the 
capacity to persuade or force other entities to behave accordingly. 
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The first type of literature in information-security governance  is one that deal with 
governance frameworks. Wibowo and Batra (2010) introduce an information-security 
governance framework that incorporates internal and external threats and note the damages 
caused by any security breach involving such a framework. Dos Santos Moreira et al. (2008) 
develop an information security governance framework based on the decision-making structure 
which prevails in information systems, containing operational level (daily activities), tactical 
level (review/follow-up), and strategic level (annual reviews, establishing policies, and 
organization view). The framework reflects policy controls, process of implementing controls, 
people who are responsible for the policy controls, and the technology used for implementing 
policy controls. Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) provide a more detailed framework for information 
security governance. This framework highlights the technology, processes, and people aspects, 
specifically comprising the strategic framework (e.g., sponsorship, strategy, and risk 
management), managerial and operational framework (e.g., security management and 
organization, security policies, user security management) and technical framework (e.g., system 
development, incident management, technical operations, physical and environmental, and 
business continuity). 
Another type of security-governance literature looks at other details of the security 
governance framework, particularly through the assessment of model and outcomes. Brotby 
(2009) details six outcomes that information security governance needs to achieve for it to be 
accepted as desirable. These outcomes are (1) strategic alignment between security activities and 
business strategy, (2), risk management, (3) business process assurance/convergence, (4) value 
delivery with a view of optimizing investments in support of business objectives, (5) resource 
management, and (6) performance measurement. Von Solms and Von Solms (2009) introduce a 
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model for information security governance, consisting of (1) three levels of management 
(strategic level or board and executive management, tactical level or senior and middle 
management, and operational level or lower management and administration), (2) direct part of 
the cycle from the strategic level to the operational level (the top-down cycle), (3) execution part 
by the operational level, and (4) control part of the cycle going from the operational level to the 
strategic level (the bottom-up cycle). 
Studies have found the executive and top management’s involvement to have significant 
impact on information security governance (Dutta and McCrohan 2002; Khalfan and Alshawaf 
2004; Knapp et al. 2006). Ward and Smith (2002) state that access control policies for 
information systems should follow corporate governance guidelines and risk management 
strategies. They propose that information security policies should be implemented through 
information security responsibilities, management accountability policy, and other baseline 
access control security policies within individual and distributed systems. Von Solms (2001) 
creates a direct link between corporate governance and information security, emphasizing issues 
in corporate information security and the necessity to include information security in corporate 
governance documents. Von Solms (2005) also states that in order to create effective information 
security governance, implementation should be supported by good practices in IT governance 
and corporate governance. The implementation should be conducted by not only the IT 
department, but also the Information Security Compliance Management Department. Von Solms 
and Von Solms (2006a) develop a framework for information security governance depicting the 
direction, execution, and control of management levels of information security, including 
strategic, tactical, and operational. They emphasize the need for the board to control (manage) 
the organization effectively in order to ensure sound information security governance. Von 
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Solms and Von Solms (2006 b) also emphasize that boards and executives should pay particular 
attention to issues in information security even if they pose no immediate danger or imminent 
risk, as a general practice in information security governance.  
Other studies investigate the direct role and impact of executive and top management. 
Posthumus and Von Solms (2004) underline the importance for executive management, 
including the board and CEO, to carefully consider issues in information security and encourage 
the need to integrate information security in corporate governance through a sound information 
security governance framework. Moreover, Moulton and Coles (2003) define corporate 
governance as a managerial attempt to efficiently manage a corporation and exploit its resources 
and an attempt to balance power between managers and investors. In the context of information 
security governance, they add that corporate governance should consider (1) security 
responsibilities and practices, (2) strategies/objectives for security, (3) risk assessment and 
management, (4) resource management for security, (5) compliance with legislation, regulations, 
security policies and rules, and (6) investor relations and communications’ activity (as related to 
security). McFadzean et al. (2007), unfortunately, contend that management only pays attention 
to information security if the strategic information systems are considered important for the well 
being of the organization and there is an imminent risk or threat to information. 
Information security governance requires active participation of not only the CISO and his 
team, but also the board and the CEO of the organization. For instance, information security 
governance requires participation, and even intervention, by higher authorities.  Information 
security governance depicts the synergy between people, organization, technology, and strategy. 
Scholars agree with the concept that information security governance is the control of 
information security policies and regulations, reflecting the good corporate practices of an 
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organization (Mishra 2009). The governance, however, involves controls of managers 
(management) by boards, boards by stakeholders, and stakeholders by management (Von Solms 
and Von Solms 2006). Information security governance is therefore an effective and efficient 
mechanism to ensure the interaction between social actors and their wider social systems. Most 
studies, however, do not consider how security governance is driven by external factors other 
than security breaches. These studies often focus on internal factors such as the role of executive 
and top management, risk management, security rules and policies, and framework. Identifying 
such gap, this study seeks to explore a level that involves an interaction between social actors in 
an internal institution and an external governance body in the wider social system. 
 
2.2.1. Information Security: Fundamental Issues and Applications in Banking Studies 
Studies often focus only on the technical perspective of information security. These studies 
look at the design and application tools for information security and hence define security as a 
tangible and concrete concept (Baskerville 1993; Dhillon and Backhouse 2001). Nowadays, 
scholars have begun to consider the non-technical perspectives of information security, i.e., the 
socio-organizational perspective (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001). The scholars studying these 
aspects advocate that while technology is important, organizational and human factors also 
significantly contribute to the success of information security (Dutta and Roy 2008). Some of 
these scholars often refer to risks when discussing information security (Blakley et al. 2001; 
Jones 2007). Some scholars have linked information security to the values of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information (Anderson 2003; Dhillon and Backhouse 2000). Dhillon 
and Backhouse (2000) extend the notions of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
information security to responsibility and knowledge of roles, integrity (as a requirement of 
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membership), trust (which is distinct from control), and ethicality (as opposed to rules). 
Anderson (2003) presents information security as an assurance of a balanced information risks 
and controls. Kulczycki (1997) defines information security as all activities undertaken to 
safeguard assets, which includes financial and accounting responsibility as well as intangible 
valuables (e.g., proprietary product information, intellectual property, and basic computer system 
integrity). Kulczycki further contends that advances in information and communication 
technologies have caused data and information to become more powerful and easier to 
manipulate and hence there is a need for more potent, advanced technology to protect the data 
and information. 
Dutta and Roy (2008) express that information security involves an intertwining of 
technical, organizational, and behavioral factors. Hazari et al. (2008) believe that in information-
security, organizational and behavioral factors are contrived upon the employees’ integrity and 
commitment to safeguarding their organizational assets and interest.  Moreover, Hazari et al. 
(2008) notice that the integrity of these individuals is influenced by attitude, subjective norm, 
and perceived behavioral control. In his paper, Dhillon (2001) denotes the use of formalized 
rules in the form of security policies, normative controls such as culture, value or belief system, 
and monitoring of employee behavior. Dhillon argues that the act of breaching information is 
performed as a result of the combination of an individual’s behavioral and normative beliefs. 
Rhee et al. (2005) take a different direction while investigating information-security related 
behavioral factors by demonstrating that the users’ optimistic bias in their risk perceptions about 
information security has a relation to the perception of controllability. Rhee et al. argue that 
individuals tend to believe that negative events are less likely to happen to them than to others. 
With respect to information security breach in banking sector, several scholars have attributed 
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such breaches to insider threat (Dhillon 2001; Dhillon and Moores 2001). Albrechtsen (2007) 
denote that employees’ security awareness and cautious behavior play an important role in 
information security performance of organizations, particularly banks. The security awareness 
and causes behavior can be improved by using the user-involving approach, whereby employees 
are engaged in various awareness activities such as participation in information security 
workshops. In a similar argument, Stinchcombe (2006) states that 70% of security breach cases 
occur from within organizations. Stinchcombe also brings to the managers’ attention several 
factors that contribute to information security breaches. These issues are password leakages and 
misuse , identity theft, phishing, spamming, etc.  
In terms of the attack method, Botha and Solms (2001, 2002) note various ways in which 
hackers attempt to breach security of information in corporations, government and banks. They 
contend that insiders often perform non-malicious attack attempts while outsiders may conduct 
both non-malicious and malicious attack attempts (2001). They also introduce the proactive 
identification model (PAIM), a fuzzy methodology to combat hacking proactively (2002). 
Kaleem and Ahmad (2008) conduct a survey of bankers’ perception of electronic banking 
and find that bankers in Pakistan perceive electronic banking as a tool that minimizes 
inconvenience, reduces transaction costs, and saves time. However, Kaleem and Ahmad also 
opine that bankers have a perception that electronic banking opens a security hole, allowing 
government access to public data, increasing the chances for fraud and reducing the level of 
security. Castiglione (2002) argues that despite the fact that banks successfully protect their 
information assets in the Internet realm using passwords, firewalls, encryption, etc., they, 
overlook the non-technical information security aspects such as trashcans, photocopiers or 
employee desks. Miller and Engemann (1996) introduce the Information Security Management 
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Planning (ISMP) program to proactively identify and analyze resources that are vulnerable to 
risks. They emphasize on the importance of proactive involvement of the management. Tsaih et 
al. (2008) support this notion by extending the importance to even non-information technology 
managers. They use a study of a bank’s loan process, which involves non-information 
technology managers dealing with safeguarding gaps of physical information assets and their 
digital formats, as well as the information-processing infrastructure to arrive at this conclusion. 
Accordingly, this study takes the view that information security is a socio-organizational 
instance that requires intensive and complex interaction between technology, organizational, and 
individual behavior. IT security has been mistakenly styled as information security, with the 
former being a mere technological artifact that secures the information asset of an organization. 
The view of technological aspect, however, is not sufficient to describe information-security 
concept since the technological aspect restricts the dynamic of social interaction, which is 
constructed by human interactions, whether in a non-formal, non-hierarchical setting or in an 
organizational setting (Dhillon and Backhouse 2001). Moreover, the organizational setting 
demands more attention since human interactions in organizational setting are defined and 
formalized within well recognized norms and goals. In addition, the organizational setting 
distinguishes the roles of its individual members. 
 
2.2.2. Information Risk 
Information risk is an essential component of information security governance. In relation 
to the banking concept, information risk is a subset of operational risk. Studies in banking 
concept and theory do not directly point out information risk. Governance and control studies in 
information security and in banking sector have stated that risk management is an essential 
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component of corporate governance. This subsection aims to create a connection between 
information risk that has been extensively investigated in information security studies and 
operational risk that is one of risk factors in banking concept and theory. By first looking at how 
operational risk is defined in banking concept and theory, one can see how information risk can 
be positioned in banking concept and theory. 
Banks are exposed to various types of risks, which are mainly categorized into four areas: 
financial, credit, market, liquidity, operational, business, and event risks (Van Greuning and 
Brajovic Bratanovic 2000; Gupta 2009; Jarrow 2008). The impediment of technology is usually 
related to the obstruction of operational risk management (Schooner and Taylor 2009). Schooner 
and Taylor (2009, p. 174) details operational risk as following: 
“It thus includes situations involving fraud, e.g., when traders deliberately falsify information, management 
failure, and inadequate procedures and controls. Technical errors may be due to breakdowns in information, 
transaction processing, settlement systems, or more generally, problems in operations that deal with the record-
keeping of transactions and the reconciliation of individual trades with the firm’s aggregate position (typically 
refered to as the back office functions).” 
 
Issues in information systems are a major concern in operational risk. Studies that 
investigate information security in banking sector often refer to the problematic concept of 
information risk and various applications of such an issue. Flores et al. (2006) explain the 
socialization and enforcement of Basel II norms on the measurement and control of operational 
risk and the bank’s effort to comply with these new requirements within their existing 
information systems. They propose to use a socio-technical approach that involves the personnel, 
IT systems (including information risk), organizational structures, and internal controls in order 
to diminish such a gap. Scholars have linked information risk to information security breaches 
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and procedures to prevent these breaches. Brenner (2007) states that ISO 27001 is an 
international standard that aids information risk management by implementing and monitoring 
strong security controls. Von Solms and Von Solms (2009) introduce a variety of frameworks 
that can be used as a basis for information security policies (e.g., COBIT, ISO 27001, ISO 
27002). Ryan and Bordoloi (1997) identify main causes of information security breaches, often 
including viruses/bombs/worms, inadequate or non-existent logon security, access to data/system 
by outsiders, loss due to inadequate backups or log files, uncontrolled read and/or update access, 
uncontrolled user privilege levels, accidental data destruction by employees, and inadequate 
audit trails. Maguire (2002) states that there are many areas of potential risk during the system 
development process, and hence this process needs to be carefully analyzed and managed. He 
identifies potential behaviors and circumstances that result in vulnerability of information to 
security breaches, including: 
1. Use of previously unused platform (failure to deal with known or unknown bugs). 
2. Multitasking capabilities (inability to handle user numbers and response times). 
3. Changes in the development team (several project managers). 
4. Lack of rigorous testing (inability to test in a “live” environment). 
5. System development methodology (inappropriate application leading to divergent 
approaches). 
6. Number of stakeholders (failure to satisfy the system requirements of the 
disparate groups). 
7. Immovable end date. 
8. Limited access to users (lack of analysis in business areas). 
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9. Consultancy support (several suppliers of consultancy with separate aims and 
objectives). 
10. Local business requirements (failure to reconcile separate design needs). 
11. System changeover (lack of contingency planning). 
12. Lack of availability of qualified staff.  
Straub and Welke (1998) suggest the importance of raising security awareness through 
education and training, and progress towards the development of information systems security 
through risk analysis, countermeasures, and security implementation. 
The effectiveness of information security risk is strongly dependent upon the efficient 
management of information security. McFadzean et al. (2007) contend to this notion by stating 
that the effective management of information security is accomplished by acknowledging the 
strategic importance of information systems within the organization and is enhanced by how risk 
is perceived. Adding to this concept, Bodin et al. (2008) argue that the Chief of Information 
Security Officer (CISO) needs to recognize and understand the nature of risk. They present three 
measures to determine and capture various aspects of information security risk. They further 
denote that risk involves multiple dimensions and meanings within the context of information 
security. Moreover, according to Blakley et al. (2001), risks of information security breaches can 
be technically managed through liability transfer, indemnification, mitigation, and retention, and 
information security risk control can be measured through vulnerabilities, incidents, losses, and 
the effectiveness of countermeasures. They also suggest that management of information risk 
emphasizes on reporting, the analysis of information risk, and the evaluation of information 
security technology. In addition, Jones (2007) recommends the development of a framework for 
information security risk assessments within an organization. Risk framework should therefore 
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consist of phases that include risks identification (e.g., compliance with standards and 
regulations, and risk ownership), risks assessment (e.g., risk modeling and testing), risks 
treatment (e.g., prioritization of risk mitigation), and risks monitoring and reporting.	  
Information security breaches can also be caused by employees. Scholars have 
acknowledged security breaches resulting from insider threat. For instance, Dhillon and Moores 
(2001) assert that computer crimes are often conducted by employees or insiders, and should 
therefore be prevented and controlled at the very least. They discuss two case studies of 
computer-crime scandals involving employees of respectively the Kidder Peabody & Co and the 
Daiwa Bank. Aldhizer III (2008) seconds this finding by presenting facts presented by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Global State of Information Security Study in 2007 which finds 
that 69% of database breaches are caused by people inside the organizations. He propogates 
another measure to safeguard the insider risk by implementing centralized and automated 
identity and access management (IAM) controls. Several studies have provided solutions and 
frameworks to predict and deter insider threat as well as to safeguard information assets. Schultz 
(2002) presents framework and models dealing with insider attack-related behaviors. Workman 
and Gathegi (2007) find that punishment and ethics training can be effective in mitigating threats 
to information and communication technologies by employees. However, the effectiveness of 
these efforts relies heavily on the underlying motivations of the employees. 
Information risk as part of operational risk needs to undergo ongoing evaluation by key 
players in order to avoid losses, particularly catastrophic losses. This effort requires internal 
controls, as well as risk monitoring and mitigation, inscribed in the bank policies and procedures; 
all of which are an essential component of information security governance. Overall, the role of 
regulatory or supervisory authorities is important in order to govern and monitor the practice of 
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risk management (Adeleye et al. 2004). Therefore, risks of security breach (i.e., information risk) 
are inherent in the use of technology, and hence can be considered issues in operational risk. As 
with the management of operational risk, the management of information risk requires 
participation and involvement of key players in a bank (Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 
2000; Fragniere et al. 2010; McFadzean et al. 2007; Dutta and McCrohan 2002; Khalfan and 
Alshawaf 2004; Knapp et al. 2006). Information risk can be viewed mostly as a risk that may 
harm or lead to the misuse of information by relying on inappropriate access to information and 
communication technologies belonging to a certain organization (Blakley et al. 2001). The most 
threatening risks, are those posed by insiders, who are employees of the organization or are 
closely connected to these employees. Various standards and frameworks (e.g., ISO 27001 and 
COBIT) have been prescribed to safeguard information from these threats. Therefore, the 
management of information risk resembles the management of operational risk whereas the role 
of the executive management and regulatory or supervisory authorities is necessary for success. 
Scholars agree that information risk can be effectively decreased only through management 
support. Top management or executive support therefore sustains the development of sound 
information systems security, enhances the adherence of organizational culture to good security 
practices, and increases the level of enforcement of existing security policies (Dutta and 
McCrohan 2002; Khalfan and Alshawaf 2004; Knapp et al. 2006). 
Studies in information security in banking sector have asserted the importance of managing 
and mitigating information risk and highlighted how failure to do so can cause a calamity in the 
victim organization. Studies in banking concept and theory however do not recognize 
information risk and do not associate information risk with operational risk. Furthermore, studies 
in information security in banking sector do not directly state that information risk is a 
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component of operational risk. This subsection aims to position information risk in studies in 
banking concept and theory. By doing so, this subsection has discovered regulatory frameworks 
(e.g., Basel II and ISO 27001) to manage and mitigate information risks in banking sector. 
 
2.2.3. Information Security Policy 
One of the essential concepts in corporate governance is the formulation and 
implementation of policies and regulations. Bank regulators govern and control the formal 
responsibility of banks to protect the interests of legal stakeholders (Singh 2006). Quaglia (2008) 
contends that policy competences affect the central bank’s ability to influence the change of 
supervisory arrangements. Central banks have mostly governed the monetary policy as an 
attempt to stabilize the nation’s economic welfare but tend to overlook the supervision and 
governance of particular policies related to operational risk (Aguiar and Martins 2008; Batini 
2007; Christiano et al. 2008; Ising 2009; Lees 2007). Nevertheless, the actions taken concerning 
the monetary policy are similar to those taken for other regulatory measures (Ising 2009). Lamy 
and Moyer (1995) state that the assessment and development of banking regulation needs to take 
into consideration the perspective of various parties involved: the banking industry, the banking 
regulators, and the banking consumer. Yang and Zhang (2007) contend that the new anti-money 
laundering regulations in China impose more severe punishment than do the old regulations. 
They also state that the new regulations help reduce the likelihood of breaches by imposing 
stringent requirements of client identity recognition, retention of client identity documents and 
trading records, and reporting of large-sum transactions and suspicious transactions. 
Issues pertaining to top management support of information security necesitate  the need to 
include issues in information security policy (Hong et al. 2006; Fulford and Doherty 2003). 
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Information security as part of the information technology plans needs to be directed and 
formulated. Smith and Jamieson (2006) define information security policies as policies that 
ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and assets through protection 
from theft, tampering, manipulation, or corruption. Chandra (2008) states that the initiation of 
information security policies denotes management’s commitment to advance and safeguard 
information as an asset. Ross (2008) seconds this notion as he states that information security 
policies and standards depict management’s objective. Knapp et al. (2009) conduct an 
exploratory study to develop a practice-based organizational model for a comprehensive 
information security policy for organizations. Knapp et al. also categorize information security 
policy based on policy management and organizational environment. 
Doherty and Fulford (2006) argue that carefully and explicitly aligning information 
security policy and strategic information system plans enhance the security of the information 
systems. They find that there is a strong impact of a carefully designed information security 
policy on the planning of strategic information systems. Knapp et al. (2006) find that top 
management support has a significant impact on the enforcement of information security policy 
as well as on the organization’s security culture. Whitman (2003) quotes findings by scholars 
which indicate that only half of the surveyed organizations had effectively designed and enforced 
information security policy and 90% of those organizations ironically detected computer security 
breaches within the past 12 months. He implies that IT executives identified information security 
as a necessary component but not as a critical issue and that information security has been 
constantly ignored by top management. However, Doherty and Fulford (2005) find no significant 
relationship between the formulation and implementation of information security policies and the 
incidence of information security breaches. They attribute this anamoly to factors such as 
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difficulties of raising awareness, difficulties of policies enforcement, policy standards being too 
complex, inadequate resources, and failure to tailor policies. In relation to information security 
policy, Vroom and Von Solms (2004) state that auditing the employee behavior with regard to 
policy compliance is difficult and suggest a less structured and more informal approach by 
looking at the organizational culture. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) examine the antecedents of 
employee compliance with information security policy in an organization and discover that the 
effects of attitude, normative beliefs, and self-efficacy  in an employee’s intention to comply are 
significant. 
Baskerville and Siponen (2002) enunciate the importance of security policy formulation, 
particularly in an emergent organization, to the implementation and development of information 
systems security. Baskerville and Siponen argue that the use of meta-policy is important for the 
implementation and development of information security, particularly the use of information 
security policy in an emergent organization. Cuppens and Cuppens-Boulahia (2008) connote that 
requirements and context are extra conditions that demand specific treatment, whereby 
information security policy can be applied. Herath and Rao (2009) develop a framework for 
information security compliance in organizations. An important finding of this study is that there 
is a strong connection between social influence and organizational commitment, and policy 
compliance intention. Hong et al. (2006) develop a summary of procedures for building 
information security policies, which include security policy development and security awareness 
and policy education. 
Information security policy is a necessary determinant of how information security should 
be formulated and adopted to prevent and deter security breaches. Information security needs to 
reflect the strategic formulation and implementation of the holistic information systems of the 
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organization. Therefore, the existence of top management and executive support contributes to a 
clear and precise formulation and adoption of information security policies. Information security 
policies may exist as rules, permissions, prohibition, obligation, or dispensation to ensure good 
practices of organizational information security and should hence be defined and formulated by 
information security meta-policies to maintain consistency and stability (Cuppens and Cuppens-
Boulahia 2008; Baskerville and Siponen 2002). In addition, information security policies need to 
be precise and concise, and should be introduced and socialized in order to be effectively 
adopted and implemented in organizations. This is because employees’ policy compliance 
attitudes are often influenced by threat perception, organizational commitment and self-efficacy. 
 
2.3. Summary and Discussion 
“Information Security Governance (ISG) consists of the management commitment and leadership, 
organizational structures, user awareness and commitment, policies, procedures, processes, 
technology and compliance enforcement mechanisms, all working together to ensure that the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of the company’s electronic assets (data, 
information, software, hardware, people, etc.) are maintained at all times.” 
       S. H. Von Solms and R. Von Solms (2009, p. 24) 
 
Based on the literature review, this section aims to conceptualize and synthesize distributed 
concepts of governance elicited from banking studies and security governance studies. The 
ultimate aim is to discover the intersection between such concepts in a wider social system such 
as banking sector. The literature unfolds the concept of two-level governance that is extensively 
present in the banking sector. Of the two types of governance, studies in banking concepts and 
theories introduce the macro-institutional perspective of corporate governance, termed as macro-
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prudential supervision. This type of governance is controlled by the central bank, resulting from 
the central bank’s possession of deontic power, constitutive power (Hall 2008; Krauskopf and 
Steven 2009), and facilitative power (Silva and Backhouse 2003). 
The concept of information security governance is essentially similar to the concept of 
conventional corporate governance. Da Veiga and Eloff (2007), Knapp et al. (2006), and Dos 
Santos Moreira et al. (2008), have emphasized the importance to exercise control and regulative 
authorities to achieve strategic objectives. Schooner and Taylor (2009), and Von Solms and Von 
Solms (2006a) second this notion by stressing the importance of management in exercising direct 
internal control to achieve strategic objectives. Schooner and Taylor (2009, pp. 105-106) state 
that: 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, 
its shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper 
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the 
company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. The presence of an effective 
corporate governance system, within an individual company and across an economy as a whole, 
helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market 
economy.” 
 
Schooner and Taylor (2009) have indentified key players in banking corporate governance. 
These key players are the bank’s board of directors, senior management, shareholders, customers 
and other relevant stakeholders. In light of the information security governance, many of the key 
players for the banking corporate governance are the same personnel accompanied by additional 
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stakeholders. Indeed, key players do play an important role as well in ensuring sound 
information security governance. Information security scholars have emphasized the importance 
of executives or top management as participants and involved members in the management of 
information security. Von Solms and Von Solms (2009) specify these key members as the board 
of directors, senior executives, steering committee, and the CISO. Each of these key players has 
an important role in accomplishing sound information security governance. Furthermore, these 
key players constitute the upper-stratum in the inter-level view of information security 
governance. 
Risk is an important aspect that needs to be considered and handled in corporate 
governance, as well as in information security governance. Strategic actions and controls need to 
be performed by key players in order to achieve desirable outcomes. Both banking corporate 
governance concept and information security governance concept entail the damaging impact of 
risk as a result of ineffective governance. Scholars have identified the results of such issue, 
leading to other harmful effects on the nation’s economic stability (Malkawi and Malkawi 2007; 
Penn 2005; Yang and Zhang 2007). Banking corporate governance concept has identified risk 
caused by the use of technology as part of operational risk. Regulatory authorities have created 
the Basel II as a guideline for managing operational risk in banks. Such a guideline, however, is 
geared toward the management of general activities in operational risk. However, aspects of both 
operational and information risk management emphasize the following: measurement and 
identification of risk, strategic actions and direct control by key players, and ongoing risk 
evaluation (McFadzean et al. 2007; Blakley et al. 2001; Jones 2007; Stone and Marotta 2003; 
Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 2000; Fragniere et al. 2010). Ongoing evaluation 
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includes raising awareness through education and training (Straub and Welke 1998; Workman 
and Gathegi 2007). 
The use of technology, particularly IT, is an important aspect of information security 
governance. Improper use of technology and lack of risk socialization by insiders may harm the 
institution (Flores et al. 2006; Hall 2008; Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 2000; Schooner 
and Taylor 2009). Despite the fact that IT plays an important role in effective and efficient 
banking operations, the improper and unethical use of IT by insiders may prove 
counterproductive (Dhillon 2001; Castiglione 2002; Dhillon and Moores 2001; Kaleem and 
Ahmad 2008). Scholars conclude that IT and security need to be regulated and should therefore 
conform to the standard notion of security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Dhillon 
and Backhouse 2000; Anderson 2003; Brotby 2009). 
Another important aspect of corporate governance is the effect of regulations and policies 
(Singh 2006). Regulations and policies are key components of an institution, and the creation and 
the enforcement of these produce the effect of institutionalization. The central bank, acting as a 
regulatory and supervisory authority, is responsible for creating and enforcing regulations and 
policies for banks and other financial institutions to adhere to. Despite the implementation of 
Basel II, the central bank seems to take for granted the implementation of regulations and 
policies for the prevention of operational risk, particularly information risk. Scholars, however, 
have underlined the importance of regulations and policies for governing information security 
(Hong et al. 2006; Fulford and Doherty 2003). As such, the existence of the implementation of 
such regulations and policies is contingent among banks on the micro surface. 
The highlight of this study is, however, the aspect of multilevel governance, or the 
existence of the central bank as the upper-stratum institution among banks as individual 
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institutions. This social instance has conjured a different type of governance, the macro-
prudential supervision, conducted only by the central bank (Hall 2008; Krauskopf and Steven 
2009). This study looks at the two levels of information security governance. The within-the-
bank governance, called the inter-level governance, is implemented by top management within 
any individual bank. Governance that involves a central governance body is the intra level, 
which is governed by the central bank in relation to other banks. The macro-prudential 
supervision lies within the concept of deontic power and constitutive power (Hall 2008). The 
central bank itself has its own micro-level information security governance implemented by its 
own key players. 
Table 2.1 is developed to highlight the key themes inferred from prior literature. Based on 
concepts from the literature review, information security governance can be categorized 
according to the security-control dimensions. Von Solms and Von Solms (2009) introduce a 
model of information security governance that consists of two major parts: the core part and the 
expanded part. The core part details the direct and control execution by management actions at 
the strategic level, tactical level, and operational level. The expanded part provides concepts on 
directives, control, risk management, organization, and awareness. The technical aspect is 
inherent in the direct and control aspects but is latent within the core part. The technical aspect is 
implemented particularly in the operational level of both direct and control aspects in the core 
part. Scholars have linked operational risk to risk of using information technology (Evans et al. 
2008; Flores et al. 2006; Schooner and Taylor 2009; Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 
2000). As for the other control dimensions (i.e., formal and informal), Von Solms and Von 
Solms (2009) state that the expanded part is to be developed using best practices in information 
security. Except for the information risk strategic action and control, all managerial themes are 
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categorized under both formal control and informal control. This is because the directive and 
control of information risk require underlying frameworks (e.g., ISO 27001) (Brenner 2007; Von 
Solms and Von Solms 2009) and strategic procedures (Blakley et al. 2001; Jones 2007), and are 
supervised and directed by top management (Bodin et al. 2008; McFadzean et al. 2007). 
According to Dhillon (2007), security awareness and education fall under the informal control 
dimension. Security awareness and education are an essential component of sound information-
security governance. 
 
Key Themes Research Methodology Relevant Literature Security Control Dimension 
Institutional Authority: Grounded Theory 
(McFadzean et al. 2007), 
McFadzean et al. (2007); Hong 
et al. (2006); Bodin et al. 
(2008); Schooner and Taylor 
(2009); Adeleye et al. (2004) 
Formal control and informal 
control 
Board of Directors Survey Method (Fulford 
and Doherty 2003; 
Fulford and Doherty (2003);    
Senior Executives Khalfan and Alshawaf 
2004; 
Dutta and McCrohan (2002);    
Steering Committee Adeleye et al. 2004), Khalfan and Alshawaf (2004); 
Knapp et al. (2006); 
  
CISO Mix Method (Knapp et al. 
2006) 
Von Solms and Von Solms 
(2006; 2009) 
  
External Authority Explanatory Case Study 
(Quaglia 2008) 
Hall (2008); Krauskopf and 
Steven (2009); Quaglia (2008); 
Schooner and Taylor (2009); 
Adeleye et al. (2004) 
 
Information Risk Strategic 
Action and Control 
Grounded Theory 
(McFadzean et al. 2007), 
Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (Bodin et al. 
2008), Multistage 
Stochastic Program 
(Fragniere et al. 2010), 
Survey Method (Adeleye 
et al. 2004; Gupta 2009), 
Cox Counting Processes 
(Jarrow 2008) 
Bodin et al. (2008); 
McFadzean et al. (2007); 
Brotby (2009); Von Solms and 
Von Solms (2006; 2009); Da 
Veiga and Eloff (2007); 
Blakley et al. (2001); Jones 
(2007); Workman and Gathegi 
(2007); Schooner and Taylor 
(2009); Fragniere et al. (2010); 
Stone and Marotta (2003); Van 
Greuning and Brajovic 
Bratanovic (2000); Gupta 
(2009); Jarrow (2008); Adeleye 
et al. (2004) 
Formal control 
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Ongoing Use of IT Case Study (Dhillon 2001; 
Flores et al. 2006; Dhillon 
and Moores 2001), Survey 
Method (Kaleem and 
Ahmad 2008) 
Dhillon (2001); Castiglione 
(2002); Dhillon and Moores 
(2001); Kaleem and Ahmad 
(2008); Flores et al. (2006); 
Van Greuning and Brajovic 
Bratanovic (2000); Schooner 
and Taylor (2009) 
Technical control 
Risk Policies and 
Regulations 
Case Study (Doherty and 
Fulford 2006; Smith and 
Jamieson 2006), Logistic 
Regression Analysis 
(Batini 2007), Survey 
Method (Doherty and 
Fulford 2005; Herath and 
Rao 2009; Hong et al. 
2006), Grounded Theory 
(Knapp et al. 2009), AS-
AD Macroeconomic 
Structure (Aguiar and 
Martins 2008), Taylor-
Rule Formulation of 
Monetary Policy 
(Christiano et al. 2008), 
Linear-Quadratic 
Framework (Lees 2007) 
Smith and Jamieson (2006); 
Hong et al. (2006); Chandra 
(2008); Ross (2008); Knapp et 
al. (2009); Doherty and Fulford 
(2005; 2006); Herath and Rao 
(2009); Aguiar and Martins 
(2008); Batini (2007); 
Christiano et al. (2008); Ising 
(2009); Lees (2007); Singh 
(2006) 
Formal control and informal 
control 
Lower-Stratum Institution: 
Corporate Governance 
Design Science (Dos 
Santos Moreira et al. 
2008) 
Dos Santos Moreira et al. 
(2008); Da Veiga and Eloff 
(2007); Brotby (2009); Ward 
and Smith (2002); Von Solms 
and Von Solms (2006; 2009); 
Flannery (1998); Hall (2008) 
Technical control, formal 
control, and informal control 
Upper-Stratum Institution: 
Macro-Prudential 
Supervision 
  Flannery (1998); Hall (2008); 
Krauskopf and Steven (2009) 
Technical control, formal 
control, and informal control 
 
Table 2.1 – Conceptual Elements of Two-Level Information Security Governance in Banking Sector 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the various bodies of literature pertaining to banking management 
and governance, and information security governance. Extant literature reveals widely accepted 
conceptualizations of information security governance, including key players in governance, risk 
management, IT in banks and information security, regulations and policies, and macro-
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prudential supervision. It is believed that the intra-level governance of information security, 
hence termed as information security macro-prudential supervision, delineates similar 
information security governance at the micro level, barring the only difference in terms of the 
key players and institutional strata. Hence the information security governance in banking sector 
reveals two-level governance: one within each institution (inter-institutional perspective) and the 
other by an institution to other institutions (intra-institutional perspective). 
The institutionalization of information security as an impact of the two-level security 
governance enhances the view of information security as a socio-organizational instance. As the 
building block for a socio-organizational study of information security, the three security-control 
dimensions are applied to each component of the information-security governance ontology. 
With the use of IT exclusively linked to the technical control, the other dimensions are applied to 
the managerial and informal aspects of information security governance. 
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3  THEORY AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The essence of institutional theory comprises of issues in society, broadly categorized 
into order and conflict, stability and change, or consensus and coercion. This chapter seeks to 
explore two theoretical frameworks that portray institutionalization of information security in the 
inter level (i.e., within an organization) and the intra level (i.e., between organizations). Both 
frameworks denote institutionalization as a process, originating from institution. Another 
objective of this chapter is to present a research design for this study, using the interpretive case 
study. This study borrows the view of institution from Scott (2008), who points towards the 
infinity of institutions, and Powell and DiMaggio (1991), who contend that there are different 
faces of institutionalization. 
The first theoretical framework looks at the combination and conjunction between 
institutional theory and structuration theory as introduced by Barley and Tolbert (1997). 
Applying such a combination can demonstrate the dynamic interactions among social elements 
in banks, as well as the formulation of policies and regulations, dictating the formation of banks 
as collective institutions. Institutional theory is concerned with the maintenance of societal 
cohesiveness, the elemental unity of society, which creates a harmonic entity, and the 
explanation of the role of regulation in society (Burrell and Morgan 1979). On the other hand, 
structuration theory presents an explanation of dynamic social structuring of agency’s interaction 
with resources (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Structuration theory provides an understanding of how 
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the use of resources or artifacts can become a habit (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The two 
theories complement each other. Institutional theory depicts the internalization process of an 
interaction between agency and modalities while structuration theory shows the dynamics of 
such an interaction. Whatever approach one undertakes, institutional theory and structuration 
theory as social-science theories attempt to discover knowledge that guides everyday life, i.e., to 
portray the reality of everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The contention of this chapter 
is that the inter-level institutionalization is an important combined concept of institutional theory 
and structuration theory. 
Another theoretical framework that is used in this study is derived from Scott’s (2008) 
view of multilevel institutional processes. This view alludes to the interaction and relationship 
between two entities and their larger social environment. While each entity affects one another, 
each entity manages its affair respectively. This view also pinpoints the influence of social 
environment on the activity of each entity. This framework serves as a roadmap for the intra-
level institutionalization. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows: section 3.2 reviews various concepts of 
institutions. Section 3.3 provides a thorough view of institutionalization that is built from 
institutional theory. These two sections contain various conservative perspectives of institutional 
theory as covered in this section, including the background of institution, the notion of 
institutionalization as a social phenomenon, and the variety of institution-related seminal works 
by researchers who have developed or often used institutional theory in their work. These 
include works by W. Richard Scott, Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, Philip Selznick, 
and Stephen Barley. Section 3.4 covers the development of the two theoretical frameworks using 
Barley and Tolbert’s combination of institutional theory and structuration theory, largely based 
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on the structuration usage and legitimacy usage (Björck 2004), and Scott’s multilevel 
institutional processes. This section explains the theoretical frameworks based on inter-level 
perspective of institutionalization and intra-level perspective of institutionalization. Section 3.5 
discusses and proposes the research methodology designed for this study. Section 3.6 concludes 
this chapter. 
  
3.2. A Review of “Institution” 
An abstract view of an institution is that it is a result of ongoing “typification of 
habitualized” actions by social actors (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 54). Such typification, or 
actions that become a habit, is shared among all members of a social system and typifies 
individual actors as well as individual actions in return (Berger and Luckmann 1966). This 
typification is an ongoing process that over time begins to be viewed as rational, and is taken for 
granted, by the members (Scott 2008). The rational view of institutional theory is taken from its 
economic roots (i.e., the rational actor model of organizations) whereby actors seek to achieve 
objectives and perform collective tasks or functions in a certain, regulated manner in a formal 
organization (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Lawrence 2003; Scott 2008). Furthermore, Selznick 
(1969, p. 77) refers to “the emergence of rationality as an attribute of a system.” Another 
conceptual view of institution is that it embodies structural principles as a reproduction of 
societal totalities in a time-space extension (Giddens 1984). Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 145) 
describe institution as “a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property.” 
Several examples of institution are marriage, academic tenure, the contract, wage labor, 
insurance, the motel, the academic discipline, voting, the corporation, the handshake, the army, 
and formal organization. One of the originators of institutional theory terms an institution as: 
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“Multifaceted, durable social structures made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and 
material resources. Institutions exhibit distinctive properties: They are relatively resistant to 
change. They tend to be transmitted across generations, to be maintained and reproduced… 
Institutions exhibit these properties because of the processes set in motion by regulative, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive elements. These elements are the central building blocks of 
institutional structures, providing the elastic fibers that guide behavior and resist change.” 
       W. R. Scott (2008, pp. 48-49) 
 
Such a view of institutions recognizes an important concept: the notion of change 
resilience. Burrell and Morgan (1979) introduce the concepts of “sociology of regulation” and 
“sociology of radical change.” Through conceptualization, institutional theory resents the notion 
of change, and thus enquires into the epistemic and the ontology of maintaining and reproducing 
social order and stability. Such an enquiry characterizes institutional theory as one belonging to 
the sociology of regulation. Despite its nature of resenting change, institutional theory also 
concerns itself with destructuration of an institution, i.e., deinstitutionalization, in which an 
institution begins to lose credibility and experiences change (Scott 2008). Furthermore, the 
foundation of institutional theory rests on the investigation of the impact of social control on 
human activity (Berger and Luckmann 1966). According to Selznick (1969, p. 8), law is required 
to enforce control, and order, and is therefore necessary to encourage “peace, settle disputes, 
suppress deviance.” 
Scott (2008) has developed exhaustive concepts for institutional theory. He contends that 
an institution is created when repetitive, rational actions become internalized by individual social 
actors. He also states that institutions “do not emerge in a vacuum; they always challenge, 
borrow from, and, to varying degrees, replace prior institutions” (Scott 2008, p. 94). He forwards 
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two approaches to studying social facts using institutional theory: one that concerns institutional 
creation and another that deals with institutional change. The study of institutional creation, as 
stated earlier, does not lend itself to the belief of an empty initial state. It rather examines how an 
institution morphs into a new institution as a consequence of ascension from its initial state and 
its contamination with reproduced interactions of beliefs, norms, and organizations within time-
space extension (Giddens 1994; Scott 2008). The study of institutional change, on the other 
hand, looks at “how an existing set of beliefs, norms, and practices comes under attack, 
undergoes de-legitimization, or falls into disuse, to be replaced by new rules, forms, and scripts” 
(Scott 2008, p. 94). There are four types of institutional change (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 
152): 
 Institutional formation: this concept is similar to the one about institutional creation as 
introduced by Scott (1987, 2008). Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 152) moreover provide 
their own definition for institutional formation as “an exit from social entropy, or from 
non-reproductive behavioral patterns, or from reproductive patterns based on ‘action’.” 
 Institutional development (or elaboration): this institutional change represents “a change 
within an institutional form” where the institutional form advances and continues to 
become complex and meaningful. This form is always evolving and nowhere near its 
extinction. 
 Deinstitutionalization: this concept represents the destruction of institutional form, or “an 
exit from institutionalization.” 
 Re-institutionalization: this concept is almost similar to deinstitutionalization, which 
represents an exit from institutionalization. Re-institutionalization, however, depicts an 
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entry into a completely different institutional form, “organized around different principles 
or rules.” 
 
Formal structures are structured social forms that act like a blueprint, for examples offices, 
departments, positions, and programs. These formal structures are similar to those elucidated by 
proponents of structuration, in which formal, or social, structures are shaped by habitualized 
interactions between agency (or actors), rules, and resources (Giddens 1984). Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991) introduce the function of formal structures as myths, which serve to rationalize 
and impersonalize the existence of technical functions of social object and can later be taken for 
granted as functions become regular, everyday guidelines. The notion of “taken-for-granted” 
refers to the fact that formalized, i.e., institutionalized, actions are superficially embedded in any 
social actor’s behavior in organizational contexts, thus becoming embedded in regular behavior 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2008). Furthermore, the notion 
of “taken-for-granted” is viewed as rational by other social actors in a similar organizational 
context and is a requirement for conformity. In other words, with acceptance emerging as a 
regular feature in any institution, legitimacy becomes invisible and imperceptible since social 
actors behave according to prescribed institutionalized procedures. Hence, this concept of 
“taken-for-granted” legitimate procedures, programs, technologies, techniques, or professions  
comes to be perceived as a myth.  
 
3.3. Institutionalization as Social Structuration 
Institutionalization is a social process of creating an institutionalized social structure 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2008). Powell 
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and DiMaggio (1991) state that formal organizations become institutions through 
institutionalization, hence institutionalization is best represented as a particular state or property 
of a social pattern. Powell and DiMaggio specifically define institutionalization as “a 
constraining process that forces units in a population to resemble other units that face the same 
constraints” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 194). Scott (1987) refers to institutionalization as a 
process to instill values beyond the technical requirements of a task over time, and as a process 
of creating social reality, which is independent of any actor’s view and actions but is taken for 
granted. Berger and Luckmann (1966) contend that institutionalization is typification of 
habitualized actions, implying the impact of history and control on activities within an 
institution. History is needed for any institution to be able to reflect on its past records, i.e., to 
reproduce itself in a modified format. Control is required as a method to ensure that an institution 
functions according to its legitimacy. These elements infer the importance of reproduction in any 
institution and that institutionalization reproduces an institution. Powell and DiMaggio (1991) 
introduce four avenues of institutional reproduction: (1) the exercise of power, (2) complex 
interdependencies, (3) “taken-for-granted” assumptions, and (4) path-dependent development 
process. Barley and Tolbert (1997) argue, however, that institutionalization does not depict a 
comprehensive process of institutionalizing formal structure since institutional scholars do not 
empirically denote the creation, alteration, and reproduction of institutions. Essentially, 
institutionalization is not only an institutional process, but also contains property variables (Scott 
2008). 
A key element to institutionalization is the exercise of control. As such, this key element 
bears resemblance to the essence of governance systems, as defined by Scott (2008):  
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“…those arrangements which support the regularized control – whether by regimes created by 
mutual agreement, by legitimized hierarchical authority or by non-legitimate coercive means – of the 
actions of one set of actors by another.” 
W. R. Scott (2008, p. 186) 
 
Borrowing the conceptual view of corporate or information security governance from 
chapter 2, institutionalization indeed requires regulations and authorities which control and 
enforce such regulations. Selznick (1969, p. 254) denotes that “the legitimacy of authority should 
be assured,” meaning that authorities should be clearly defined and are required to act in 
accordance with their scope and “principles of legitimacy.” He also contends that act of 
governance needs to be constrained to the extent of protecting all legal interests. Furthermore, he 
introduces the concept of bureaucratization, which is a result of governance on formal 
organization. Bureaucratization embodies the following characteristics: (1) performance of tasks 
or functions under an explicit purpose, (2) requirement of a determinate organizational hierarchy 
as a chain of command, (3) appointment of and control by officialdom as the designated 
authorities, and (4) governance and administration according to policies and regulations. 
An additional element highlighted in chapter 2 is multilevel governance. Scott (2008) 
introduces multiple levels of institutional processes in formal organizations. Scott (2008) 
enunciates that organizational field pinpoints a locus between individual actors and organizations 
at inter-levels, and between systems of societal and trans-societal actors at intra-levels. The use 
of inter-levels of institutional processes provides “a wider institutional environment within which 
more specific institutional fields and forms exist and operate” (Scott 2008, p. 191). Furthermore, 
this allows for the bidirectional influences among social actors in institutions. Top-down 
processes, e.g., “constitutive activities, diffusion, translation, socialization, imposition, 
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authorization, inducement, and imprinting,” describe the governance, administration, or control 
of authorities (higher stratum) to their subordinates (lower stratum) (Scott 2008, p. 191). On the 
other hand, the bottom-up processes, e.g., “selective attention, interpretation and sense-making, 
identity construction, error, invention, conformity and reproduction of patterns, compromise, 
avoidance, defiance, or manipulation,” depict the opposite effect, i.e., the influence of the lower 
stratum  on the higher stratum (Scott 2008, p. 191). As such, the bidirectional influence that can 
be depicted in a recursive fashion shows an ongoing, cyclical institutional creation, diffusion, 
and reproduction. The recursive manner represents a situation through which institutionalization 
may emerge at multiple levels, with the inner processes denoting the inter-levels and vice versa. 
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Figure 3.1 – Multilevel Institutional Processes: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Processes in Institutional 
Creation and Diffusion (Scott 2008, p. 192) 
 
A distinguishing feature of intra-level institutionalization is the authoritative powers 
possessed by higher-stratum societal institutions. Hall (2008) introduces the relationship between 
institutions and deontic powers and constitutive powers. Hall contends that: 
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“Deontic powers, deriving from the collective assignment of status functions, thereby constitute 
social structures of power relations by generating institutional facts that function as structures that 
generate desire-independent reasons for action.” 
(Hall 2008, p. 50) 
 
Specifically, he denotes that “deontic powers, in the social realm, create social relations of 
power, such as rights, duties, and obligations” (Hall 2008, p. 49). Hall further states that deontic 
power provides trans-societal actors with the ability to exercise authority and certify “states of 
affairs” and assigns them status functions (Smith and Searle 2003; Hall 2008). In other words, 
the authority status functions of certain trans-societal actors having deontic powers provide such 
trans-societal actors with higher authority over their subordinates. In relation to the notion of 
deontic powers and institutions, Smith and Searle (2003, pp. 285-286) highlight the two-level 
ontology of social reality. The lower level refers to the ‘brute’ facts, by which facts can exist 
independently of human beings and their institutions (i.e., observer-independent phenomena), 
while the upper level refers to institutional facts, whereby facts are crafted intentionally by 
human institutions (i.e., observer-dependent phenomena) (Smith and Searle 2003; Hall 2008). 
Institutional facts are composed of two elements: (1) “they are constituted first through collective 
intentionality” (Hall 2008, p. 47), and (2) they emphasize on “assignment of function to an 
object, person, or group which does not intrinsically have that function but acquires it only by 
virtue of the assignment of function” (Hall 2008, p. 48). 
Another aspect of intra-level institutionalization involves the exercise of constitutive 
powers. Larner and Le Heron (2005) imply that constitutive power of institutions is one such 
factor that affects the governance of practices within institutions. Hall (2008) states that while 
deontic power emerges from the collective assignment of status functions, constitutive power is 
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derived from the social relations of constitution. One such example is the institutional power of 
money, arising from financial and economic constitutions, or constitutive rules (Hall 2008). 
Another example by Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999) depicts money as an institution that has an 
impact on how politicians behave in order to achieve their subjective goals. Furthermore, 
constitutive power relations describe how “particular social relations are responsible for 
producing particular kinds of actors” (Hall 2008, p. 84). Therefore, such actors are bestowed 
with the constitutive powers to determine social relations. 
Using their argument of the lack of dynamism  in institutional theory, Barley and Tolbert 
(1997) offer a combination of institutional theory and structuration theory to delineate a more 
dynamic approach to institutionalization. The fundamental concept is the habitualized 
interactions between agency and modalities (e.g., rules and resources). Such habitualized 
interactions become rational and taken for granted (Giddens 1984; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski 
2000; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Walsham 1993; Walsham and Han 1991). These habitualized 
interactions are then institutionalized as actors become familiar with their routine activities in a 
formal organization, characterized by the creation of orderly interactions called a script (Barley 
1986; Barley and Tolbert 1997). The script serves as a link between action (represented by realm 
of action) and institution (represented by institutional realm). 
 
3.3.1. Institutional Realm 
Central to this concept is the resentment of change that is a fundamental characteristic of 
an institution (Scott 2008). Institutional scholars (e.g., Barley 1986; Barley and Tolbert 1997) 
have sought to add the concept of resistance to change to the duality of structure. Thus has 
developed a concept of a dynamic structure that seeks to maintain social order and stability, 
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creating an institutional realm. Institutional realm, or the “realized structure” (Barley 1986), is an 
abstract framework of typifications of habitualized actions (Berger and Luckmann 1966) which 
actors use to make sense of their actions based on their cumulative past experience with their 
actions (Barley 1986; Barley and Tolbert 1997). The three social structures – signification, 
domination, and legitimation – are abstracted within the institutional realm and are continuously 
produced, maintained, and altered. 
There are various interpretations of the institutional realm in relation to social structures. 
Orlikowski (1992) states that institutional properties such as organizational culture and business 
strategy promote the interactions between agency and artifacts (e.g., technology). She denotes 
that institutional properties embody social structures. Furthermore, Barley (1986) and Orlikowski 
(2000) support the notion of continuous production of institutional realm as a result of situated 
action (Barley 1986) and knowledge of an actor’s experience with the use of artifacts 
(Orlikowski 2000). 
As indicated earlier, the institutional realm appears in different aspects. Barley (1986) 
introduces the concept of evolution of structure, taking into account sociologists’ observations of 
organizational differences as a result of structuring processes and the production and 
reproduction of structures as a result of situated action. In her more recent work, Orlikowski 
(2000) presents a recursive structurational use of technology in which an agency draws on the 
knowledge of their past experience with the use of technology and the current situation, the 
resources available to him/her, and the rules that dictate his/her interaction with technology, and 
apply all such modalities to produce the structurational usage. As such, this explanation provides 
positive evidence that structuration theory demonstrates that social processes are continuous 
processes recurring across time and space (Giddens 1984). 
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3.3.2. Realm of Action 
The realm of action is defined as the “actual arrangements of people, objects, and events 
in the minute-by-minute flow of the setting’s history” (Barley 1986) or the “social life’s 
unfolding” (Barley and Tolbert 1997). This realm, also called the “interaction order,” represents 
the continuous interaction between an agency and all three modalities (Barley 1986) in an 
ordered manner (Orlikowski 2000). Modalities, particularly artifacts and regulations, are the 
agency’s creation and become meaningful only through their interaction with the agency 
(Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski 2000). The social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann 
1966) denotes an instance of meaningful use of modalities when these modalities are used by the 
agency in an ordered manner (Orlikowski 1992). The ongoing use of artifacts (e.g., technology) 
may create different patterns of structured use of artifacts as the agency interacts with different 
artifacts (Orlikowski 2000). 
 
3.4. Theoretical Framework 
This section seeks to encapsulate and synthesize concepts presented in previous chapters. 
The objective is to construct frameworks that will guide observations and organize findings. 
There are four assumptions as to how social scientists approach their subjects: ontology, 
epistemology, human nature, and methodology (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Lee 2004). As  stated 
in the previous sections, the theoretical framework borrows the nomalism view of ontological 
stance. This is due to the nature of social construction of reality which social scientists need to 
internalize, meaning that a social scientist is expected to understand his subjects by diving into 
the mind of his subjects (Schutz 1962-66; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Burrell and Morgan 
1979). By doing so, the social scientist is able to conclude that no behavior is irrational and that 
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certain circumstances lead to certain behavior. A major distinction between positivism and 
interpretivism is that the former ignores the fact that human subjects have the ability to 
communicate. 
The institutional theory, including one that is combined with elements borrowed from 
structuration theory, embodies all such assumptions of interpretive social science. It is the 
combination that appropriates the use of interpretive scheme, since structuration theory involves 
the communicative interaction among subjects; a property captured only by using the interpretive 
scheme (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984). The combination introduced by Barley and 
Tolbert (1997) is primarily used to model the inter-level institutionalization. The multilevel-
institutional-processes framework by Scott (2008) used for the intra-level institutionalization is 
appropriate to delineate relationships between institutions and a central governing body in 
governing and implementing information security.  
The use of institutional theory also best represents the situational illustration of 
information security practices in organizations. The information security practices in 
organizations involve maintaining the integrity of three dimensions of information security: 
technical controls (i.e., technological aspects such as hardware and software as well as technical 
aspects such as encryption), formal controls (i.e., management, governance, and control of 
information security practices), and informal controls (i.e., socializing security practices and 
increasing security awareness such as training and education programs) (Dhillon 2007). 
Technical-controls dimension alone does not suffice to maintain effective and efficient 
information security practices (Blakley et al. 2001; Dhillon 2007). Furthermore, maintaining the 
integrity of these three dimensions involves the use of various social actors; hence depicting the 
institutionalization of information security in organizations (Dhillon 2007). 
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3.4.1. The Inter Level: A Structuration View of Institutionalization 
The lower-stratum institutionalization, henceforth termed as inter-level institutionalization, 
is constructed using elements of structuration theory, particularly the “duality of structure” 
(Giddens 1984, p. 25). Researchers explain the duality of structure as a manifestation of synergic 
relationship between agency and structures, whereby social structures are produced and 
continuously reproduced by human actions and interactions, and as such become a routine that is 
taken for granted (Giddens 1984; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Orlikowski 2000; 
Walsham and Han 1991; Walsham 1993). The use of institutional theory in conjunction with 
structuration theory provides social scientists with dynamic, recursive and iterative production 
and reproduction of institutions (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Structuration theorists and 
researchers have also lent the concept of “institutional realm” to the social structure, with the 
addition of the concept of resistance to change (Barley and Tolbert 1997, p. 97; Giddens 1984; 
Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Scott 2008).  These researchers contend that human 
interaction with technology creates institutional properties of structured technological practices 
(Barley and Tolbert 1997; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Orlikowski 2000). 
The general picture of structuration begins with the duality of structure. Giddens (1984), 
Walsham and Han (1991), and Walsham (1993) state the importance of power when illustrating 
structuration. Studies have demonstrated that deontic power, constitutive power, and facilitative 
power are an appropriate concept to explain status functions and social relations of constitution, 
for instance in banking-sector context (Smith and Searle 2003; Larner and Le Heron 2005; Hall 
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2008). Constitutive power has been shown to be an exclusive property of central bank due to its 
governance functionality and its impact on constitution (Larner and Le Heron 2005; Hall 2008). 
Moreover, the notion of resources or artifacts has widely been espoused by structuration 
scholars. Such notion is essentially in context of IT artifacts, represented by the view that IT, 
e.g., hardware and software, is an object that is manufactured, used, or modified by humans 
(Orlikowski and Iacono 2001). In this sense, the technical-control dimension of organizational 
information security can be considered as being that of the information security artifacts. This 
view is enhanced using the notion of exploring beyond the “technical means of protecting 
information resources” (Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2006). In support of this artifact notion, 
Orlikowski (1992) has maintained that technology is created by an agency, but is dynamic since 
the structure of technology is repeatedly created through the routine use of technology. 
Social structures, associated with the property of change resistance, create an institutional 
realm. Enmeshing information security artifacts, deontic and constitutive powers, and risk 
policies and regulations in the structuration context creates an institutional realm of structured 
information security practices in institutions. The structuring of information security practices in 
each institution therefore experiences continuous production and reproduction. The institutional 
process that includes exercising control, i.e., institutionalization, in the inter level is conducted 
by the agency that directly structures information security practices in a particular institution. 
Moreover, in a lower stratum institution, agency’s actions and interactions may be affected (i.e., 
governed and controlled) by higher-stratum agency’s sanctioning. This level borrows the 
structuration view of institutional theory (Björck 2004) and is constructed by combining 
institutional theory and structuration theory. 
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The theoretical framework for the inter-level institutionalization is largely built upon the 
concept of duality of structure. Taking into account the approach introduced by Barley and 
Tolbert (1997), however, causes some modifications to the traditional concept of duality of 
structure. Barley and Tolbert (1997) develop a combination of structuration theory and 
institutional theory to model an institutionalization of habitualized actions. This model embraces 
the institutional realm and the realm of action, and proposes recursive instances of an 
institutionalized structure. The recursive instances depicting the social structure reflect an 
attempt to maintain stability or social order (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Each episode of 
institutionalization depicts a unique structure affected by certain phenomena or a particular 
incident (e.g., security breach). Barley (1986) terms the episodic institutionalization as the 
evolution of structure. The model hence produces a series of information security 
institutionalizations involving a script for each episode, serving to support the recursive 
institutionalization. The script is characterized as the “observable, recurrent activities and 
patterns of interaction characteristics of a particular setting” (Barley and Tolbert 1997, p. 98). 
The script, however, should not be regarded as one of the three modalities as in the original 
structuration theory. This is because a modality is a tool that is used by the agency or is used to 
support the interaction between an agency and other modalities. 
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Figure 3.2 - Inter-level Institutional of Information Security Governance Using Barley’s Model of 
Institutionalization (1986) 
 
Figure 3.2 depicts the institutionalization episodes as described by Barley and Tolbert. The 
model introduces two general streams of institutionalization: the effects of action on structure 
and the effect of institutional constraints upon action. Each stream constitutes two processes that 
shape either action or structure. The processes corresponding to the institutional constraints on 
action involve the process of encoding principles in the script in a specific episode (see arrows a, 
e, and i) and the process of enactment of the principles in the script by actors (see arrows b, f, 
and j). Script encoding refers to the moment when policies and regulations are successfully 
Legend: 
 Script encoding: a, 
e, i. 
 Principles 
enactment: b, f, j. 
 Script revision and 
replication: e, g, k. 
 Patterned-actions 
objectification and 
externalization: d, h, 
l. 
 T1, T2, or T3: a 
distinct episode of 
security 
institutionalization. 
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formulated and begin to be adopted in a formal organization, while principles enactment entails 
social actors beginning to realize and accept such policies and regulations that guide actors’ 
behavior. The other processes (i.e., those that correspond to the effects of action on structure) 
include the process of script revision or script replication (see arrows c, g, and k) and the process 
of “objectification”1 and externalization of patterned actions (see arrows d, h, and l). Script 
revision and script replication explain the moment when scripted behavior is replicated in the 
institutional abstraction. However, this process can also be used to explain the moment when 
policies and regulations that have been successfully adopted are revised after a negative incident. 
Patterned-behavior objectification and externalization denote the moment when both the 
regulatory aspect and behavioral aspect in a formal organization becomes successfully 
implemented and habitualized. As shown in figure 3.2, each box depicts an episode of 
institutionalization. Arrow a and arrow b in the left box (episode T1) is similar to arrow e and 
arrow f in the middle box (episode T2) and arrow i and arrow j in the right box (episode T3). 
These arrows are diagonal arrows that describe how the institutionalized structure directs and 
controls the agency’s action (represented by the realm of action). The vertical arrows (arrow c 
and arrow d in episode T1, arrow g and arrow h in episode T2, or arrow k and arrow l in episode 
T3) describe the agency’s actions that institutionalize social structure (represented by the 
institutional realm). The episodes may be infinite since institutions are always evolving after they 
come into existence, are always being challenged, and hence keep on changing their facets. Each 
transition between two episodes (e.g., a transition between T1 and T2) signifies an institutional 
change (e.g., institutional development or re-institutionalization). Such institutional change can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Barley (1986) and Barley and Tolbert (1997) introduce the notion of objectification to demonstrate how patterned 
actions become an abstract entity (i.e., principles) that occupies the institutional realm. 
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be triggered by an exogenous event (e.g., technological change or security breach), an 
endogenous event (e.g., implementation of new rules and standards), or a combination of both 
exogenous and endogenous events (e.g., security breach that prompts the central bank to create 
new guidelines for new security policies). 
 
3.4.2. The Intra Level: Macro-Prudential Supervision of Information Security Practices 
Figure 3.3 shows the holistic information security governance in banking sector, henceforth 
termed as the information security macro-prudential supervision. This framework depicts the 
practices of information security governance in separate institutions, centrally governed by one 
institution as the higher authority (i.e., the central bank). The framework in figure 3.1 can be 
seen to represent a component of this holistic theoretical framework. Such a framework shows 
that each institution structures its own information security practices. The central bank, however, 
possesses powers (deontic, constitutive, and facilitative powers), which enable the central bank 
to govern and control commercial banks. This action represents the top-down process of 
institutional creation and diffusion (i.e., institutional process (Scott 2008)). Hence, the central 
bank possesses the authority to govern and control security practices of commercial banks. 
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Figure 3.3 – The Macro-Prudential Supervision of Information Security Governance in Banking Sector 
(Reproduction of Scott’s Model of Multilevel Institutional Processes (2008)) 
 
Commercial banks reciprocate the conformity governed by the central bank through 
policies and regulations. Commercial banks are also required to report information security 
governance and practices, directed internally by each commercial bank’s institutional 
management (e.g., board of directors, senior executives, steering committee, and CISO). This 
action represents the bottom-up process of institutional process (Scott 2008). As such, in this 
context, institutions affect one another via their agency. In other words, the intra level of 
institutional process involves interactions among agencies of institutions. This level assumes the 
legitimacy view of institutional theory (Björck 2004).  
Therefore, both processes affect the structuration of information security practices in each 
institution, whereby each institution sanctions and informs security practices in two directions 
(i.e., between higher-stratum institution and a lower-stratum institution). The institutionalization 
of two-level information security governance presented in this framework mimics the multilevel 
institutional processes. 
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3.5. Research Design 
Research activity is socially constructed and is approved and conducted by scientists and 
scientists are instruments of their research activity, i.e., observation (Berger and Luckmann 1966; 
Lee 1999). The methodology is designed to influence research activity by providing guidance 
using theoretical framework. This study uses the interpretive case-study research since the use of 
structuration theory that supports the institutional theory involves communicative interactions 
among respondents (i.e., subjects). Such interactions can only be captured using the interpretive 
scheme (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Giddens 1984). The interpretive scheme of research 
methodology requires that such methodology begin “from the position that our knowledge of 
reality, including the domain of human action, is a social construction by human actors” 
(Walsham 2006, p. 320). To preserve the interpretive nature, this study therefore incorporates a 
case-study research in the tradition of Walsham (1993; 1995) and Eisenhardt (1989). 
The unit of analysis for this study is the banking sector in Indonesia. Three institutions 
have been observed for this study. The first institution is the nation’s central bank. The other two 
institutions are large commercial banks. These banks are selected due to their great influence on 
the nation’s economic welfare. The first bank, Centro Metropolitan Bank, is a large government-
owned commercial bank that is known for its substantial assets, loans, and deposits. The second 
bank, Blue Sequoia Bank, is the nation’s largest private commercial bank that owns a large 
number of ATM machines distributed in almost every geographical region in Indonesia. Data 
collection is performed in the respondents’ natural setting. While there are various data 
collection methods for case study research, this study uses interviews as its main data source. 
The interviews involved approximately 30 respondents, ranging from an entry-level analyst to a 
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senior executive. There are 18 respondents from the Earl Capita Bank, 8 respondents from 
Centro Metropolitan Bank, and 4 respondents from Blue Sequoia Bank.  
In a case study research, building theories from case studies involves a “frequent overlap of 
data analysis with data collection” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 538). Such an overlap provides flexible 
data collection and allows for a head start in analysis. While the primary source of data is 
interviews, other sources include secondary materials such as pamphlets as in the case of Blue 
Sequoia Bank and magazines, which are supporting materials to analyze the Centro-
Metropolitan-Bank case. Interviews are tape recorded and transcribed to provide easier analysis 
of patterns and categories (e.g., reputational risk, security policies, institutional relationship). 
Since interviews are tape recorded, interviews are semi structured and open ended to allow for 
casualty and flexibility in probing respondents. Translations are derived from the transcription. 
Analysis of patterns and recognitions as well as theory building is developed from the 
translations.  
Data analysis in interpretive scheme, however, is not expected to attend to issues of 
generalizability. This is due to the ideographical nature of its methodological stance, as opposed 
to the nomothetical view of positivist scheme. Nomothetical view dictates the necessity of 
controlling formal procedures and provides evidence of “formal propositions, quantifiable 
measures of variables, hypothesis testing, and the drawing of inferences about a phenomenon 
from a representative sample to a stated population” (Klein and Myers 1999, p. 69; Orlikowski 
and Baroudi 1991). Furthermore, positivism has dictated the use of “certain criteria of validity, 
rigor, and replicability in the conduct of scientific research” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p. 
12). Such positivist features are clearly distinct from those of an interpretive scheme as adopted 
for this study. According to Lee and Baskerville (2003), a theory conducted as an interpretive 
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based study in a single setting is valid by the nature of interpretive scheme and can be applied to 
other settings. Therefore, generalizability in interpretive scheme can be achieved by applying the 
theory that has been confirmed in one setting to descriptions of other settings (Lee and 
Baskerville 2003, p. 233). 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter seeks to explore and build theoretical frameworks and to develop a research 
design for this study. The social phenomena under investigation are essential for achieving social 
order, and instrumental in determining the consequences of not doing so. Drawing on the 
elements of information security governance, institutional theory has been found suitable for use 
in modeling the conceptual framework of this study. Björck (2004) denotes that 
institutionalization can be used to “explain why formal security structures and actual security 
behavior differs” (Björck 2004, p. 5). Several similarly important elements between institutional 
theory and information security governance include the intentness of authorities, governance, 
and regulations.  
Since this study uses theoretical frameworks that mandate communicative interactions 
among respondents, the interpretive case-study research is selected to capture such interactions. 
Research in information systems and security has demonstrated the wide use of institutional 
theory for capturing structuration and legitimacy issues. The next three chapters cover case 
studies of the three banking institutions, beginning with the central bank case study. 
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4  THE CASE OF EARL CAPITA BANK 
 
 
4.1. Overview 
The objective of this chapter is to present a thorough analysis of the nature of 
information security governance in Earl Capita Bank. Earl Capita Bank., the highest 
authority in banking sector, alludes to the fact that no other institution in the sector directs 
and controls the institutionalization of information security in Earl Capita Bank. The 
initiative comes within the purview of the institution’s community itself, which in this 
case are the Earl Capita Bank’s personnel. The institutional instances of information 
security governance are examined from the internal perspective and also in terms of the 
institutional relationship that exists between the central bank and commercial banks in 
general. The case study concerning the internal practice is organized according to the 
model introduced by Barley and Tolbert (1997) to delineate the institutionalization of 
information security. Four processes are identified as the themes for the case study: the 
script encoding, the principles enactment, the script revision and replication, and the 
patterned actions objectification and externalization.  
Section 4.2 describes the nature and characteristics of Earl Capita Bank as the 
nation’s central bank. This section details the institution in terms of its position as a 
central bank, its historical background, and its organizational structure. Section 4.3 
presents the empirical analysis for the Earl Capita Bank case. This section contains the 
following subsections: the internal security practices that define the micro-level 
institutionalization of information security governance within Earl Capita Bank, and the 
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Earl Capita Bank’s relationship with commercial banks by employing the macro-
prudential supervision of information security governance. This section also provides a 
discussion at the end of each subsection. Section 4.4 concludes this chapter. 
 
4.2. Organizational Background 
4.2.1. Earl Capita Bank as the Central Bank 
As the Central Bank of Indonesia, Earl Capita Bank’s primary objective is to 
achieve and maintain the stability of the nation’s currency. In 2004, Earl Capita Bank 
became an independent state institution and consequently free from influences and 
interferences by all external parties, including the government. In support of such a 
statement, Schooner and Taylor (2009) and Ullrich (2007) denote that a Central Bank 
needs to be independent of political control so that it can be free to determine interest 
rates. As such, Earl Capita Bank possesses the autonomy to fully formulate and 
implement its authority as a deontic monetary institution. This is because as an 
institution, it manifests power that arises from a specific form of constitution, distinct 
from other financial institutions (Hall 2008). Furthermore, Earl Capita Bank has the 
authority to issue policy rules and regulations as a public legal entity, meaning that it 
possesses constitutive power because of its deontic status (Hall 2008).  Consequently, as 
a civil legal entity, the bank also has the right to represent itself in and outside a court of 
law. 
In order to achieve the above mentioned objectives, while maintaining its right and 
authority as a legal institution, Earl Capita Bank is obligated to upholding the principles 
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of accountability and transparency in implementing its duties, authorities, and budget.1 
Given such obligations, Earl Capita Bank has to maintain information symmetry between 
public, government, and commercial banks. The dilemma lies in the provision of 
information, which in the Earl Capita Bank is expected to be handled and disseminated as 
is done in all financial institutions. Information security breach, however, may negatively 
impact institutional reputation and even harm the nation’s economic stability. In addition, 
Earl Capita Bank, as a premier authoritative institution, realizes the need to protect and 
preserve its own information. In doing so, Earl Capita Bank maintains judicious internal 
information security and supervises the governance of information security in other 
commercial banks. 
 
4.2.2. History of Earl Capita Bank 
The history of Earl Capita Bank can be divided into two eras: the colonial and post 
independence era and the reformation era. The colonial era of Earl Capita Bank can be 
traced back to the founding of De Javasche Bank by the Dutch East Indies government in 
1828.2 The bank was developed for circulating and issuing currency. Despite this 
seemingly crucial function, the bank was merely operating as a commercial bank. It 
continued to operate until the colonial Dutch government transferred sovereignty to 
Indonesia in 1949. In 1953, it was nationalized (post independence era) as the Republic 
of Indonesia’s circulation bank3. In 1953, the government of Indonesia passed the Act of 
Earl Capita Bank and declared the establishment of Earl Capita Bank and endowed it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Source: http://www.bi.go.id/web/en/Tentang+BI/Fungsi+Bank+Indonesia/Akuntabilitas/ 
2 Source: http://www.bi.go.id/NR/rdonlyres/FC7439FE-0C50-44F1-A042-
2CFB6FE5CA43/18316/07_sejarah_rev1.pdf 
3 Source: http://www.papermoney-indonesia.com/de-javasche-bank-1828-1953-still-under-construction/ 
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with the additional central bank status held previously by the De Javasche Bank. In 
addition to being a commercial bank, the newly founded Central Bank performed the 
following functions: monetary, banking, and the payment system. The bank also held 
supplementary duties in relation to the government. In 1968, the government passed the 
Act of Central Bank, detailing the status and functions of Earl Capita Bank as a Central 
Bank and hence abolishing the bank’s previously commercial bank status. In addition to 
the aforementioned three core tasks of a central bank, Earl Capita Bank provided 
assistance to the government, functioning as a development agency supporting real sector 
productivity and developing and creating employment opportunities aimed at public 
welfare. 
After the downfall of the new era regime and the rise of the reformation era, Act 
No. 23/1999, which concerns Earl Capita Bank, restated the objective of Earl Capita 
Bank yet again as one aimed at achieving and maintaining the stability of the nation’s 
currency. In 2004, the government issued act concerning Earl Capita Bank was amended 
to place more emphasis on critical aspects of the bank’s mandated tasks and authorities, 
including the strengthening of its governance. In 2008, the government issued another 
regulation in lieu of law No. 2 of 2008 concerning the second amendment of Act No.23 
of 1999, which identified Earl Capita Bank as a part of the efforts to maintain financial 
system stability. The amendment was designed to strengthen the resilience of Indonesian 
national banks in facing the global financial crisis by improving any bank’s access to the 
Short-Term Funding Facility provided by Earl Capita Bank. 
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4.2.3. Organization Structure 
Earl Capita Bank is managed by a Board of Governors; led by a Governor who is 
assisted by a Senior Deputy Governor (Vice Governor) and several Deputy Governors. 
The Board of Governors oversees the directors of the main sectors: Monetary, Banking, 
Payment System, and Internal Management. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 – The Higher-Level  Organization Chart of Earl Capita Bank 
 
Each main sector consists of several departments and each department is managed 
by a director. Departments under the monetary sector mostly deal with tasks of 
controlling money supply and interest rates. Hence these departments do not deal directly 
with commercial banks and financial institutions. The departments under the Banking 
sector and Payment System sector deal mostly with commercial banks and financial 
institutions. The Internal Management sector includes departments that manage the 
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operability of Earl Capita Bank. The respondents for this dissertation are personnel of 
departments other than the monetary sector. 
The internal security practices of Earl Capita Bank include the provision  of the 
information-security governance practice which is overseen by departments that handle 
information processing and technology within the institution. These departments, namely 
the Information Technology Department and the Information Management Division, are 
divisions of the Internal Management Sector. 
Internally, each department of Earl Capita Bank attempts to safeguard access to its 
information according to unique regulations and cultures prevalent within that particular 
department. Each department maintains and regulates its own information systems where 
as the Information Technology Department manages the technical maintenance for these 
information systems. In the past, each department possessed absolute authority over the 
control and use of information extracted from its own information systems, including the 
electronic data warehouses installed in each department. In 2002, Earl Capita Bank 
established the Information Management Division to oversee the manipulation and 
distribution of information within Earl Capita Bank and from Earl Capita Bank to 
external parties. However, internal departments still reserve the right and authority for 
information access and manipulation of such information within their own departments. 
In other words, each department is the sole administrator of its applications, whereas the 
Information Technology Department is the administrator of systems databases and 
networks. The Senior Analyst at the information management division states that: 
“Our campaign is to raise awareness across the bank that any particular department 
doesn’t own information. Information belongs to the bank. And raising this awareness is 
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very hard work for us since this practice has been established for a long time and has 
become an institutional norm. It’s very difficult to change.” 
 
          Security Policies and Supervision 
 
Figure 4.2 – A Partial View of the Internal Governance of Information Use and Security 
 
The roots of internal governance of information, its use and security within Earl 
Capita Bank are embedded in the Information Technology Department and the 
Information Management Division. The internal governance includes the formulation of 
regulations and policies as well as the supervision and enforcement of regulations and 
policy. The Information Technology Department oversees the technical control of 
information security while the Information Management Division supervises the formal 
control of information security. Both departments, however, create and supervise the 
informal control of information security by educating employees and raising their 
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awareness levels about the importance of information security4. For instance, the 
Information Technology Department does so by distributing flyers which describe the 
dangers of password cracking while the information management division reminds 
personnel of the importance of information security by holding seminars on newly 
developed software packages.  Correspondingly, the Information Technology Department 
manages the password control while the Information Division Management determines 
which information is considered confidential and unsuitable for sharing with the public. 
Despite the demarked responsibilities of formal control and technical control between 
these two departments, Earl Capita Bank also maintains the three information-security 
controls: technical, formal, and informal (Dhillon and Moores 2001; Dhillon 2007). The 
implementation detail of governance practice varies within each department and is 
dependent on each department’s culture and functionalities. 
 
4.3. Empirical Analysis 
This section contains a case study that is organized according to two objectives: 
Inter- Institutionalization and Intra-Institutionalization. The Inter Institutionalization 
adopts the Barley and Tolbert’s Model Of Institutionalization. Institutionalization 
comprises of four processes: the process of encoding principles in the script in a specific 
episode (or script encoding), the process of enactment of the principles in the script by 
agency (or principles enactment), the process of script revision or replication (or script 
revision and script replication), and the process of objectification and externalization of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Both departments share the same responsibility for enforcing the informal control of information security 
in addition to their primary roles within the institution. This statement is based on the author’s deduction. 
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patterned actions (or patterned-actions objectification and externalization). The Intra 
Institutionalization borrows Scott’s Model of Institutional Creation and Diffusion. 
 
4.3.1. Inter-Level Institutional of Information Security Governance 
4.3.1.1. Script Encoding: As the premier authoritative institution, Earl Capita 
Bank’s main concern is its reputation. Even a minor information-security breach can 
destroy the institution’s credibility, leading to financial chaos and even political 
instability. The Head of Risk Management Team says: 
“As a public institution, we are expected to be transparent. However, there are some rules 
of the game, specifically the rules regarding information disclosure. Whether or not it is 
confidential, information, especially about policies, if disclosed before formal approval or 
leaked out can lead to information asymmetry in the financial market. Some market 
players who feel they have never received the ‘disclosed’ information may think that we 
have favorites as regards providing information. This can disrupt the market and damage 
our reputation by leading to our being perceived as unfair and unprofessional. This is one 
of the major downsides of information leak.” 
 
To preserve confidentiality of its information, Earl Capita Bank formulates 
regulations and supervises compliance concerning the production and dissemination of 
information within itself and to external parties. Security issues in an organization are 
often recognized when a security breach occurs (Bodin et al. 2008; Gordon et al. 2003) or 
when security risks are acknowledged. The Risk Management Team assists other 
departments in identifying risks. The Head of Risk Management Team explains such 
assistance as follows: 
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“Departments know exactly what they need. Every three months, departments submit a 
report of risks profile through an integrated system. They indicate the types, events, 
incidents, and measurement, indicating whether a risk is low, moderate, or high. If a risk 
is indicated to be high, or red, then the department needs to devise a mitigation plan. 
Especially for prospective risks, the mitigation plan is absolutely required. For example, 
the Information Management Division would want to submit to us a risk profile regarding 
information risk and create a mitigation plan.” 
 
Once the risk profile and the mitigation plan have been created and submitted, the 
department in charge manages and oversees the risks mitigation. It has been indicated 
that information risk is the responsibility of the Information Technology Department and 
the Information Management Division. The existence of the Information Management 
Division, however, is disrupted by authority issues, despite its relatively strong and 
equitable position vis` a vis` other departments. This division is regarded as the stepchild 
in the institution. One of the Information Management Division’s major tasks is the 
creation of an information-confidentiality category, with the highest rating (top 
confidential) to be accessed only by the Board of Governors and executive directors. The 
lowest category is for public consumption such as information posted on the institution’s 
homepage. The Information Management Division hence views information security as a 
users’ issue. Such categorization is regulated and communicated to users of all other 
departments within Earl Capita Bank. Other departments identify the category and apply 
it to the hardcopy and electronic documents they are producing. Any violation of the 
security of these documents is considered a felony and the penalties, regulated and 
enforced by the Human Resource Department, may include work termination and 
incarceration. 
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The division, however, has little power to convince departments to integrate their 
data; hence centralizing information is a difficult task. Despite the uniform security 
policies, the implementation and the enforcement of the policies varies amongst 
departments, partially attributable to the data ownership issue. The success achieved by 
the division is apparent in the formulation of the Board of Governors Regulation of 
Information Management in Earl Capita Bank.  Senior Analyst at the Information 
Management Division elucidates: 
“According to the Board of Governors Regulation of Information Management in Earl 
Capita Bank, information is stated not to belong solely to a department or to a division. 
This was because during the 1999 transformation program, many still considered 
information to be his or her power domain. During the financial crisis, the governor 
would announce the currency rate early in the morning and suddenly the senior governor 
deputy would announce a different rate at mid morning due to their sources being from 
different departments. We then stated that information belongs to Earl Capita Bank only. 
Basically, we aim to change each department’s perception regarding data ownership.” 
 
As described earlier, a departmental request to another department for sharing its 
data and information is relatively difficult to accommodate due to the issue of data 
ownership. Each department behaves like a kingdom and assumes full authority to 
determine what part of the information under its control can be distributed to other 
departments, to personnel of other departments, and even to the public5. Surprisingly, 
there is a distinct possibility that there could be an instance or occasion when a document 
may be pronounced top confidential by a department but is treated as belonging to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This statement is based on the author’s deduction after several interviews with the respondents from the 
information management division. 
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lower confidentiality bracket by another department, depending on its usage purpose. The 
Information Management Division merely watches over how the confidentiality category 
is implemented but does not have the power to determine the detail and implementation 
of any category. Although this information management division has seen limited 
success, Earl Capita Bank is beginning to witness centralized information usage and 
centralized information confidentiality management directed by the Information 
Management Division. 
Current practice denotes that the Information Management Division manages how 
information should be used, whereas the Information Technology Department maintains 
devices by which information is processed and used. The other departments reserve the 
right to use and distribute this information. The Information Technology Department has 
full authority over the implementation and maintenance of technology in Earl Capita 
Bank. The department regards information security as an issue that is strongly related to 
those in hardware and software. The department enforces office-hour access to websites, 
for instance, by not allowing employees to access social-network websites during office 
hours. It conducts password maintenance, upgrades antivirus software and firewall 
applications, etc. The department also initiates disaster recovery and business continuity 
plans. In essence, both departments also educate personnel of the other departments of 
the importance of information security and attempt to raise their awareness. The Head of  
Information Technology Department expresses that: 
“The business continuity plan (BCP) that we designed is probably one of the exemplary 
BCPs in the nation. We take pride in our BCP despite the fact that our disaster recovery 
center is located in the same geographical area as our headquarters.” 
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 The formulation of policies and regulations directing the secured use of 
information asset signifies the dual centralized authority, equally divided between the 
Information Management Division and the Information Technology Department. The 
difference, however, is that the sole authority to formulate policies and regulations 
regarding the use of software and hardware is with the Information Technology 
Department while the authority to use that information is with the Information 
Management Division. 
 
4.3.1.2. Principles Enactment: Information usage is interpreted and implemented 
according to their own discretion by departments and varies according to each 
department’s goal and functionalities within Earl Capita Bank. Departments also interpret 
and apply various confidentiality categories to their information assets.  The 
interpretation process creates an institutional structure by which departments within Earl 
Capita Bank recognize the need to attach different levels of confidentiality of their 
information asset, hence safeguarding their top confidential information which is to be 
consumed only by the Board of Governors and executive directors. Despite such 
variations, the goal of the information management division is ultimately achieved: which 
is to have each department classify, mark, and safeguard its electronic and hardcopy 
information. 
Designating departments to manage their own data and information creates a notion 
of information stewardship. Information stewardship allows departments to own and 
manage their own data warehouses with a sense of departmental ownership. While Earl 
Capita Bank in a larger context owns an Electronic Data Warehouse (EDW) managed by 
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the Information Management Division, other smaller data warehouses are distributed to 
departments to house information systems that may serve as links to external parties (e.g., 
commercial banks and financial institutions). According to an Analyst of the Information 
Management Division: 
“About information stewardship, this functionality is given to each department that owns 
and operates information systems in Earl Capita Bank. Each department selects a person 
responsible as the information steward. This person manages data and chooses which 
data to share with selected people outside the department.” 
  
In addition to managing their own data and information, departments own the right 
to operate their information systems as part of their information-stewardship 
functionality. Some of these information systems, which are the institution’s most critical 
systems, include: 
 The LHBU (“Laporan Harian Bank Umum” or “Commercial Bank Daily 
Report”) system, which is owned by several departments. The ownership depends 
on the usage context; for example: the Accounting and Payment System 
Department oversees the electronic-payment report of the LHBU system. 
 The RTGS (“Real-Time Gross Settlement”) system, which are co-owned by the 
Accounting and Payment System Department and the Information Management 
Division. 
 The SID (“Sistem Informasi Debitur” or “Debitor Information System”) system, 
which is exclusively owned by the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking 
Information. 
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 The SIMWAS (“Sistem Informasi Manajemen Pengawasan” or “Supervision 
Information Management System”), which is exclusively owned by the 
Directorate Of Bank Licensing and Banking Information. 
  The SOSA (“Sentralisasi Otomasi Sistem Akunting” or “Centralized Automated 
Accounting System”) system, which is exclusively owned by the Accounting And 
Payment System Department. 
 The SKN (“Sistem Kliring Nasional” or “National Clearance System”) system, 
which is co-owned by the Accounting and Payment System Department and the 
Directorate of Banking Research and Regulation. 
 
Information stewardship can be used to grant partial access to data and information 
to external users of the departments. These external users are Earl Capita Bank’s 
personnel, commercial banks, and financial institutions. The procedure for external users 
to obtain data and information is, as stated by an Analyst of the Directorate of Bank 
Licensing and Banking Information as follows: 
“If there are external users wishing to access data and information from systems that we 
administer, they simply need to come to us. The procedure they need to follow is a formal 
one regardless of whether they are Earl Capita Bank’s staff. They need to create a memo 
and send us this memo, informing us of their intention to use our information systems, 
stating their affiliation, which data or information they need to use, and the purpose of 
using our systems, data, or information. We will decide whether to grant them access to 
our systems, data, and information. And if granted, we will request user names and 
passwords to be created for them. The role and privilege are limited according to their 
needs and we monitor how they use our systems.” 
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This seemingly intricate procedure to obtain access to a department’s information 
systems as well as their content boosts the security of these systems. The implementation 
of data ownership seems to create a sense of power on one hand and security on the other 
hand. This concept affects not only selected individuals that can interact with the 
systems, but also imposes a restriction on the interactions and how these interactions are 
practiced. The Analyst of the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking Information 
further confirms the security effect of such a procedure: 
“As far as I’m concerned, there has never been any record of a breach of our systems and 
those of the other departments. There has also been no record indicating the misuse of our 
data and information, or even of those across Earl Capita Bank.” 
 
Despite such selectivity and monitoring practices, departments do not hold the 
capacity to create usernames and passwords. The creation of usernames and passwords 
belongs to the Information Technology Department. The Information Technology 
Department possesses the sole authority to formulate policies and regulations regarding 
the use of usernames and passwords and to supervise such usage. The Senior IT 
Researcher reaffirms such authority: 
“Based on the legislation by the Board of Governors, the IT department holds the full 
authority to govern the internal IT systems of Earl Capita Bank. This also includes sole 
authority to govern the security of IT systems and the disaster recovery plan of Earl 
Capita Bank.” 
 
The seemingly rigorous selectivity and monitoring practices, however, do not seem 
to cause the same restrictive effect on internal personnel of the owner department. 
However, the procedure and regulation tightly restrict external users’ access to systems, 
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data, and information of each department. With regard to the procedure and regulation, 
the Analyst of the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking Information states that: 
“We have to make a formal request to access permission if we want to use a system that 
belongs to any other department. The same procedure is followed by other departments if 
they want to get access to our systems. We also need to request permission to use and 
analyze data and information processed by other departments. Let’s say, we request a 
permission to view the electronic-payment report of the LHBU system. For that, we need 
to create and send a memo to the accounting and payment system department before they 
can order the IT department to grant us the permission to view the report.” 
 
Any data and information transmission or use of information systems other than 
those regulated or proposed through the information steward is considered a felony, the 
impact of which can jeopardize the personnel’s career and can even lead to fine and 
incarceration. Once there is a violation of the use of the institution’s asset or properties by 
personnel, the matter is handed over to the Human Resource Department and the penalty 
is imposed according to the severity of the impact caused by the misconduct. The Senior 
IT Researcher states that: 
“We regard our information technologies, data, and information as our asset and 
property. We regulate the conduct and the use of our systems. For example, we create a 
firewall that also controls which websites our personnel can access during office hours. 
We block websites such as porn sites and even Facebook and Twitter. So basically we 
hope that they access only websites relevant to their work and don’t waste their 
productive hours by browsing around cyberspace. Any staff member who manages to get 
away with this and gets caught later on will be handed over to the Human Resource 
Department and will be charged accordingly. Thank goodness there hasn’t been any such 
incident in recent years.” 
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The issue that now arises is whether the same procedures and regulations apply to 
external users that are not personnel of Earl Capita Bank. The procedure and regulations 
are enforced for access to Earl Capita Bank’s information systems as well as its data and 
information content if their confidentiality category is not categorized as public data and 
information (example of public data is the information content on the Earl Capita Bank’s 
official website). Individuals, commercial banks, or financial institutions wishing to get 
access to Earl Capita Bank’s information systems need to request a formal permission 
from Earl Capita Bank. The Analyst of the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking 
Information states such a procedure and regulation to be as follows: 
“If someone wants information about a person’s credit score or record, he needs to come 
to us and make a formal request for that information. He needs to provide valid 
documents such as his own existing credit validation, ID, and whatever he has as  proof 
that validates  his need. We will consider the request to be a fraud if he manages to obtain 
the data but fails to provide any evidence or valid document. The penalty is a Rp.-50-
million fine per one piece of information.” 
 
The penalty for misconduct and misuse of Earl Capita Bank’s information systems 
is managed by the general court according to the severity of impact caused by the 
misconduct. . The fine is regulated for ID Rp. 50 million (approximately US $5,807.20) 
per one piece of data or information. 
 
4.3.1.3. Script Revision and Script Replication: The script replication in Earl 
Capita Bank occurs when an individual’s behavior becomes entrenched and minor 
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deviations of behavior occur which are not worthy of causing a stir in the 
institutionalization process (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Script revision, on the other hand, 
emerges only when major incidents such as a security breach or policy change cause a 
radical change. As stated earlier, Earl Capita Bank does not have any record of security 
breach in the past few years. Since there has been no major exogenous incident (e.g., 
security breach), then personnel are likely to reinforce their actions in order to conduct 
habitualized actions. This is the core concept of script replication. 
The practice of script replication and revision becomes visible when there is a 
growing need to accommodate technology change. Whenever information technologies 
need to be upgraded or replaced, policies and regulations that direct the use of such 
technologies are revised as well. The artifact and regulatory revision is an authority that 
belongs to the Information Technology Department. An elaboration of such authority by 
a Senior Analyst at the Information Management Division is as follows: 
“The authority to upgrade and replace IT hardware, software, applications, and suchlike 
belongs to the Information Technology Department. The procedure requires that a 
department requesting for a technology upgrade forward a formal request to the 
Information Technology Department. When the Board of Governor agrees and a budget 
has been allocated, the upgrade takes place. The Information Technology Department 
usually sends expert staff members to deal with the upgrade. They also formulate and 
socialize new policies and regulations for using the new technology. Of course, they will 
also assign access privilege and security to the new technology.” 
 
Earl Capita Bank has not undergone radical institutional change of its information 
security. The focus of this subsection shifts to script replication instead. The script 
replication emerges when agencies become familiar with what is expected of them and 
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begin to internalize such expectations. The difference between the script replication and 
revision phase and the earlier one is within the consciousness of action. Whereas the 
previous phase denotes the personnel’s willingness to accept the regulation that shall 
dictate their behavior, this phase depicts the threshold of behavior according to such 
acceptance and deviations from approved behavior that might occur during the 
acceptance. Regarding the issue of data ownership, for instance, the Senior Analyst at the 
Information Management Division describes such an issue: 
“Data ownership is part of the culture in Earl Capita Bank. It’s an ugly truth, yes. People 
here do it anyway and it’s very difficult for us to change. This is mainly because they 
think of us as the baby in Earl Capita Bank, or the stepchild that the Board of Governors 
would get rid of sometime soon. It took us several years to finally convince them to 
change their mindset that data and information belong to Earl Capita Bank, and not to a 
particular department. They gradually accept this concept but yes, it does take time. But 
I’m very confident that information systems in Earl Capita Bank will be completely 
centralized in the future. Everything related to information systems, whether it’s about 
data, software, hardware, and even security. We at the Information Management Division 
are working hard to make this happen.” 
 
The issue with unconscious script replication seems to relate to corporate culture 
and maintenance of status quo, which is closely linked to social stability. The data-
ownership issue reflects a slow deviation from the status quo. Regardless of the attempt 
to deviate data ownership towards centralized information systems, the security of Earl 
Capita Bank’s information systems is well maintained. Many of the institution’s 
personnel confirm that there has never been a case of security breach in Earl Capita Bank. 
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Information security has been widely accepted as mandatory in Earl Capita Bank 
and personnel have acknowledged its importance and identified procedures to implement 
it. Despite the issue with data ownership, departments have enforced security practice and 
have controlled access to their information systems according to the prescribed policies 
and regulations. The prescribed policies and regulations are a privilege assumed only by 
the Information Management Division and the Information Technology Department. The 
unconscious implementation of information security, signifying institutionalized 
information security, marks the final phase of information security institutionalization. 
This phase delineates the objectification and externalization of patterned information-
security actions and behavior amongst the community of Earl Capita Bank. 
 
4.3.1.4. Patterned-Actions Objectification and Externalization: The issue with 
objectification and externalization of patterned actions emerges as an agency begins to 
accept the revised script and behave accordingly (Barley and Tolbert 1997). The focus is 
therefore on how actions and behavior become habitualized and rational, and how they 
replicate the script prior to objectification and externalization. In the case of Earl Capita 
Bank, personnel have begun to accept security policies and regulations, and interact with 
technologies and security artifacts according to laid down policies and regulations. 
The acceptance of and interaction with technologies and security artifacts denote 
the typification of habitualized actions by Earl Capita Bank’s personnel. When the 
actions and behavior become habitualized, the personnel unconsciously strive to maintain 
information security in Earl Capita Bank. The Senior IT Researcher states that: 
“Again, we have the best BCP in the country. So what I can tell you is that our staff and 
management take the regulation and penalty for the same under serious consideration. 
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We put every effort into becoming an example of dedication and conformity. If you ask 
me, I personally believe in our integrity and commitment as a community of Earl Capita 
Bank.” 
 
Earl Capita Bank maintains a high standard of integrity and commitment as regards 
its personnel. Earl Capita Bank regards information security as a socio-organizational 
issue and is particularly confident of the integrity and commitment of its personnel. The 
institution relies exceedingly on its policies and regulations that even restrict internal 
behavior. This is in line with the position of the institution as a premier governing body 
that formulates and enforces law, policies, and regulations. The Head of Risk 
Management Team describes Earl Capita Bank and its personnel as: 
“… a governing public institution that takes care of commercial banks and monetary 
issues in Indonesia. We understand the risk regarding personnel’s misconduct that can 
severely damage our reputation as an institution. That’s why we try to keep the risk as 
minimum as possible, even zero. If we fail to manage our own integrity, the public’s trust 
is at stake.” 
 
According to the concept of patterned-actions objectification and externalization, 
the integrity and commitment of Earl Capita Bank’s personnel creates high resilience 
towards minor changes (e.g., technology upgrade) to the institutionalization of 
information security in Earl Capita Bank. In addition to the integrity and commitment of 
its personnel, the fact that Earl Capita Bank enjoys the highest authority in banking sector 
in Indonesia contributes to the high resilience.  
The objective of patterned-actions objectification and externalization is therefore to 
highlight the interaction between social actors (i.e., agency) and artifacts, which in this 
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case are technologies and security artifacts. Information and technology are the media, 
i.e. artifacts, for structuring information security in organizations, including Earl Capita 
Bank. As one of the modalities that that an agency socially constructs, the technologies 
are used to routinely produce and reproduce social structures (Orlikowski 1992; 
Orlikowski et al. 1995; Orlikowski 2000). Through agency’s interaction with these 
media, behavioral and cognitive, (e.g., power, communication, sanction, etc.) properties 
in the structuration of information-security institution emerge. Technology is regarded as 
a tool to assist personnel in processing information and completing their day-to-day tasks 
whereas technological use leads to information, which is the processed object.  Earl 
Capita Bank relates the use of technology to operational risk. Any information security 
breach is one of the greatest lurking threats that can harm Earl Capita Bank’s reputation. 
Despite there being no record of such a security breach, the central bank realizes the 
potential for such incidents. Therefore governance of the use of technology is highly 
enforced by the Information Technology Department and by the department that owns the 
technology. The Head of Risk Management Team states that: 
“As a public institution, the government and the people demand us to be transparent. 
However, there are certain parts that need to be kept confidential. Potential leak is what 
we call an operational risk and such a leak may create information asymmetry that can 
harm the market. We have rules that regulate information which is for public 
consumption and specific times when this information can be made available.” 
 
The Information Technology Department manages the technical controls of 
information security, conducting one of the department’s functionalities within Earl 
Capita Bank. In addition to maintaining the operability of Earl Capita Bank’s Information 
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Technologies System, the department maintains the security of the technologies and 
asserts the necessity to safeguard the use of these technologies. The department is also 
responsible for raising the awareness about the importance of safeguarding the use of the 
Earl Capita Bank’s information technologies amongst its personnel. The result of this is 
the usage and implementation of secure information technologies by personnel and the 
regulatory act to safeguard their use of these technologies. This implementation and act 
has become a habitualized routine whereby personnel realize the importance of keeping 
their username and password to themselves6. From the technological perspective, the 
habitualized routine practices of technical controls and informal controls of information 
security therefore socially structure the institution of information security in Earl Capita 
Bank. 
 
4.3.1.5. Discussion: The high emphasis on legality and regulation placed at Earl 
Capita Bank identifies it as an information-systems focused institution. The issue with 
data ownership, however, seems to be the most prominent stumbling block in efforts to 
centralize information systems. Regardless of the seemingly disparate control and 
ownership of information systems, data and also information within Earl Capita Bank, the 
governance of information security is in reality under the authority of the Information 
Technology Department and Information Management Division. The information-
security governance of the logical content belongs to the Information Management 
Division, while the Information Technology Department assumes full authority on the 
governance of the security of the institution’s technology and infrastructure.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The security culture of making use of a username and password in Indonesia is so low that an employee 
may share their office username and password with any “trusted” colleagues, hence allowing them access 
to their personal professional information. 
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The governance of information security within Earl Capita Bank is not centralized; 
i.e., the governance practice is not directed by a single department. Rather, the concrete 
responsibility is dichotomized and empowered to two departments (i.e., the Information 
Technology Department and the Information Management Division)7. While the 
Information Technology Department directs the technical controls of information 
security, the Information Management Division manages the formal controls of 
information security. The two departments share the responsibility to oversee the 
informal controls of information security (e.g., raising personnel’s awareness of the 
importance to secure the distribution and dissemination of information and providing and 
promoting education of the personnel concerning the importance of safeguarding their 
username and password). These three dimensions of information security are 
continuously enforced so that they become grounded as a regular practice of safeguarding 
the Earl Capita Bank’s information asset. Hence the practice of governing and 
implementing these three dimensions forms social structures that have become routine 
and are highly resilient, creating an institution (Björck 2004; Scott 2008). Other 
departments simply determine which information systems, data, and information to share, 
and select which users can gain access to their systems and access and utilize the 
departments’ data and information. The other departments have the freedom to determine 
the implementation of information-security practices and are required to contribute to the 
security culture which is in turn governed by the two departments. 
The data ownership issue, however, may hinder the effectiveness of information 
security governance within Earl Capita Bank, interrupting the continuous reproduction of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The dichotomized concrete responsibility is one that embodies the technical controls and the formal 
controls. These are two of the three dimensions of information security as envisioned by Dhillon (2007). 
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institutionalized information security. Each department within Earl Capita Bank 
possesses power over the use of and access to information processed from its own 
information systems. Personnel of each department are very knowledgeable about 
managing and processing the information of their department’s information systems. 
However, they can only access processed information from other department’s 
information systems under permission of the department concerned. These personnel can 
only procure a read-only access to information from someone else’s department and use 
the end-result for analysis only. Each department has its own regulations concerning the 
use of and access to its information systems and sanctions only such use and access. This 
depicts the strong data ownership system that has its own merits and drawbacks. The 
advantage is the guaranteed security of the access to Earl Capita Bank’s information 
systems. The drawback is the uncoordinated and dispersed information that is supposedly 
derived from the same data, but mostly leads to the creation of “the lack of architecture 
interoperability, incompatible data standards, lack of relevant integration expertise, and 
the existence of legacy processes” (Lam 2005). Figure 4.3 depicts the flow of authority 
and responsibility among departments in Earl Capita Bank. 
Figure 4.3 depicts the dual governance of information security, which is shared 
between the Information Technology Department and the Information Management 
Division. Process P1, denoted by the blue arrows, delineates the implementation of 
information-confidentiality category by the Information Management Division and 
information stewardship. Other departments such as the Information Technology 
Department, the Directorate of Bank Licensing and Banking Information, and the 
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Accounting and Payment System Department, implement the categorization and the 
stewardship according to their function and need. 
 
Figure 4.3 – The Flow of Information-Security Authority and Responsibility in Earl Capita 
Bank 
 
The bidirectional red arrows of process P2 demonstrate the requests for systems 
access and the granting of such access among departments. The green arrows of process 
P3 highlight the right and responsibility of Information Technology Department to create 
and grant technical access (e.g., username and password) upon request or when any 
technological change takes place. 
Despite the data-ownership issue that constrains the authority of the Information 
Management Division, the consistent effort to safeguard the Earl Capita Bank’s 
information asset creates the continuous structure of an institutionalized information 
security. In an attempt to resolve the data-ownership issue, the Information Management 
Legend: 
 P1: order for 
confidential 
category. 
 P2: request for 
systems access 
and grant of 
such access. 
 P3:  IT 
department’s 
right and 
responsibility 
to create and 
grant access. 
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Division created an information-stewardship concept, which highlights “trust and 
competency; adoption of technology” (Rosenbaum 2010). This concept allows 
departments to decide which of the data and information under their management can be 
shared with users outside their departments. The practice is to ask departments to assign 
different levels of confidentiality category to their data and information. Despite the rigid 
procedure for external users and even internal personnel to gain access to data, 
information, and information systems, Earl Capita Bank possesses one of the most 
reliable and secure information-security systems in the nation. The effort is partially due 
to the institution’s pledge as a public institution and a central governing body. 
The summary of the institutionalization of information security in Earl Capita Bank 
can be elucidated using the institutionalization model by Barley and Tolbert (1997). The 
institutional realm signifies the structure of information security in Earl Capita Bank 
while the realm of action signifies the agency and the behavior that shapes the structure. 
Furthermore, since Earl Capita Bank is the highest authority in the nation’s banking 
sector, external forces of information security institutionalization are due to technology 
change or environmental change that initiates strategic change. The first process, namely 
the script encoding, signifies the moment when, for example, the Information 
Management Division introduces the information stewardship concept or the Information 
Technology Department puts a new policy regarding the use of social network websites 
during office hours in place. When personnel begin to acknowledge the new regulations 
and departments begin to socialize these regulations, the principles of this script become 
enacted as evidence imbedded in the agency’s behavior. Several stumbling blocks such as 
the data-ownership issue might lead to similarities  among several minor deviated 
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behaviors. They are, however, resolved through behavior revision and are replicated back 
in the script as principles that emerge from personnel’s interaction with artifacts 
(Orlikowski 2000). The behavior revision is progressing slowly as the data-ownership 
issue has not been completely resolved in Earl Capita Bank. Finally, the replicated script 
is permanently recorded in the institutional realm when personnel’s behavior becomes a 
rationale amongst one another and is recognized as having become habitualized and 
accepted as the norm in Earl Capita Bank. 
 
4.3.2. Relationship with Commercial Banks 
4.3.2.1. The Macro-Prudential Supervision of Information Security 
Governance: Earl Capita Bank is the regulator and supervisor of commercial banks and 
other financial institutions in Indonesia. As a means to achieving financial system 
stability, Earl Capita Bank also undertakes crisis management among commercial banks 
and conducts banking intermediation. Earl Capita Bank attempts to maintain the nation’s 
financial stability as depicted in its function to formulate financial regulations and 
policies that are to be adhered to by commercial banks and financial institutions. It also 
supervises banks and institutions in ensuring their adherence to such regulations. Such a 
function elevates Earl Capita Bank’s status as an authorized auditor and supervisor of 
commercial banks and renders it the deontic power. Evidence in support of this statement 
is the historical fact of Earl Capita Bank being a governmental institution whereby its 
Governor was a member of the Cabinet. 
Today, Earl Capita Bank possesses the freedom to maintain financial stability. It 
monitors and ascertains current domestic and international economical stance and 
determines financial regulations in support of this stance. In doing so, Earl Capita Bank 
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regards information as a crucial aspect and recognizes that any failure to safeguard it may 
harm the nation’s financial stability. Earl Capita Bank supports and protects information 
confidentiality belonging to each commercial bank and encourages commercial banks to 
safeguard its information from unauthorized and inappropriate access. Three departments 
within Earl Capita Bank, the Accounting and Payment System Department, the Banking 
Research and Regulatory Department, and the Bank Supervisory Department, are in 
charge of regulating and governing the information access of commercial banks. 
Various matters related to credit card payment, debit card payment, electronic 
banking, or SMS (text-messaging) banking are handled by the Accounting and Payment 
System Department. This department issues regulations concerning processing and 
accessing of payment information. It also grants permission to commercial banks for 
launching new electronic related banking products. The department is therefore 
responsible for the security of this information. It owns several information systems 
which are used to process information for electronic related banking products and card 
payment products. Users from other departments wishing to have access to these 
information systems can only do so with permission granted by the Accounting and 
Payment System Department. The department also has the right to independently audit 
and supervise commercial banks on their electronic-banking activities and card payment 
functionalities. In fact, the accounting and payment system department is the only 
department that oversees electronic related banking products and card payment products. 
As evidence of this fact, the Head Payment Information Systems Supervisor denotes that: 
“If we want to further investigate their security system report, we can summon them for 
verification or we can pay them a visit in order to audit their system.” 
 
	   94 
Furthermore, the department possesses sole authority to impose penalties on 
commercial banks that fail to follow electronic banking or card payment regulations. 
Failure to adhere to these regulations may result in several implications for commercial 
banks, ranging from payment of fine to losing the permit to run their electronic related 
banking products or card payment products. According to the Head of Payment 
Information Systems Licensing: 
“After the first and the second reminder, we always coach them. We don’t just leave 
them to figure out what to do themselves. However, if they still fail to follow the rules after the 
third reminder, then we have to decide that they are not suitable for owning such a banking 
product.” 
 
Other auditory and supervisory tasks are handled by the bank’s supervisory 
department. In general, this department is divided into three subdivisions: the State Banks 
Supervisors (Bank Supervisory Subdivision 1), the Foreign Banks Supervisors (Bank 
Supervisory Subdivision 2), and the Private National Banks Supervisors (Bank 
Supervisory Subdivision 3). The department assumes similar responsibilities as those of 
the Accounting and Payment System Department in more general areas. It performs 
annual regular audit and random audit. Annually, the department dispatches a group of 
auditors responsible for visiting a bank according to the legal status of a bank. The 
auditory team may consist of up to 10 personnel. For instance, subdivision 1 dispatches 
auditors for a state bank. The Senior Private Bank Supervisor explains that: 
“We make annual auditory visits to each bank. Prior to these visits, we create the annual 
Audit Booking Plan, which is based on the bank’s current performance and future 
potential risks. Specifically for Blue Sequoia Bank, we focus on three risks: credit risk, 
operational risk, and strategic risk.” 
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Such a visit involves auditing a commercial bank’s information systems, including 
the security of such systems. For instance, the auditors determine the appropriateness of 
network and server location, installed firewalls, regular updates of antivirus software, etc. 
Random auditory visits, however, usually involve incidents (e.g. security breach) that 
potentially threaten the reputation and operability of the bank. 
Unlike the Accounting and Payment System Department, however, the Bank 
Supervisory Department does not possess legal authority to formulate regulations. This 
right is owned exclusively by the Banking Research and Regulatory Department. This 
department formulates and develops policies and regulations concerning currency rate, 
financial stability, and commercial banks. The Senior Researcher of the Directorate of the 
Banking Research and Regulation explains the formulation of regulations as following: 
“These are not the regulations or policies that dictate the practice of information security 
in commercial banks. These are just guidelines that we have created that banks can 
follow and modify according to their own conditions. I call them guidelines since these 
contain basic information security principles that commercial banks need to meet, along 
with the privilege of modifying them to meet their conditions. When we created this 
guideline document back in 2006, I personally had less than five hours of sleep almost 
every night. And it took us a year to complete the formulation process. We hosted several 
sharing sessions where we invited large commercial banks and consultants to share their 
ideas and experiences with information security. Although the guidelines are exclusively 
reserved for use by commercial banks, we also incorporate some of the very essential 
ideas for our internal use. This is exemplified by the use of ISO 27001 as the basic 
framework for our internal security policies and regulations.” 
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Figure 4.4 – A partial view of the Information-Security Chapter codified in the Earl Capita 
Bank’s Guidelines 
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Due to the diverse conditions prevailing in commercial banks, the department is 
obliged to formulate abstract and general regulations applicable to any condition and 
technological advancement. Hence, these policies and regulations need to be further 
enhanced by each bank to satisfy its personal circumstances. As a result, these policies 
and regulations can even accommodate the needs of manual information-processing 
banks (i.e. those with no automated/electronic information systems). Figure 4.4 depicts a 
partial view of the guidelines, suggesting the required basics that commercial banks need 
in order to satisfy the implementation of information security. The Senior Researcher of 
the Directorate of the Banking Research and Regulation elucidates this notion as follows: 
“Banks are a complicated entity. Some of them would actually come to us, asking us to 
reconsider enforcing our guidelines. They would be whining about their legacy networks 
and servers, their security system that is not up to date, and they would even beg us to 
consider their manual information systems. I told them that the guidelines are meant to be 
guidelines for every bank for creating policies and regulations according to their own 
situations. You could probably hire more security officers if you have a manual 
information system, heighten your existing security policies and regulations, or improve 
your employee satisfaction for better commitment. Just because your system doesn’t have 
a sophisticated security feature or is not automated, doesn’t mean we have to bend the 
rules just for you. A rule is a rule- you have to deal with it.” 
 
4.3.2.2. Discussion: The macro-prudential supervision framework highlights the 
relationship between Earl Capita Bank as the governing body and commercial banks. The 
relationship consists of two reflexive processes: the governance and control process by 
Earl Capita Bank and the conformity and report by commercial banks. 
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The macro-prudential supervision of information security governance uses the 
legitimacy view of institutional theory (Björck 2004). The top-down lines labeled as the 
governance and control lines as depicted in the macro-prudential supervision framework 
(see figure 3.3) represent the supervisory acts by the Earl Capita Bank. These supervisory 
acts include formulating and enforcing security policies and regulations, regular auditory 
visits, and random auditory visits. The reciprocity acts (i.e., the bottom-up lines in figure 
3.3) include the conformity actions taken with respect to the security policies and 
regulations governed by Earl Capita Bank and the reporting acts of routing practices of 
information security as well as security incidental cases. 
Another department that owns independent information systems and possesses 
liberty to formulate policies and regulations for using in such information systems is the 
Bank Licensing and Banking Information Department. This department exclusively owns 
the debiture information systems, which connect commercial banks and financial 
institutions to a customer’s credit score, and serves as the administrator for the use of this 
system. The system connects commercial banks to financial institutions and the 
department provides policies and regulations for using the system. The department also 
owns the right to penalize banks that fail to follow the regulations and grants (and deny 
them) access to the system. In a response to a statement by the Analyst of the Bank 
Licensing and Banking Information Department about access permission, the Senior 
Analyst of this department states that: 
“We issue regulations for use of the debiture information systems and we also determine 
who can have access to this system. For instance, if a bank wants to assign some of its 
employees to become admin for its application that connects to our system, the manager 
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needs to register his employees with us and they need to complete and sign a request 
form and send it back to us.” 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
Earl Capita Bank is a premier institution that acts as the central bank of Indonesia. 
The bank originated in the Dutch colonial government as a commercial bank that 
functioned to manage inflation rate and currency. When Indonesia gained its 
independence in 1945 and matured as an independent nation, the bank was renamed as 
Earl Capita Bank and achieved a central bank status. Such a status empowers Earl Capita 
Bank with a deontic power and constitutive power enabling the institution to audit and 
supervise commercial banks and financial institutions operating in Indonesia. Such 
auditory and supervisory privileges allow Earl Capita Bank to audit and supervise the 
practices of information security in commercial banks and other financial institutions. As 
an independent institution, however, Earl Capita Bank also implements the practices of 
information security internally. 
The objective of this chapter is to present and discuss the empirical analysis of the 
practices of information security of Earl Capita Bank. The practices of information 
security are therefore divided into internal practices and auditory and supervisory 
practices. The empirical analysis delineates the implementation of the three dimensions 
of information security: technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls. The 
implementation of these dimensions is not centralized, however- meaning that it is not 
directed by a single department. Rather, two departments initiate the first two dimensions 
and together, these departments manage the other dimension with respect to their main 
obligations. All units in the institution reciprocate thereby socially constructing the 
	   100 
structure of information security practices and continuously reproducing this structure, 
creating an institution of information security. 
Externally, Earl Capita Bank possesses the deontic power and the constitutive 
power to audit and supervise the information security practices in commercial banks. 
Empirical analysis has shown that the power property endows the authority and 
government status to Earl Capita Bank. Commercial banks and financial institutions 
respond to such status through conformity and adherence. The institutional theory used to 
reflect such a relationship depicts two lines with opposite arrows: one line describes the 
governance and control of information security regulations and practices by Earl Capita 
Bank and the other line denotes conformity with the information security regulations and 
reporting of the information security practices by commercial banks. 
The issue of data ownership has long been shrouded in ambiguity at Earl Capita 
Bank. The data ownership issue creates inconsistency of data and information in Earl 
Capita Bank. Such an inconsistency may interfere with the practices of information 
security, particularly in terms of the formal controls of information security. Reasons for 
such interruption (e.g., lack of architecture operability, incompatible data standards, lack 
of integration expertise and use of legacy processes) are evidence of the practice of 
inconsistent information in Earl Capita Bank. Personnel need to be vigilant against 
information risk as security threat has the potential to become a distinct possibility.	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5 THE CASE OF CENTRO METROPOLITAN 
BANK 
 
 
5.1. Overview 
This chapter presents a case study of an instance of the implementation of 
information security governance at a commercial bank amidst considerable government 
participation. The case study is also an example of a commercial bank’s conformity with 
the central bank’s security regulations and policies as well as its compliance with 
reporting norms concerning information security practices s laid down by the central 
bank. As an independent commercial bank, Centro Metropolitan Bank has the authority 
to put into place a routine practice of information security, thus creating an 
institutionalized information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank. In addition, this 
chapter presents a security specific case whereby the bank attempts to resolve such an 
issue with the involvement and interference of the central bank. Such involvement and 
interference are elaborated upon in more detail at a subsequent section, using the 
institutional theory to depict the top-down process (i.e., governance and control) and the 
bottom-up process (i.e., conformity and reporting) between Earl Capita Bank as the 
central bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank as the commercial bank. 
This chapter therefore aims to present a comprehensive description and depiction of 
information security practices and governance in Centro Metropolitan Bank. The 
practices and governance have been theoretically prescribed to involve external parties 
	   102 
such as the central bank and external threats. In this chapter, institutionalization of 
information security reflects both the internal and external information security 
governance that is strongly influenced by the central bank. The organization of this 
chapter is as follows: section 5.2 presents the history of Centro Metropolitan Bank as 
well as its characteristics. Section 5.3 provides the empirical analysis for the Centro 
Metropolitan Bank case. Various aspects such as the internal security practices elucidated 
by a combination of institutional theory and structuration theory, the relationship between 
the bank and the central bank as depicted by the institutional theory, and the descriptive 
security incident or case study of electronic data-capture fraud. Section 5.4 summarizes 
and closes this chapter. 
 
5.2. Organizational Background 
5.2.1. A Government-Owned Commercial Bank 
Centro Metropolitan Bank is a large government-owned bank and is considered to 
be the nation’s financial backbone. The bank is the largest bank in the nation in terms of 
assets, loans, and deposits. As a government-owned bank, Centro Metropolitan Bank 
receives full attention from the government and from the central bank in particular. By 
December 2006, the bank had grown into one of the nation’s essential and key economic 
and financial players and had even established three principal subsidiaries: Bank Syariah 
CMetro, CMetro Sekuritas, and AXA CMetro. As a commercial bank, Centro 
Metropolitan Bank is obliged to fulfill the following duties: (1) act as a financial 
intermediary, (2) create and process information about firms, and (3) participate in the 
nation’s payment systems (Scott et al. 1992). The financial service that Centro 
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Metropolitan Bank provides is one of the best examples of its kind in the nation, 
reflecting its efficiency and effectiveness in transactions involving financial instruments 
(e.g. auto loans, mortgage notes, bonds, demand deposit currency, etc.) (Fixler 1993). 
Like other large banks in the nation, the bank is headquartered in Jakarta. 
In support of its commitment as a financial entity with an unimpeachable 
reputation, the bank “maintains independent Offices of Compliances, Audit and the 
Corporate Secretary, and is under regular scrutiny from external auditors representing 
Earl Capita Bank and the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), as well as international auditing 
firms” 1. Centro Metropolitan Bank has enjoyed a solid reputation in internal audit 
practice, which audits every aspect of the bank including the information security 
practices. In fact, the bank’s internal Information Technology Audit Services are one of 
the major management tools for directing its information security (Da Veiga and Eloff 
2007; Knapp et al 2009). Centro Metropolitan Bank has envisioned the abiding 
commitment to prudential banking practices and displayed the willingness to comply 
with regulations and laws. The objective is to maintain good relationships among the 
bank’s various elements, including management, stakeholders, and the Board of 
Commissioners, on the basis of ethics, corporate culture, and corporate value. As a result, 
the bank prides itself on its strong commitment to corporate governance and has proven 
this by receiving many awards for best corporate governance practice and banking 
service excellence. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Source: http://www.bankmandiri.co.id/english/corporate01/about_profile.asp 
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5.2.2. History of Centro Metropolitan Bank 
Historically, the bank has emerged as a result of the merger of four government-
owned banks and has undergone a series of major reorganizations. The bank was 
officially founded on October 1998. The merger was accomplished in 1999 as part of the 
government’s bank-restructuring program, which was one of its attempts to remedy the 
economic crisis which befell the nation in 1998.  The history of the bank can be traced 
back to the existence of the four government-owned banks that no longer exist but that 
served as the bank’s foundation. These banks are: 
1. World Heritage Bank: This bank originated as a result of an exhaustive process to 
nationalize De Nationale Handelsbank NV, a Dutch-owned bank, which became 
Bank Umum Negara in 1959. In 1964, Chartered Bank, a British-owned bank, 
was also nationalized and its operational right was given to Bank Umum Negara. 
In 1965, Bank Umum Negara was merged into Bank Negara Indonesia, becoming 
Bank Negara Indonesia Unit IV. Three years later, the Unit IV separated and 
became an independent bank named as World Heritage Bank2. 
2. National Commerce Bank: This was one of the oldest banks in the nation. It was 
initially founded as Nederlandsch Indische Escompto Maatschappij in Batavia 
(now Jakarta) in 1857. The bank was renamed as Escompto Bank NV in 1949 and 
was then nationalized and renamed as National Commerce Bank in 19603. The 
bank served to finance the industrial and mining sectors before it was merged 
with the other three banks.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Source: http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_Bumi_Daya (translated) 
3 Source: http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_Dagang_Negara (translated) 
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3. Exima Bank: The bank’s name stands for Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesia. It was a 
government-owned bank that financed import and export. The history of this bank 
is traceable back to NV Nederlansche Handels Maatschappij, a Dutch-owned 
firm, which was founded in 1842. The operational activities included banking 
activities in 1870. The bank was nationalized in 1960 and was merged into Bank 
Negara Indonesia to become Bank Negara Indonesia Unit II. In 1968, the Unit II 
was divided into two separate units, of which one served specifically to handle 
exportation and importation. This subunit was then renamed as Exima Bank4. 
4. Bapindo: Bapindo stands for Bank Pembangunan Indonesia, which originated in 
1951 as Bank Industri Negara. Unlike the other three banks, Bank Industri Negara 
was founded by the government of Indonesia and immediately served as a 
government-owned commercial bank. The bank was intended to support the 
nation’s economic sector, particularly in areas such as farming, industry, and 
mining. The bank was renamed as Bapindo in 1960. In 1970, Bapindo served to 
help direct the nation’s development process, specifically serving to finance the 
manufacturing, transportation, and tourism industries. 
 
All these banks have had significant impacts on the nation’s economical welfare 
and have immensely contributed to it also. Hence the economic and financial turmoil that 
tremendously impacted the nation in 1998 also hit the banks severely.  The government 
decided to merge these four banks, restructuring and reorganizing the new bank thus 
formed. As of today, the bank has about 956 branch offices, 6 overseas branches and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Source: http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_Ekspor_Impor_Indonesia (translated) 
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representatives, 2500 ATM machines, and three principal subsidiaries (CMetro Syariah 
Bank, CMetro Sekuritas, and AXA CMetro)5. 
 
5.2.3. Organization Structure 
Centro Metropolitan Bank is directed by an executive management team of Board 
of Directors, headed by a President Director. The management and governance are 
supervised by the Board of Commissioners appointed directly by the nation’s Ministry of 
State-Owned Enterprise. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Source: http://www.bankmandiri.co.id/english/corporate01/about_profile.asp 
	   107 
 
Figure 5.1 – Organization Chart of Centro Metropolitan Bank 
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As a large institution, Centro Metropolitan Bank contains divisions each of which is 
managed by a director. Each division oversees a subdivision (i.e., group), which plays a 
significant role in conducting the bank’s operational activities. The governance and 
practices of information security are managed by the IT security department, which is a 
part of the IT Planning, Architecture, and BCP (Business Continuity Plan) group. This 
group is structured under the Technology and Operations Division, which is responsible 
for overseeing all issues regarding the implementation of Information Technology 
System in the bank and by the bank’s customers. 
Unlike those of Earl Capita Bank, the internal information-security practices in 
Centro Metropolitan Bank are initiated solely by the IT Security Department. The Vice 
President of the IT Security Department states the following: 
“The vision and mission of the IT security department is based on the idea of 
safeguarding our information assets. The formal statement is prescribed in the 
functionality statement of our department, which states that it is our responsibility to 
conduct the analysis, formulation, synthesis, development, implementation, and 
evaluation of an IT security instrument to ensure the security of information technology 
as an asset, whether physical or logical (i.e., data and information) of the bank in the 
short term and in the long term.” 
  
Hence the governance of information security within the bank is centralized around 
the IT security department, involving controls of the technical aspects, formal aspects, 
and informal aspects of security (Dhillon and Moores 2001; Dhillon 2007). The 
department’s main responsibilities include: 
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1. To coordinate the implementation of IT security solutions including 
infrastructure, application, and operating system in which all functions 
aiming at safeguarding the bank-wide information and data security. 
2. To evaluate the internal IT security system and the best practices to create, 
develop, and implement the bank-wide IT security blueprint and 
infrastructure. 
3. To coordinate the review process for business strategy, operation and 
business process and application development, aiming to develop, 
synchronize, and implement the IT security blueprint and strategy. 
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Figure 5.2 – Organizational Structure of the IT Security Department 
 
4. To ensure that user ID assignment and access right is in accordance with 
policies, and to direct the custodian user ID and password using security 
administrator, key management, as well as the public key infrastructure 
certificate to ensure confidentiality and security of the Information 
Technology System. 
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5. To monitor and direct the implementation of the IT strategic plan and 
architecture so as to safeguard the integration of the IT security 
infrastructure as well as its synchronization even through changes in IT as 
a whole. 
6. To manage the administrative process, human resource, and budget in the 
IT Security Department in order to ensure the implementation of 
regulations at the departmental level, optimize resources (e.g., personnel 
and budget) allocation, and develop personnel’s capability by providing 
training and structured assignments. 
 
As shown in figure 5.2, the IT Security Department consists of three subunits: (1) 
the IT security solutions unit that conducts the IT security systems development, (2) the 
IT security access and control unit that oversees the user access and privilege, and (3) the 
IT security strategy and planning unit that formulates the IT security strategic plan and 
blueprint as well as the IT security policy and procedures. These units respectively 
provide effective information security governance and practices which are synchronous 
with information security best practices, the bank’s culture and identity and the 
technologies owned by the bank. 
 
5.3. Empirical Analysis 
This section delivers a theoretical review of the Centro Metropolitan Bank case 
study. Drawing upon institutional theory and structuration theory, the case study 
elucidates the institutionalization of information security from a sociological stance. 
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Unlike the Earl Capita Bank case study, this case study includes a presentation of a 
security breach incident, which is essential to delineate an instantiation of re-
institutionalization. Similar to the previous case study, the organization of this case study 
is structured on the basis of the internal security practices as an inter-level 
institutionalization and the relationship with the central bank regarding practices of 
information security. 
 
5.3.1. Inter-Level Institutional of Information Security Governance 
5.3.1.1. Script Encoding: Just as Earl Capita Bank considers reputational risk as 
its consequential threat, so does Centro Metropolitan Bank. Centro Metropolitan Bank 
regards reputational risk, which is closely linked to operational risk, as a leading cause of 
crowding out customers, potentially creating financial losses. With regard to information 
security and technological security Centro Metropolitan Bank identifies access to 
information and use of technology as potentially damaging risks if they are not properly 
handled. The bank characterizes such risks as an operational risk and abides to the 
handling of such risk using Basel II framework as a guideline. The Operational Risk 
Management Team Leader defines risks within the bank as follows: 
“We use the common definition for risk as a potential loss that may harm the 
bank. We define operational risk using Basel II’s definition of operational risk, 
which we believe all banks should refer to. This definition states that this risk is 
a harmful risk that is caused by dysfunctionality, or inadequacy, or failure, and it 
damages the bank through its people, procedures, systems, and events.” 
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Risk related to systems, or the use of technology, is closely linked to reputational 
risk as it may harm the bank’s customers. For instance, if the bank’s information systems 
are down, the resultant impact is manifested in the form of customers’ dissatisfaction 
whereby such dissatisfaction can lead to negative publicity that harms the bank’s 
reputation. As such, the bank regards operational risk as more damaging than financial 
risk. 
Hence the bank rigorously maintains its information systems and their security. 
Consequently, it possesses some of the most solid corporate information systems in the 
nation. The bank prides itself on the fact that its most precious information (i.e., its 
customers’ data) has never been found susceptible to any leakage.  The information 
technology security is maintained and preserved by the IT Security Department. One of 
the department’s goals is to ensure the security of information technology assets, either 
the physical or logical components (i.e., data and information), both in the short and long 
run. This department also formulates policies and regulations on how information 
technology and electronic applications are to be used to preserve information security. 
Electronic applications include the bank’s intranet system, electronic banking, ATMs, 
electronic data capture (EDC) machines, etc. In addition to ensuring the proper use of 
information technology, the department also educates stakeholders and raises their 
awareness about the importance of information security. The Head of IT Audit Unit 
maintains that: 
“All tasks that include regulating, enforcing, controlling, and revising standard 
operating procedures or policies regarding risk of using IT are performed by the 
Information Technology Department. They assume full responsibility for these 
tasks.” 
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Policies and regulations in Centro Metropolitan Bank are recognized as the 
Operational Guidance Standard (OGS). This guidance standard is specifically developed 
for operational activities and is used to manage operational risk, including information 
technology and its security. Information security as part of the operational activities is 
given special consideration. As a policy and regulation, the information security SPO is 
formulated by the IT security department. The Vice President of IT Security Department 
says about the information security SPO: 
“When I create policies to secure information, or security policies, before they are 
enacted, they have to be tried by the ORC (operation risk committee). And then, we give 
presentations about these policies, and the ORC reviews and challenges the policies. 
When the policies get through, the Board of Directors, particularly the Risk Director and 
the Technology and Operation Director, sign the policies.” 
 
In general, information-security policies and regulations are formulated based on 
international framework and references in order to ensure rigor and functionality. These 
framework and references include COBIT, ISO 17799, and ISO 27001 from which the 
Centro Metropolitan Bank has received a certificate of excellence. However, the drive to 
formulate and enforce policies and regulations is based on Earl Capita Bank’s guidelines 
concerning information security governance and practice. Centro Metropolitan Bank 
creates information-security policies and regulations according to its needs and culture, 
blending all framework and guidelines given by the central bank. The Vice President of 
IT Security Department states that: 
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“Earl Capita Bank does provide regulations and guidelines for use of information 
technology and for securing their use. However, we want to modify such guidelines to 
suit our culture so that we can use technology according to what we need and become 
what we want to be in a cultural context.” 
 
Hence, the IT security department owns the quasi-exclusive governance of 
information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank. The department oversees matters of 
technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls of information security, 
although some matters may be shared with other departments within the bank. Despite 
the privilege of formulating policies and regulations, the IT security department does not 
assume the responsibility of regulating e-information usage.  Consequently, other 
departments control the access to information, what information can be accessed, and 
permits for such an access.  
To quote an example, the Electronic Banking Group, which falls under the micro 
and retail banking division, initiates and maintains procedures and regulations related to 
the use of electronic banking products, including SMS (text messaging) banking, phone 
banking, EDC machines, debit or credit card payment etc. Such a responsibility enjoins 
the group to invent electronic-banking products, whereby the technology creation and 
maintenance aspects are handled by the IT Planning, Architecture, and BCP group. The 
Electronic Banking group also has to formulate and enforce the formats and the use of 
personal identification number (PIN) for electronic-banking products among others. As 
such, the group enforces how these products are to be properly used to maintain 
information security. According to the Assistant to the Mass-Banking Vice President, the 
framework to maintain the information security of an electronic-banking product is: 
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“First of all, staff members that are involved in developing the card are sworn by 
employment contract to protect the information about such a product. We regard the 
development of a banking product as a program or project. Hence the staff members also 
understand their duties and know what information is confidential or which of it can be 
put up for public consumption who again vary according to the categories they have been 
assigned. For instance, news reporters will be asked to identify themselves, the 
organization to which they are affiliated, why they need to access our information, etc.  
Another example is our newly launched program by which a customer shops at a local 
market and receives a local brand of juice for free. We cooperate with the local market 
that sells the juice and the juice distributor. We agree by law and contract that we won’t 
disclose each other’s data. For instance, if we would like to disclose to our customers that 
they can receive similar benefit at other local market, we need to ask permission of the 
local market that is bound to us via our legal cooperation.” 
 
The formulation of information-security policies and regulations, particularly the 
SPO, marks the script encoding in the Centro Metropolitan Bank case. As a large 
financial institution and a formal organization, Centro Metropolitan Bank initiates such 
formulation based on risk management.  
In the later section that describes an actual case, the formulation of policies and 
regulations came to be initiated after an incident of fraud.  The policies and regulations 
serve as guidelines for governing and practicing information security in Centro 
Metropolitan Bank. 
   
5.3.1.2. Principles Enactment: The regulatory body of information security in 
Centro Metropolitan Bank is assumed to be the Information Security Department. In fact, 
all actions concerning information security from the level of branches to even the 
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headquarters is centralized from the information security department. The department 
assumes full authority and responsibility for overseeing information security in the bank. 
Using a technical illustration based on the network and infrastructure, the Vice President 
of IT Security Department states about the centralization as follows: 
“The technology infrastructure and network of the bank is star-shaped. Probably it can 
also be likened to the star network topology. It goes up from branches to headquarters. 
Right here at the IT security department is where security is enforced and controlled. We 
are the center for ensuring information security for the bank. All areas of IT operational 
are protected using relevant tools.” 
 
The branches are equipped with workstations, but do not maintain databases and 
function merely as clients. Servers (i.e., the core-banking) are installed on the 4th floor in 
the bank’s headquarters and make use of IBM AS/400 machines. Servers installed at 
branches therefore only connect branches to headquarters. From a non-technical 
perspective, any action occurring at the branch level should be reported to headquarters. 
The report could be an initiative report, particularly reports for incidental cases such as 
any security breach. These reports are intended to report new products, organizational 
reformation or incidents. Branches have an autonomous right exclusively to maintain 
their lower-level operations (e.g., hiring and delegating branch staff). As indicated, 
however, maintenance of information systems and their security is a function which 
belongs to headquarters, with the information-security governance and control being 
delegated to the IT security department. 
Other departments determine what information can be accessed, how it can be 
accessed, and who can access it through the aid of the IT Security Department. As for 
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information security, the other departments provide conceptual plans for information-
security implementation and delegate the technical implementation to the IT Security 
Department. The Electronic Banking Group also determines the logical implementation 
of security identification for electronic-banking products. For instance, to access the 
bank’s electronic banking feature by using text messaging (i.e., the SMS banking 
feature), the bank regulates and enforces two modes of phone banking using PIN: 
• Plain text: consumers may simply type in transactions using keypads. 
• Real-time menu: consumers experience interactive banking transactions. 
All data is encrypted during transmission from server to customer’s cell 
phone). 
 
Whatever be the nature and type of the products it develops and maintains, the 
group consults and requests assistance from the IT Planning, Architecture and BCP 
group, particularly the IT Security Department, for the development of the products’ 
security. Hence, the technological aspect of these products is developed and maintained 
by the Information Technology Department. In addition, any issue regarding these 
products, including security breach, is handled by a special investigation team comprising 
of the IT Security Department, the Mass Banking Group, the IT Audit Unit, and Board of 
Directors.   
The implementation and practice of SMS banking, which is the bank’s signature 
electronic-banking product, provides one such example. Similar to the case of Earl Capita 
Bank, data ownership seems to be the major parameter that determines how information 
and data can be shared among personnel of different departments within the bank. As 
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such, other departments requesting access to data and information from a particular 
department need to provide a formal request to that particular department. Furthermore, 
the department that receives such a request needs to request access to the IT Planning, 
Architecture, and BCP group since data and information belong to the IT Planning, 
Architecture, and BCP group, which is physically housed at the 4th floor of the 
headquarters building. The group finalizes the request and provides the access 
permission. For example, personnel from other departments are required to provide 
formal request to the Electronic Banking Group should they intend to access e-banking 
data. The E-Banking Product Manager verifies this notion: 
“If a department wants our data, they have to make the request to me. For instance, it 
could be a request by the Customer Care Department for the purpose of producing a 
report on the total new customers for this month. That request should be addressed to me, 
the owner of that product. But in order for me to get that data, I have to request the data 
from the IT Planning, Architecture, and BCP group. But again, we act as the final 
doorkeepers to the data because they’re not supposed to make such a request to the group 
directly. All requests to access e-banking data and information should be made through 
us." 
 
Therefore, the difference between data ownership in Centro Metropolitan Bank and 
Earl Capita Bank is in the power and authority of the division/department that oversees 
information security. The data ownership issue displays a strong sense of power over the 
use of and protection of data. Information stewardship as in Centro Metropolitan Bank on 
the other hand merely emphasizes on data protection and recovery (Baldwin et al. 2011). 
In Centro Metropolitan Bank, while departments address a formal request to an 
information-steward department, that department is required to submit another request for 
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grant  of access to the main IT department, which is considered the owner of the data and 
information. Centro Metropolitan Bank also has developed a dual-approval procedure, 
which is a manifestation of exercising control as is directed by the central bank. This 
essentially refers to a procedure of applying for approval to two bodies of authority 
before a request can be granted. The data access request is an example of a dual approval, 
whereby the teller has to request an approval from the head teller when the head teller 
faces the decision to act beyond her authority. 
The principles of the enactment of information security institutionalization in 
Centro Metropolitan Bank can be summarized as a framework aimed at preventing and 
managing fraud. The components of such framework include details such as: 
• Multiplicity of personnel performing duties: each task is performed by 
several personnel, departments, or a taskforce consisting of personnel 
from different departments. 
• Individualized access levels: this concept is similar to the access privilege 
whereas each personnel involved in a specific task is given an access right 
according to his or her unique role in the task. 
• Dual control and approval. 
• Supervision. 
• Transaction and post transaction control. 
• Exception reports: reports generated to detect unusual transactions. 
• Workflow. 
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• One-way passwords: each transaction request needs to pass the system 
supervisor. The system supervisor determines the access eligibility of the 
individual presenting such a request. 
 
5.3.1.3. Script Replication: As a commercial bank with nationwide operations, 
Centro Metropolitan Bank owns branches, ATM machines, and EDC machines 
distributed throughout the geographical expanse of the nation. The operational aspects of 
these entities are managed by regulations issued by headquarters and these regulations 
reflect the unique culture of Centro Metropolitan Bank as a corporation. The Operational 
Risk Management Team Leader says: 
“All policies and procedures are determined at management levels. There is no way 
anyone can create and implement procedures if there is no referring policy. These 
procedures are not just for people at headquarters, but also for every stakeholder of the 
bank. These procedures reflect our culture.” 
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Figure 5.3 – The Triangle of Regulations of Centro Metropolitan Bank 
 
The procedures, regulations, policies, and culture of Centro Metropolitan Bank are 
depicted as a triangle. The top of the triangle, which comprises the policies, is depicted as 
the highest level of regulations and functions across the bank. Policies are translated into 
procedures, which are strategic and end-to-end6. Each procedure pertains to a certain 
business unit within the bank and needs to be acknowledged and agreed upon by the 
board of directors. An example of procedures is the procedure to handle payment cards. 
These procedures belong to the mass-banking group. The procedures include: 
a. Procedures to create payment cards. 
b. Procedures to issue payment cards. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This means that procedures need to be explicit and clear, and depict operational procedures from 
beginning to the end. 
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c. Procedures for use of payment cards by customers. 
 
The lowest level, which is very unique to each branch or each merchant that uses 
the EDC machines, represents the technical and implementation guidelines. These 
guidelines are to be acknowledged and agreed upon by the head of business unit. 
Illustrating this point is the requirement that the use of EDC machines needs to be 
acknowledged and agreed to by a store manager before the machines can be adopted. 
Another example is the implementation of dual-approval procedure at local branches. The 
Operational Risk Management Team Leader talks about these risks: 
“We have to maintain and heighten controls at our branches and at stores that use our 
EDC machines. They are physically away from us here at the headquarters. We can’t bear 
any consequences due to our failure to identify risks relating to people and procedure.” 
 
At these levels, all regulations are adopted and implemented according to the orders 
issued from the headquarters. Personnel and stakeholders (e.g., customers) at the lowest 
level reciprocate this sensitivity to security to support the bank’s identity and culture. The 
replication of such regulations (i.e., scripted behavior) is present across the bank: from 
top level to bottom level and from headquarters at the nation’s capital to regional and 
local branches. The paths of translating policies to technical and implementation 
guidelines signify the script replication whereby principles contained in policies are 
transferred and further developed from business units at the headquarter to guidelines at 
local branch offices.  
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5.3.1.4. Patterned-Actions Objectification and Externalization: Due to the 
great diversity and the number of people involved in the bank’s operational activities, 
control is rigorously implemented at branch level and merchant level (for EDC 
transactions). This is because the likelihood of people- risk and procedure -risk becomes 
much more apparent at these levels. The degree of control required for handling such 
risks is higher to prevent manipulation by personnel. The E-Banking Product Manager 
says: 
“Once we had a case of deception by our branch staff. They were found to be playing 
around with our dual-approval procedure. That one time, a customer registered for our 
product and did not fill out his phone number. But a customer relation staff used her own 
number and asked her supervisor to approve the form. That could happen and it did 
happen. And then, when this form was verified, we found out that the phone number was 
the phone number of the staff’s cousin. This incident was reported to us, and we 
immediately started thinking of steps needed to be taken to make our dual-approval 
procedure more effective. So my team and I sat down with IT, market operational risk, 
compliance, and audit, and discussed how to improve the procedure.” 
 
The biggest issue which arises with diversity is the protection and perpetual 
strengthening of the organizational culture. Due to the eclectic and diverse ethnic groups 
in Indonesia, diversity in culture causes Centro Metropolitan Bank to emphasize utmost 
on assigning authority to the headquarters. Local branches adhere to such authority. In 
information security, such authority in general determines how production, distribution, 
and storage of data is implemented. The biggest issue is, however, lack of security 
awareness. The Vice President of the Head Corporate Center Audit specifies this 
concern: 
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“The biggest problem that we have is the lack of security awareness, especially at our 
lowest level. We put the onus to increase awareness responsibility upon our branch 
managers. They are then made responsible to raise awareness of local branch staff and 
customers alike. This responsibility allows managers to enforce the disciplinary act on 
staff failing to comply with security guidelines. The penalty is hierarchical and is 
categorized as follows: mild, medium, and severe. If there is a security breach at a local 
branch, the penalty is considered medium. The staff involved will receive warning and 
their misconduct will be recorded. They will also receive a salary cut for 6 months and a 
poor annual performance appraisal.” 
 
As such, branches are technologically linked with workstations connected to 
headquarters to enforce control. Every activity at branch level has to adhere to the 
policies and procedures enforced and are supervised by the Board of Directors and the 
Board of Commissioners. The dual-approval procedure is strictly enforced to ensure that 
personnel at the branch level comply with the policies and procedures. This procedure 
consists of verification steps that a supervisor needs to implement in order to verify the 
validity of a transaction. 
As for EDC machines, merchants need to comply with rules about the use of EDC 
machines which are prescribed by the acquiring bank and the central bank. Centro 
Metropolitan Bank admits to the difficulty of controlling the EDC implementation, 
particularly when the bank is the issuing party7. This is because it is impossible for 
Centro Metropolitan Bank to supervise and control the use of its card products on EDC 
machines that have offline feature. The only opportunity that the Centro Metropolitan 
Bank has is to control its own EDC machines through regulatory mechanism and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This means that Centro Metropolitan Bank is the issuing bank whose card product is used on an EDC 
machine that belongs to another commercial bank (i.e., the acquiring bank). 
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technology control. Centro Metropolitan Bank employs some of the strictest and most 
rigorous procedures for merchants who wish to obtain the bank’s EDC machines (see part 
B of subsection 5.3.1.3). In addition, the bank maintains the security of its EDC machines 
by employing the following features: 
 Content security: this feature uses various cryptography schemes. 
o Terminal line encryption (TLE): an encryption method that encrypts 
data before it is transmitted from the EDC machine to the host. 
o Pretty good privacy (PGP): this encryption method involves a third 
party (e.g., Visa or Mastercard). Data is encrypted before it is 
transmitted from Centro Metropolitan Bank to the third party. 
o Triple data encryption system (3DES): this is a feature to encrypt PIN 
numbers. 
 End point security: this is a feature to secure entities such as laptop 
computers, servers, hosts, etc. 
o Host-based intrusion prevention system (IPS): a system that detects 
unusual activities at computer hosts end. 
 Security management:  
o To consolidate monitoring of security tools. 
o To adhere to international and local standards and frameworks. 
 
The drive to conduct such practices is a part of the bank’s effort to maintain its 
vision and mission and to better serve its customers. These practices demonstrate how 
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doing so or using the given tools becomes a rational habit and a routine among not only 
bank personnel, but also its customers and third-party card issuers. 
 
5.3.1.5. Case: Electronic Data Capture (EDC) Fraud: This subsection presents 
the security breach incident that occurred at Centro Metropolitan Bank in late December 
2009. The case has never been publicized and is still undergoing investigation. This 
subsection is divided into two parts: the incident and the aftermath. 
A. The Incident: In general, the EDC fraud case is an information security 
breach case in which a fictitious merchant, a fictitious customer, and subsequently a 
fictitious transaction resulted in financial loss to a commercial bank. Parties other than 
the fictitious merchant and customer directly involved in this case, which occurred in late 
December 2009, include Centro Metropolitan Bank and another commercial bank, Silver 
Blue Bank, which suffered from financial loss. This case also drew attention and 
intervention from Earl Capita Bank, which acted as an intermediary between the two 
banks and also as a consultant. This case indirectly involved a credit card issuer, which in 
this case was Visa. The case has never been made public as it is capable of causing 
significant damage to the reputations of both commercial banks involved. 
The case became a subject of serious attention when Silver Blue Bank, as the 
acquiring bank, sent a chargeback on February 2010 after settlement (Base 2 transaction) 
occurred. However, the Base 1 transaction, which was the requesting transaction, had 
never occurred. This is due to the fact that Silver Blue Bank had allowed the use of 
offline transactions involving debit card, a feature that should not be permitted for non-
credit transactions in Indonesia. Debit card is less secured compared to credit card since 
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debit card relies only on magnetic strip as an identification mechanism. Furthermore, 
magnetic strip is not embedded with fraud detection aids. Since the Base 1 transaction 
never existed, the credit card issuer could not debit the issuing bank (i.e., Centro 
Metropolitan Bank); hence payment could not be made in favor of Silver Blue Bank. If 
the transaction had been made online, Centro Metropolitan Bank would be able to 
immediately reject the transaction during the Base 1 transaction. However, the offline 
transaction allowed only for card number verification but was not able to verify the 
magnetic strip. 
The perpetrator of this fraud was very familiar with Centro Metropolitan Bank’s 
Bank Identity Number (BIN), which comprise of the first five digits of a debit card 
number. The perpetrator also had knowledge of transaction procedures using debit card 
and the offline transaction feature that Silver Blue Bank offers. The perpetrator was able 
to withdraw more than US $ 1 million and committed the crime from various spots in 
Jakarta.  To commit the crime, the perpetrator created and used a fake debit card that used 
Centro Metropolitan Bank’s debit card characteristics and obtained an EDC machine 
from Silver Blue Bank using a fictitious identification and false requests. The ease with 
which he was granted a product shows the leniency of the procedures in Silver Blue 
Bank. Centro Metropolitan Bank’s procedures require prospective customer to provide 
proof of merchant permit, location permit, and applicant validity. Centro Metropolitan 
Bank also demands proof of administrative legality and business continuity (i.e., product 
shall not be granted if business is on the verge of bankruptcy). 
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Figure 5.4 – Two Modes of Credit Card Transaction 
 
Figure 5.4 describes the transaction processes using a credit card. The top box 
depicts a credit-card transaction process using an online mode EDC. An online-mode 
EDC transaction allows for direct customer verification as depicted by the base-1 
procedure. When a customer enters his credit-credit identifiers (e.g., credit-card number 
and expiration date) or swipes his credit card, the merchant’s EDC machine forwards the 
identifiers to the acquiring bank that owns the EDC machine, requesting for customer 
verification. The acquiring bank acknowledges the request and forwards the request to 
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the credit-card issuer (e.g., Visa or American Express). The credit card issuer 
acknowledges this request and forwards it to the issuing bank, which is the bank to which 
the customer belongs, for verification and validation. The issuing bank then verifies the 
validity of the customer and sends back the verification. The objective of the settlement 
process, which is depicted in the base-2 transaction, is to make the payment request to the 
issuing bank by the merchant through his acquiring bank. In an online electronic credit-
card transaction, the merchant requests for the payment by sending a request to the 
acquiring bank. The acquiring bank sends the request to the credit-card issuer, which 
forwards the request to the customer’s issuing bank. The issuing back acknowledges the 
request and deducts the payment from the customer’s account. 
The lower box, however, depicts the offline electronic credit-card transaction. This 
type of transaction is one that was implemented by the Silver Blue Bank and the 
perpetrator for the EDC fraud case. The base-1 transaction demonstrates the merchant’s 
assumption that the customer is valid during the initial transaction. In the offline-mode 
base-1 transaction, the merchant accepts the payment that will be credited during the 
settlement at a later time. In other words, the merchant does not immediately validate and 
verify his customer. The merchant does so when he sends a payment request to the 
customer’s issuing bank. The problem emerges when the customer or the credit card is 
fictitious. When the acquiring bank sends a request for a payment that is based on either a 
fictitious customer or a fictitious credit card, the issuing bank rejects the request as shown 
in the base-2 settlement transaction. Unable to retrieve the payment, the credit-card issuer 
requests the payment from the acquiring bank instead causing the acquiring bank to pay 
up and lose money. 
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In this instance, after Centro Metropolitan Bank rejected the chargeback, Silver 
Blue Bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank both contacted their respective bank 
supervisors at Earl Capita Bank. They also consulted about the case with their respective 
accounting and payment system supervisors at Earl Capita Bank. Both banks realized that 
if the case became public, they would suffer damage to their reputations and credibility in 
the eyes of the public. In addition, Silver Blue Bank suffered a financial loss of more than 
US $ 1 million. The accounting and payment system supervisors of Silver Blue Bank 
examined Centro Metropolitan Bank systems and demanded progress reports on 
resolution, action plan, and mitigation progress from Centro Metropolitan Bank through 
the Audit Department. Progress was monitored and reports were requested and delivered 
from January 2010 to March 2010. In addition, Earl Capita Bank also conducted random 
inspections of all EDC machines as an attempt to ensure that EDC machines were being 
used for online transaction only. One of the members of the perpetrator syndicate was 
apprehended. The case is still under investigation as of now. 
B. The Aftermath: When an exogenous event such as an incidental case 
occurs, a formal organization strives to return to social stability. In the case of Centro 
Metropolitan Bank, such an effort entails attempts to diminish any damaging impact 
caused by the EDC fraud incident. Internally, Centro Metropolitan Bank formed a 
taskforce to handle this case. The objective of the taskforce formation is to investigate 
any serious incident such as the EDC fraud incident and to coordinate the implementation 
of preventive measures and actions. The taskforce consisted of personnel from the IT 
audit unit as well as the team coordinator, IT Security Department (a subsidiary group of 
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IT Planning, Architecture, and BCP subdivision), Customer Care Group, and Electronic 
Channel Operation Unit. The duties of the taskforce are as following: 
• Assessment of the losses suffered by Centro Metropolitan Bank. 
• Indicating latent risks that potentially threaten Centro Metropolitan Bank 
in the long run. 
• Remedying the acquiring process of Centro Metropolitan Bank’s EDC 
machines. 
• Planning actions to remedy any loss and to prevent similar incidents in the 
future. 
• Reporting the action plans to the Board of Directors. 
 
In addition, Centro Metropolitan Bank also launched the following projects of: 
• Enhancing the security of Centro Metropolitan Bank’s EDC machines. 
• Reformatting the merchant acquisition policies to ensure the existence of 
no fictitious merchant. 
• Forming a new unit whose task is to monitor transactions involving debit 
card and guarding against any misuse or fraud concerning the card.  This 
was done because earlier this unit was a part of the credit card unit. 
• Modifying/reformatting the back office that handles electronic 
transactions so that it is able to immediately detect a transaction that is 
marked or indicated as a possible fraud. 
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These efforts can best be described as controlled maintenance. Controlled maintenance 
can be perceived as a period in time when structure becomes stabilized and hence rules 
and habits become typified and grounded. Controlled maintenance is ultimately stated as 
a post condition to the institutionalization and a priori condition to an incidental or 
exogenous event. As such, when institutionalization occurs, controlled maintenance 
emerges over time through habitualization of resource use. Controlled maintenance, 
however, also signifies an activity that is initiated as a result of a security breach incident 
after which the enforcement becomes heightened due to the strong involvement of the 
central bank. Therefore, the objective of controlled maintenance is to promote social 
order and stability in the organization. In terms of electronic banking transactions, the E-
Banking Product Manager describes this controlled maintenance as follows: 
“We provide policies for customers who wish to use our SMS (i.e., text-messaging) 
banking system and educate our customers on how to use this system. For example, they 
are required to create a PIN during feature activation and we show them how to do this 
through pamphlets. This breakthrough program is not a required electronic banking 
product decreed by the central bank.” 
 
The objective of the Bank’s controlled maintenance and task-force formation is 
therefore to maintain social order and preserve social stability. The patterned-actions 
objectification and externalization is a final process preceding a re-institutionalization, 
creating a new episode of institutionalization. Centro Metropolitan Bank, suffering from 
a serious incident that threatened its reputation, has put every effort into retaining the 
already formed patterned-actions. The result of implementing controlled maintenance and 
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taskforce formation is an implementation of preventive measures, which the Head of IT 
Audit Unit concurs with: 
“We continue to take serious steps to prevent any case similar to this EDC fraud case 
from happening in the future. For example, we created a new unit that specifically 
monitors and controls electronic debit-card transactions and enforces the policies of such 
transactions. We also reformatted our back office that handles electronic transactions to 
enable early detection of suspicious transactions. This case also attracted several 
preventive actions by the central bank. The central bank has ordered that all EDC 
machines are to be used for online transactions only. So no more offline EDC machines! 
There is a six-month grace period to allow all commercial banks to change their EDC 
machines.” 
 
The newly reformatted back office emphasizes on the importance of reporting 
unusual transactions (e.g., a base-2 transaction that is not preceded by a base-1 
transaction for debit-card transactions). The initial focus was on the use of technology. 
However, the mere utilization of technology has proved to be less reliable due to human 
creativity and the general customer’s lack of security understanding. The Vice President 
of IT Security Department confirms this statement: 
“Most security cases are not caused because of technology failure. People can be very 
creative. They can simply put a stick of cigarette matches inside the ATM’s card reader 
so that any card inserted gets stuck. When the gullible customer gets confused, and 
obviously starts panicking, the criminal steps in, disguised as our technical support. 
When he succeeds in getting the card back, he gives a false instruction to our customer, 
telling her to hand over the card and her identification to him for further investigation.” 
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The reporting mechanism is therefore a combination of human effort and 
technology operation. In addition to reformatting its back office, Centro Metropolitan 
Bank also enhanced its EDC machine features, mainly to prevent offline transactions. 
Such efforts depict Centro Metropolitan Bank’s intention to reorganize its operational 
activities by addressing the major obstacle (e.g., security breach incident). Such efforts 
have redirected the operational activities into becoming a habit and an action that is taken 
for granted. 
 
5.3.1.6. Discussion: Centro Metropolitan Bank views technology as an artifact 
that is created by humans and used by them to aid them in their daily activities. The 
interaction between humans, who act as the agency, and technology, provides meaningful 
attributes to the technology as it becomes useful to humans. Technology alone does not 
commit any crime, the combination of humans and technology, however, has a potential 
to cause damage to an institution, including Centro Metropolitan Bank. In addition to 
technology, the bank therefore, carries a strong belief that threat to information security 
may be due to human factor. The practice of securing its information is in compliance 
with the definition of operational risk by Basel II. When auditing the bank’s information 
systems, the auditory team of the audit unit investigates factors that contribute to 
operational risk: people (e.g. faults due to human error or lack of responsibility), process 
(e.g. false procedures), external factors (e.g. hackers or outsiders), and system (i.e., 
technology) (Scandizzo 2005; Flores et al 2006: p. 384). Many procedures and standards 
are formulated in a way that belongs to and is comprehended only by bank’s personnel 
and customers. These procedures and standards are developed using ISO 27001 
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framework, particularly for specific scope such as one that regulates data center. To audit 
the bank’s information systems and their security, the auditory team uses a combination 
of ISO 27001 and COBIT (i.e., for high level maintenance use such as governing risks 
related to the use of information technology). In addition to these frameworks, procedures 
and standards are formulated to conform to and reflect regulations as issued by Earl 
Capita Bank. These procedures and standards become a habit and are communicated 
among personnel, forming and reflecting the culture of Centro Metropolitan Bank. 
The view that humans and technology together may cause harmful impact is 
adopted by Centro Metropolitan Bank. This view is a fundamental notion of the socio-
organizational view of information security. Similarly, this interaction enables the 
emergence of behavioral and cognitive (e.g., power, communication, sanction, etc.) 
properties in the information security institutionalization. As such, the central notion to 
this is that of technology as an artifact. The procedures to access technology in Centro 
Metropolitan Bank are centralized as they are maintained by the IT Security Department. 
As such, the interaction between personnel and technology is regulated by the bank 
whereby such interaction shapes the bank’s structure and needs to be secured in order to 
maintain the bank’s existence. 
The practices and implementation of information security in Centro Metropolitan 
Bank are almost exclusively directed by the IT Security Department. The IT Security 
Department enjoys the privilege to direct the three information-security controls (i.e., 
technical, formal, and informal). The formal control, however, is shared with other 
groups or departments that own and manage the manual format of the automated banking 
feature or product. The technical control and the informal control are therefore the 
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exclusive privilege of the IT Security Department. Unlike that of the Earl Capita Bank, 
the governance of information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank is centralized. 
Centro Metropolitan Bank relies on Basel II’s definition of operational risk. This 
definition highly emphasizes on people, process, external factors, and system and 
believes that the functions of any system depend on people and process. Centro 
Metropolitan Bank mandates one department- the Information Technology Department, 
to maintain and regulate information systems and security, through its IT security unit, 
within the bank. The IT audit unit functions to ensure that the operations of Centro 
Metropolitan Bank’s information systems support the operations of Centro Metropolitan 
Bank in general. Security breach cases in Centro Metropolitan Bank are generally 
individual cases of security fraud at branch level and hence the appropriate actions are 
usually taken by the branch management. Each branch has autonomy (i.e., independent 
power). Each branch usually delivers regular reports regarding any activity as well as any 
newly launched product, reorganization, or incidental case to headquarters. However any 
action involving the use of information systems and security needs to involve the bank’s 
headquarters. The Head of IT Audit Unit explains: 
“Autonomy here means that branch may formulate its own policies within its 
scope. If it involves system, management needs to report to the ones ‘above’. 
For instance, if a branch says they want an IT operational staff, they will have to 
make a request to the headquarters. If branch were given autonomy for the entire 
system, that would be very difficult since our systems are very diverse.” 
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Legend: 
 P1: request for 
data access. 
 P2: request for 
security and 
data access to 
IT security 
department. 
 P3:  self-request 
of owned data 
to IT 
department. 
 P4 and P5: IT 
department and 
its sub-
department’s 
authority to 
grant security 
and data access. 
 
Figure 5.5 – The Flow of Information Security Authority and Responsibility in Centro Metropolitan 
Bank 
 
Unlike Earl Capita Bank, each department in Centro Metropolitan Bank needs to 
send a request to the Information Technology Department in order to access data, as IT 
Department is supposedly the information steward. Hence, access to data is regulated by 
the IT security department, while other departments own the privilege to process data 
according to their own need. For instance, if the electronic banking group needs to 
request for access to the Internet banking data, the group sends the request to the IT 
Security Department. According to its needs, the electronic banking group is given the 
access and modification privileges to process and analyze the Internet banking data to 
recreate other electronic-banking products and regulations. Figure 5.5 above shows the 
implementation and practices of information security among divisions in Centro 
Metropolitan Bank. P1 denotes divisions requesting for electronic-banking data and 
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access to such data to the electronic banking group. P2 entails the electronic banking 
group making security and access requests on behalf of the divisions to the IT security 
department. Interestingly, P3 entails the electronic banking group making data request for 
itself as well as other divisions to the IT planning, architecture, and BCP group. P4 and P5 
denote the divisions’ authority to grant data access and security access, with P4 
specifically denoting permission to use data by the IT planning, architecture, and BCP 
group while P5 denotes access privilege by the IT security department. 
The institutionalization of information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank can be 
simplified according to episodes T1, T2, and T3. Each episode denotes all the four 
institutionalization processes: script encoding, principles enactment, script replication and 
or revision, and patterned-actions objectification and externalization. Episode T1 denotes 
a condition prior to the EDC fraud incident. Episode T2 depicts a situation when the 
incident took place in which each process demonstrates the efforts undertaken by Centro 
Metropolitan Bank to cope with the impact. Episode T3 emerges as an effect of such 
efforts in episode T2, in which social order and stability have successfully been 
maintained. Script encoding in episode T1 describes a situation when Centro 
Metropolitan Bank adopted the guidelines given by Earl Capita Bank, taking into account 
Centro Metropolitan Bank’s unique culture and additional regulative frameworks (e.g., 
Basel II, ISO 27001). When principles are enacted in this episode, Centro Metropolitan 
Bank’s personnel began to adopt the recently formulated regulations into their everyday 
operational activities. Moreover, personnel manage to habitualize their action as script is 
further replicated. This is because there is no incident or event that affects a change in 
Centro Metropolitan Bank as an institution. An example of this situation is the regular 
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practice of information security and governance, which pervades every place from 
headquarters to local branches. Finally, the moment when personnel’s action becomes 
successfully habitualized and hence institutionalized denotes the patterned-actions 
objectification and externalization. In episode T2, script encoding is preceded by the 
EDC fraud incident, resulting in much of the encoding effort initiated by the strong 
influence of the central bank. The subsequent institutionalization processes denote the 
bank’s struggle to overcome the impact of the incident by implementing the orders issued 
by the central bank. Script revision applies in lieu of script replication since the incident 
caused a dramatic change in the institution and personnel are aware of such change and 
crave for improvement. Script encoding in episode T3 depicts a situation when regulatory 
efforts take into consideration previous efforts in episode T2. The subsequent processes 
in this episode repeat the processes of principles enactment, script replication, and 
patterned-actions objectification and externalization in episode T1 with the difference 
being that these processes signify successful maintenance of social order and stability. 
 
5.3.2. Relationship with the Central Bank 
5.3.2.1. The Macro-Prudential Supervision of Information Security 
Governance: A risk that becomes an actual threat with the potential to cause a 
devastating impact on the bank and public in general is regarded as a reputational risk. 
Any imminent threat related to reputational risk will often invite the central bank - Earl 
Capita Bank to interfere and help in finding solutions to combat such a threat. As a 
regular practice   in adherence with Earl Capita Bank’s policies and regulations, Centro 
Metropolitan Bank, as a commercial bank, delivers regular (e.g. weekly, monthly, or 
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annual) reports to Earl Capita Bank and welcomes auditory visits by a team dispatched by 
Earl Capita Bank. Owing to its own diligent reporting practice, Centro Metropolitan Bank 
attempts not to involve Earl Capita Bank in issues that it is confronting; rather the 
commercial bank strives to conform and abide with Earl Capita Bank’s policies and 
regulations and to consult with Earl Capita Bank when necessary. The interference by 
Earl Capita Bank often results in bad publicity for a commercial bank since it may be 
perceived as being unreliable and unable to resolve its own problems. 
Despite the effort to avoid interference by Earl Capita Bank whenever issues or 
emergencies arise, regular activities (i.e., regular reports by Centro Metropolitan Bank 
and regular auditory visits by Earl Capita Bank) are administered through “one single 
door”, which is the Compliance Department. This department assumes a major 
responsibility to deliver reports and written progresses to Earl Capita Bank. It also assists 
departments in composing reports so that the requirements and format of deliverables 
conform to those enforced by Earl Capita Bank. The Compliance Department is the 
backbone for the bank’s institutional relationship with Earl Capita Bank. The Vice 
President of Compliance Group confirms this in terms of the bank’s institutional 
relationship with the central bank in the following words: 
“The objective of our group is to represent our bank in maintaining institutional 
relationship with the central bank. This relationship hinges on our obligation to provide 
any activity report to the central bank. In return, they are watching over us too. An 
important impact of this relationship is that we are required to adopt and implement 
statutes and guidelines enacted by the central bank. All commercial banks are required to 
abide by the laws enacted by the central bank and penalties are enforced on banks that 
fail to abide. Of course, we select and evaluate only those that are relevant to our culture. 
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Keep in mind that not all the statutes and guidelines can have significant impacts on our 
operations.” 
 
The practice of regular reporting begins with creating lists, which depict the 
recognized and inventoried bank’s responsibilities. These lists are passed to the 
corresponding departments in charge of maintaining practices of certain items in the lists 
and the person in charge within such department is to elaborate upon the report. In 
essence, this department strives to maintain good institutional relationship between 
Centro Metropolitan Bank and Earl Capita Bank. Penalties are, however, imposed 
whenever there is an error in reporting or late delivery. The Vice President of the 
Compliance Department remarks on penalties, whereby: 
In general, penalties are awarded when report delivery passes its due date. Another 
reason for penalty is due to typing error in the report. For instance, there was an incident 
by which a branch was trying to submit a report online, instead of typing of 3 million, the 
person in charge typed 3 thousand. But this incident was immediately red-flagged and 
handled so that penalty could be avoided.” 
 
As the central bank, Earl Capita Bank, equipped with its deontic power, controls all 
operational activities of commercial banks, including Centro Metropolitan Bank. The 
implementation of such a control is based on the principles and guidelines that Earl 
Capita Bank issues and enforces. Such control is also applied to operational routines 
(e.g., e-banking products monitoring) in addition to control practices for incidental cases. 
This control lays much less emphasis on punishment unless extraordinary impact takes its 
toll on operational routines. In addition to the statement on electronic banking products, 
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the E-Banking Product Manager makes another statement regarding the central bank’s 
control on electronic banking products: 
“…This breakthrough program is not a required electronic banking product decreed by 
the central bank. The central bank, however, pays close attention to this service to ensure 
that it’s working properly and it does not harm confidential data and information.” 
 
Not only does Earl Capita Bank oversee the governance and implementation of 
information security in Centro Metropolitan Bank, but Earl Capita Bank also exercises its 
deontic power to interfere into Centro Metropolitan Bank’s incidental cases, including 
security breach incidents. Earl Capita Bank plays its role as an external governing body 
by summoning Centro Metropolitan Bank’s representatives for risk education, demanding 
intensive reports on mitigation progress, and dispatching auditory teams. With regard to 
the EDC fraud incident, the Head of IT Audit Unit says: 
“…The central bank also dispatches a team to randomly inspect merchants whether their 
EDC machines have been changed by their host bank to conduct offline transactions 
only.” 
 
In terms of information security case, the reporting practice is similar to the 
reporting practices of other cases and itemized reports. The reporting practice of 
information security case may be delivered by the Compliance Department, or not. . This 
decision depends on the nature of complexity of the report. If the case to be reported is 
delicate, the report is then composed with the assistance of the Compliance Department 
and is also delivered by the Compliance Department. If the case involves inputs from 
various departments in addition to the IT Security Department, the Compliance 
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Department shall act as a coordinator for these departments. Before the report is delivered 
to Earl Capita Bank, it is reviewed once more by the IT Security Department and passed 
on to the Board of Directors to be challenged and debated. The final draft is then signed 
by the Board of Directors and delivered to Earl Capita Bank. 
 
5.3.2.2. Discussion: This section can be summarized using Scott’s multilevel 
institutional processes, similar to the discussion of the same section in the previous 
chapter. The focus of this section is trained on Centro Metropolitan Bank’s institutional 
relationship with the central bank. 
 
Figure 5.6 - The Institutional View of Information Security Governance Focusing on the Governance 
Relationship between Earl Capita Bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank 
 
Figure 5.6 depicts the institutional view of the information security governance of 
Centro Metropolitan Bank which is governed and controlled by Earl Capita Bank. Similar 
to the theory covered in the same section of the previous chapter, the line with the arrow 
facing towards Centro Metropolitan Bank depicts the governance and control of 
information security practices by Earl Capita Bank. The governance and control practices 
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include controls on operational routines such as overseeing of the correct implementation 
of electronic banking products according to prescribed regulations (Van Greuning and 
Bratanovic 2000), demanding reports on information security implementation, raising 
information security awareness, and auditing information security implementation. The 
line with the opposite direction depicts the conformity and report of information security 
practices by Centro Metropolitan Bank to Earl Capita Bank. This one-to-one governance 
and supervisory relationship, which focuses on individual institutions, signifies the 
micro-prudential supervision relationship (Khoury 2009; Krauskopf and Steven 2009). 
As indicated earlier, the micro-prudential supervision of information security in Centro 
Metropolitan Bank is administered by the Compliance Department in a manner called 
“single door.” The representative tasks include providing regular or requested reports to 
Earl Capita Bank and assisting Earl Capita Bank’s audit team during auditory visits. The 
formal relationship between Earl Capita Bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank, particularly 
in terms of information security governance and practices, stems from uncertainty 
avoidance and power distance between the two institutions (Shankarmahesh et al. 2003). 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
Centro Metropolitan Bank is a large government-owned commercial bank which 
has come into being as a result of the merger of four large government-owned 
commercial banks. Three of the four government-owned commercial banks originated 
from Dutch commercial banks and underwent the nationalization process after Indonesia 
gained its independence in 1945. The economic crisis that hit almost all nations in Asia, 
including Indonesia, in 1998 plunged the country into financial difficulty. Troubled 
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commercial banks were either abolished or merged and restructured. The four large 
government-owned commercial banks were merged and restructured to become what is 
now known as Centro Metropolitan Bank. 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss and analyze the case study of information 
security in Centro Metropolitan Bank. Centro Metropolitan Bank is deemed to become an 
example for other commercial banks in terms of IT and security governance practice. 
Unlike Earl Capita Bank whose information security governance is shared by two 
departments, Centro Metropolitan Bank empowers its IT security department to oversee 
the governance of information security. The governance, however, is not exclusively 
enjoyed by the department. The department is required to share the implementation of the 
logical security regulations. An example of this being the regulations that require the use 
of username and password to gain access to the Internet Banking, formulated and 
governed by the Electronic Banking Group. 
An incidental case, such as the EDC fraud, demonstrates government’s intervention 
through the deontic power and constitutive power possessed by Earl Capita Bank. The 
case depicts a fictitious transaction using credit card made possible by an offline-mode 
EDC. In addition to the delineation of deontic power and consecutive power, the case 
also demonstrates that implementing information security is a responsibility shared 
among all subjects within an institution. This evidence is obvious as Centro Metropolitan 
Bank formed a taskforce that consists of not only personnel of the IT security department, 
but representatives of other departments to investigate the case of fraud. 
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6  THE CASE OF BLUE SEQUOIA BANK 
 
 
6.1. Overview 
Similar to the case presented in the previous chapter, the case of Blue Sequoia 
Bank also provides insightful depiction of the governance and practices concerning 
information security in a large commercial bank. Blue Sequoia Bank is one of the large 
banks in Indonesia and is a private commercial bank that has the capacity to leave 
substantial systemic impacts on the nation’s financial well being. As a commercial bank, 
the bank provides a wide array of services to its customers, including electronic banking, 
deposit accounts, export-import facilities, and foreign exchange facilities. This chapter 
focuses on the implementation of governance and practices of information security in a 
private commercial bank.  
In Blue Sequoia Bank, the information security implementation invites lesser 
intervention from the government compared to Centro Metropolitan Bank as outlined in 
the previous case study. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the difference between a 
government-owned commercial bank and a private commercial bank may lie in the extent 
of government involvement. As in the previous case study, the case of Blue Sequoia 
Bank also begins with the background description. It proceeds with details about the 
governance and practices of information security within the bank and the impact of the 
Central Bank’s governance on the internal practices of this bank. 
The objective of this chapter is similar to the objective of the previous chapters: to 
provide a theoretical depiction of information security practices and governance in Blue 
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Sequoia Bank. The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 provides the 
historical background and characteristics of Blue Sequoia Bank. Section 6.3 provides the 
empirical analysis for the Blue Sequoia Bank case, consisting of the following: the bank’s 
internal security governance and practices modeled using the structuration view of the 
institutional theory, the relationship between the bank and the Central Bank depicted by 
the institutional theory, the descriptive security incidental case of the skimming of 
automated teller machines, the interconnection between the structured security practices 
and the institution of information security, and the impact of technology on structured 
information security practices and vice versa. Section 6.4 provides the closing remarks 
and  summarizes  this chapter. 
 
6.2. Organizational Background 
6.2.1. A Private Commercial Bank 
Blue Sequoia Bank (BSB) is one of the largest private banks in Indonesia. It is 
probably one of the few banks in Indonesia that own a large number of ATM machines 
distributed in almost every geographical region across Indonesia. It is also the bank that 
has the largest number of EDC machines used by merchants everywhere in Indonesia and 
provides sponsorships for many social and entertainment events. The bank provides a 
wide range of useful, efficient, and convenient services, which can be attributed to1: 
1. A highly professional management team that is always on top of national 
and international banking policies and regulations. 
2. Highly trained, customer-oriented human resources. 
3. A bouquet of innovative products and services that meet real needs. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Source: http://www.klikBSB.com/individual/silver/company.html?s=2 
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4. Appropriate use of the most advanced technology. 
5. Relentless efforts to maintain the highest level of banking security. 
6. A large network of branches and sub-branches throughout Indonesia. 
7. A broad choice of distribution channels to ensure maximum banking 
convenience. 
8. As on March 31, 2010 BSB has around 6710 cash ATM, non-cash ATM, 
and Cash Deposit Machines installed at strategic places throughout the 
country. 
 
Blue Sequoia Bank’s underlying objective is to always focus on the evolving 
customer requirements. The bank strives to achieve this objective by continually 
enhancing their products and services, i.e., adding more features to increase customer-
banking convenience. For example, the bank rigorously adds more facilities such as 
ATMs, features and services for Internet banking, features and services for mobile 
banking, etc. In addition, the bank further tailors its services for its commercial and 
business customers. The following is a list of services provided by Blue Sequoia Bank: 
 
Types Name of Products or Services 
Deposit Accounts 
TAHAPAN savings, TAPRES savings, Demand Deposit, Time Deposit, 
CD 
Credit Cards BSB Card, BSB Master Card, BSB Visa, BSB JCB 
Electronic Facilities 
ATM BSB, DebitBSB, TunaiBSB, KlikBSB Internet Banking, m-BSB 
mobile banking, BSB Link,Call Center 
Banking Services 
Safe Deposit Box (SDB), fund transfer, travelers cheques, clearing, 
foreign currency 
Loans 
KPR (mortgage), KKB (vehicle loan), capital loan, syndicated loan, export 
credit, trust receipt 
Bank Guarantee 
Bid bond, payment bond, advance payment bond, performance bond, and 
Import Duty Exemption and Refund Center 
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Export-Import 
Facilities 
LC, negotiation, bill discounting, documentary collections, bankers 
acceptance 
Foreign Exchange 
Facilities Spot, forward, swap and other derivative products 
 
Table 6.1 – Products and Services Provided by Blue Sequoia Bank 
 
6.2.2. History of Blue Sequoia Bank 
The bank was founded on August 10, 1955 as the “NV Perseroan Dagang Dan 
Industrie Semarang Knitting Factory” and commenced operations as the Blue Sequoia 
Bank on February 21, 1957. In the 1970s, the bank provided additional channels, as it 
became the Foreign Exchange Bank in 1977. During the 1980s, the bank expanded its 
branch network and enhanced its information-technology services by establishing an 
online system for its branch office network. It also added new products such as saving 
accounts. 
In the 1990s, the bank developed an ATM network as an alternative delivery 
channel and installed 50 ATMs in Jakarta and its vicinity. To enhance the ATM delivery-
channel service, the bank cooperated with the nation’s premier telecommunication 
provider and Citibank. This cooperation allowed customers to pay their phone bill or their 
Citibank credit-card bill through the bank’s ATM. Throughout its long history, this bank 
too has undergone a lot of ups and downs. It most notably survived the severe 1997 
economic crisis that hit Indonesia. However, the panic rush forced BSB to seek assistance 
from the government. As a result, BSB was one of the banks that were restructured and 
reorganized by the Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA). Eventually, the 
bank overcame the crisis in the following year due to its exceptional management and 
decision-making savvy. 
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The recovery was clearly evident: assets increased from US $5.9 million in 
December 1997 to US $7.5 million in December 19982. Public confidence was fully 
restored and IBRA released BSB to Earl Capita Bank in 2000. BSB became a public 
company the same year and hence its shares were slowly diverted from IBRA until the 
agency had finally released 51% of its shares by 2002. A Mauritius-based financial 
institution, Farindo Investment Ltd., won the tender. Today, BSB holds the distinction of 
being one of the banks that exhibit good corporate governance, sound risk management, 
and strong commitment to the needs of customers. It also boasts of being the bank in 
Indonesia with the largest number of ATMs; by virtue of having 6000 ATMs distributed 
across Indonesia. 
 
6.2.3. Organization Structure 
The management structure and organization of Blue Sequoia Bank is similar to 
that of Centro Metropolitan Bank. The executive management team is the Board of 
Directors, led by a President Director. Similarly, Board of Commissioners, headed by a 
President Commissioner, supervises the management and governance practices in Blue 
Sequoia Bank. The only difference is that the Board of Commissioners is not appointed 
by the nation’s government. For instance, the bank’s main shareholder, Farindo 
Investment, appointed an American citizen to become the Chairman and President 
Commissioner of the bank in 20023. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Source: http://www.klikBSB.com/individual/silver/company.html 
3 Source: http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article.aspx?articleID=1026439 
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Figure 6.1 – Organizational Chart of Blue Sequoia Bank 
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Similar to the structure of Centro Metropolitan Bank, each division within Blue 
Sequoia Bank is managed by a Director and each division manages groups that perform 
certain functionalities and roles that support the bank’s operational activities. The 
practices and implementation of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank are governed 
by the Enterprise Security Group. This group is listed under the Information Technology 
and Operation Strategy Division. This division is part of the Corporate Support Business 
Unit, which is one of the bank’s four business units (i.e., Branch Banking Business Unit, 
Individual Banking Business Unit, Corporate Banking Business Unit, and Corporate 
Support Business Unit). Similar to the case of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the governance 
and practices of Blue Sequoia Bank are the sole responsibility and privilege of the 
Enterprise Security Group. In general, the Enterprise Security Group is responsible for 
not only the IT security system of the bank, but also the business continuity plan (BCP) 
for the bank. The Head of the Enterprise Security Group asserts this in the following 
words: 
“Our group manages the following: information security, physical security, and business 
continuity. Yes, this means that we also deal with business continuity. We have a unit 
that specifically handles business continuity and crisis as well as incident management. 
This special unit manages our disaster recovery plan and actions. The Business 
Continuity Management ensures that our operation is always continuous and crisis 
management takes care of incidents that could lead to a possible crisis such as dealing 
with power outrages.” 
 
With respect to this assertion, the Enterprise Security Group deals largely with the 
infrastructure and technical aspect of information security. The bank prides itself on 
	   154 
having one of the most reliable Disaster Recovery Centers amongst all the institutions in 
the nation. Unlike those of the other institutions covered in this dissertation, the Disaster 
Recovery Center of the bank is located in a different geographical location from 
headquarters. The credit for these measures can be attributed to the group’s belief that 
disaster recovery and business continuity represent the ‘availability’ element of 
information security’s core elements: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
 
6.3. Empirical Analysis 
6.3.1. Internal Security Practices (Inter-Level Institutional of Information Security 
Governance) 
6.3.1.1. Script Encoding: Similar to that of Centro Metropolitan Bank, 
information security implementation and practices at BSB too are handled by one 
department: the Enterprise Security Group. This department oversees issues in physical 
or architectural security and business continuity. Any policy regarding information 
security is initiated and conceptualized at the level of the Enterprise Security Group. 
Hence this department assumes the responsibility and privilege of formulating and 
enforcing policies and procedures regarding information security and business continuity. 
The initiation of these rules is based on corporate needs. For example, a security policy is 
initiated due to a need which has been analyzed and initiated by the Enterprise Security 
Group or in response to a need for a tighter application procedure for new customers’ at a 
branch due to the localized culture and higher crime rate in the area where the branch is 
located.  The Head of the Enterprise Security Group says: 
“The initiation is often made by us, especially if we feel there is an urgent need to make a 
new security policy and regulation. But sometimes, a branch feels the new policy restricts 
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their freedom to conduct business and may request the modification of a policy in order 
to make it fit their needs better. Anyway, it doesn’t have to be so rigid. We are very 
flexible.” 
 
 As with policy frameworks for Centro Metropolitan Bank, the BSB uses ISO 
27001 and ISO 27002 as its base frameworks for security policies and procedures. The 
main framework reference the BSB uses is ISO 27001 so that the bank can fully comply 
with regulations governed by Earl Capita Bank. Hence, the implementation of 
information security in Blue Sequoia Bank shows a similarity to security implementation 
in Earl Capita Bank. In Blue Sequoia Bank, divisions possess the authority and 
ownership to own and process information assets. The implementation in Blue Sequoia 
Bank however differs from that in Earl Capita Bank in terms of physical data ownership. 
This practice in BSB is rather similar to security implementation practice in Centro 
Metropolitan Bank. The Head of the Enterprise Security Group states this differentiation 
as follows: 
“Divisions own the right to own and manage their own data and information. If there is a 
request received to access data belonging to some division, the permission needs to be 
requested from that division. But we’re the one that give the final access to the data. Take 
this case for example: a user from division A wants access to information which is owned 
by division B. Then, division A needs to make a request to division B.  After which, we, 
the Enterprise Security Group, provide access to the information.” 
 
Similar to Centro Metropolitan Bank, even if a group or division is the Information 
Steward, the Information Steward still needs to make a request to access its data to the 
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Information Technology and Operational Strategy Division. The Head of the Electronic 
Banking Operation Group states the following: 
“That’s right, we own the data. But we still need to make sure that they, the IT people, 
provide us access to our own data, this is because they have the server.” 
 
In practice, new information security policies and procedures are formulated by a 
task force which is coordinated by the Enterprise Security Group. This task force 
analyzes the gap between the bank’s needs and the requirements by Earl Capita Bank. 
These rules are then finalized and approved by the Board of Directors. In terms of 
business continuity, the formulation procedures include studying the impact analysis, 
formulating strategies and procedures, and educating stakeholders. Through the 
Enterprise Security Group, the bank seeks helps from consultants or higher institutions to 
formulate business continuity procedures. 
While the social and behavioral (i.e., human related) aspects of information security 
of certain banking products are mostly handled by departments that own such products, 
the Enterprise Security Group owns the privilege to deal with the physical and technical 
aspects of the information security of such products. The department manages 
installations and upgrades of IT systems security tools (e.g., anti virus software or 
firewalls) and maintains the use of security management applications (e.g., identity 
management application or user ID management application). The department reviews 
these applications annually to assess the needs for further enhancement. Security tools 
enhancement depends on availability of new patches or versions of such tools. These 
maintenance and enhancements depend upon: 
 User (i.e., the bank’s personnel) request. 
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 Policies made by the Enterprise Security Group or by the Information 
Technology Department (usually for development of new hardware). 
 Demand by a business unit or a department (e.g., the need to develop a 
new banking product). 
Regarding the maintenance and enhancements issue, the Head of the Enterprise 
Security Group states that: 
“Yes, the process is that way. So, if you ask me about any changes of technology and 
security, there are three sources for such changes. These are the user, the policies issued 
by IS or the IT and Operation Strategy Division, and a demand made by a business unit. 
If a request comes from a business unit, it’s usually because of a new product or a new 
service. So if a business unit makes a proposal request, we will assess the need based on 
the IT requirement, security requirement, and service requirement, before it’s 
implemented. All these could dramatically change the existing information security. But 
you can also say that a user request represents a request by a business unit because a user 
is the bank’s staff and a member of a certain business unit.” 
 
In addition to the above mentioned security policies, the Enterprise Security Group, 
has the authority to formulate and enforce policies regarding the bank’s Business 
Continuity Plan. Policies and procedures regarding Business Continuity Plan are 
considered complex policies and procedures. 
 
6.3.1.2. Principles Enactment: In general, the bank classifies security risk as 
internal risk or external risk. The bank believes that security risk often generates outside 
of the bank and therefore feels the need to ensure transaction security and convenience 
for its customers. However, the bank also realizes that risk can be an internal issue, which 
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is likely to be caused due to unethical conduct by the bank’s personnel. An example of 
this is data leaked by an employee for monetary exchange. Given this premise, the bank 
feels the need to develop and implement integrated information security governance. 
Despite the fact that breach incidents are often caused by human conduct, the focus of 
security governance in Blue Sequoia Bank is largely on procedures to secure technology. 
Just like any other institution, the bank also believes and does realize that security 
risk is closely related to people- failure (i.e. socio-engineering issue) as stated by the 
Head of the Enterprise Security Group: 
“Security is not simply a matter of technology. Therefore, security is linked to the process 
and people aspects. So we’re trying to make sure that the policies and procedures that we 
have formulated meet the current technology development as exists out there.” 
 
A shift towards more “human and organization oriented” security governance has 
actually been initiated. Blue Sequoia Bank considers reputational risk to have a more 
destructive impact than financial risk. As an attempt to implement a more human and 
organization oriented security governance, the bank’s focuses on raising security 
awareness, using standards prescribed by the International Standards Operation (ISO). 
Some of these efforts include: 
 Annual security campaign by issuing encouraging statements to personnel. 
 Security education, for example displaying videos on security best practices 
for personnel. 
 Customers’ awareness: efforts have been made as a part of the security 
campaigns. These campaigns are short advertisements on national television 
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or statements on how to securely type in a PIN number in an ATM, which 
are published in newspapers and magazines. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 – An Example of Security Campaign Using Sticky Note Aimed at Bank Personnel 
 
Figure 6.2 depicts an example of the Annual Security Campaign which shows 
statements aimed at the bank’s personnel. This statement is printed on a sticky note that is 
distributed to the personnel. It is seen, and then is implemented internally by personnel. 
The statement is loosely translated as “Is your computer anti-virus application in its 
latest version?” 
The practice of addressing a business unit or any specific demand by a department 
starts by the Board of Director’s evaluating procedures and services for implementation 
	   160 
of the new product. The implementation is then supervised by the Enterprise Security 
Group. When such a demand is addressed, new policies are circulated and distributed 
throughout the Headquarters and to branches. Branches receive the new policies and 
procedures through electronic copies or via Local Area Network (LAN). Complex 
policies and procedures (e.g., policies and procedures for Business Continuity Plan) 
require socialization of the entire hierarchy from the branch manager to the lowest 
functionary or clerks. As an effort to socialize staff to the new policies and procedures, 
Enterprise Security Department personnel visit the bank branches to provide solutions for 
the implementation of these new policies and procedures. Such solutions are the 
conduction of  workshops, developing information kits, providing instructional videos, 
etc. 
While the Enterprise Security Group deals with the physical and technical aspects 
of security, the Electronic Banking Operation Group, for example, handles electronic 
banking products such as ATMs, Internet banking, mobile banking, phone banking, debit 
and cash electronic payments, and the Flazz® card. This department proposes and 
develops new electronic banking products and maintains such existing products. Despite 
the security requirements and applications being maintained and managed by the 
Enterprise Security Group, new product proposals are handled by the Operation and 
Service Support Group. Hence all policies related to electronic banking products are 
formulated by the Operation and Service Support Group. Together with the Electronic 
Banking Operation Group, the Operation and Service Support Group evaluates user 
requirements for any new electronic banking product. This department also formulates 
the policies and procedures related to the use of any new product. Security policies and 
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procedures for a new electronic banking product, however, are still formulated and 
enforced by the Enterprise Security Group. For example, when the Enterprise Security 
Group formulates security policies for the purpose of electronic payment using a debit 
card, the department reflects the policies already enshrined in the debit-card payment 
policies which are distributed and enforced by Earl Capita Bank. However, as the Earl 
Capita Bank requires a standardized format for debit cards, this mandatory compliance 
requirement delays BSB’s attempt to enhance its security feature for its debit-card 
payment. 
 
6.3.1.3. Script Replication: Among commercial banks in Indonesia, Blue Sequoia 
Bank is known for its large number of ATM machines and branches distributed 
throughout the nation. Such a large number of ATMs and branches gives rise to various 
challenges as far as promoting secure electronic and banking transactions in a nation with 
a large population is concerned. The obvious challenge that the bank faces is in the form 
of the various interpretations of security culture which are prevalent among Indonesians. 
Owing to low Internet penetration, most security breach cases occur at branch level and 
involve unaware or even gullible, customers. The Head of the Electronic Banking 
Operation Group states: 
“Security breach… Cases in security breach usually are caused by customers not 
knowing the importance of keeping their information and transaction data to themselves. 
It’s simply a question of customers being unaware of security. Indonesian customers are 
different from western customers. Security breach cases in Indonesia often occur not 
because of sophisticated attacks, for example hacking cases such as in the west. Here in 
Indonesia, customers are not avid Internet users. In fact, not many people know about the 
Internet and ICT, except those in major metropolitan cities such as Jakarta.  Customers 
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are so gullible that criminals take advantage of the lack of security awareness and prey on 
these customers. Customers are tricked into handing over their private and sensitive 
information to undercover criminals. That is what’s happening here.” 
 
While state-of-the-art technologies and security applications have been the bank’s 
primary concern, Blue Sequoia Bank does realize the importance of the people aspect in 
information security. The bank understands that a strong security culture begins with 
security-savvy and well-educated personnel. In general, the practice of information 
security governance in Blue Sequoia Bank is closely related to and is embedded in the 
bank’s business process. Any newly employed staff member is educated about 
information security awareness, particularly on security rules. These rules are initiated 
and formulated by the Enterprise Security Group. The rules are particularly enforced at 
the bank’s touch points, which are points where personnel directly relate to and 
communicate with the bank’s customers (e.g., local branches). Any violation of these 
security rules is considered a fraud. An example is a staff member’s failure to follow 
procedures for money transfer. 
As a private, non government-owned institution, Blue Sequoia Bank has a more 
straightforward culture and a less vertical chain of command. Already formulated rules 
are studied by a task force. The objective of doing so is to analyze and ascertain if the 
rules have satisfied both the requirements of the Central Bank and also the needs of Blue 
Sequoia Bank. If not, then a revision is rendered necessary. All rules, including those for 
information security, once formulated and revised are proposed to the Board of Directors 
for approval. Once they are approved, a new policy is expanded to include the details of 
the newly formulated rules in standard procedures. The procedures are implemented for 
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the benefit of all personnel in all strata at various branches (see figure 6.3 for rules and 
behavioral transfer). 
Headquarter 
 
Regional Offices 
 
Main/Regional Branch Offices 
 
Local Branch Offices 
 
Figure 6.3 – Rules and Behavioral Transfer at Blue Sequoia Bank 
 
As such, the new policies and procedures require thorough and rigorous 
socialization at each branch, from the branch manager to the lowest level personnel. In 
order to do so, the Enterprise Security Group at headquarters sends a delegate to each 
branch. The delegate provides education and solutions of issues arising from the 
implementation of these policies and procedures. Examples of policies and procedures 
education and solutions include conducting workshops, distributing pamphlets, and 
showing videos. Moreover, local branch managers have a right to connect directly with 
headquarters through the operational development and service division to report and 
register request for revision. The Head of the Electronic Banking Operation Group 
expands on the issue of educating and socializing staff about the security rules for 
electronic banking in the following words:  
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“Education and raising awareness of e-banking products and their uses are done by us, the Electronic 
Banking Operation Group. Our efforts include the education and raising of awareness about secure 
electronic banking. The message is conveyed to customers and our staff using various communication 
channels, such as emails and newspaper ads. We also put up flyers and banners at local branches.” 
 
6.3.1.4. Patterned-Actions Objectification and Externalization: Blue Sequoia 
Bank has the most sophisticated technology and information-security technology among 
its peers in Indonesian banking sector. As the bank realizes that security is also largely 
connected with people and organizational issues, the bank enhances its technical security 
features so that people cannot trespass easily. In addition, the bank promotes concentrated 
campaigns to increase security awareness among its stakeholders and educate its most 
precious stakeholders- the customers. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 – Electronic Token Device 
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The bank has put comprehensive and sophisticated IT security systems in place. 
The bank prides itself on its security coverage. The BSB was the first public institution to 
issue electronic token for online-transaction authentication. The bank prides itself on 
being the pioneer in the use of token for authenticating electronic transactions. In addition 
to username and account, certain systems that are prompted for payment using BSB card 
require a dynamic password that is generated by the token. The token, provided by 
VASCO Data Security International Inc., is available free to bank customers provided 
they are able to verify their account validity. The Head of Enterprise Security Group 
reasons that: 
“Authentication is important as it allows us to differentiate between those who own the 
right to gain access and those who don’t. In the past, authenticating internal users was 
easy since these are employees. However, development of technology and Internet has 
provided the external users, our customers, with the capacity to access our systems. 
Hence we figure that we need to create usernames and dynamic passwords.” 
 
Other authentication technology includes biometric authentication. The bank has 
incorporated biometric authentication since 1996, which is a system that works by 
authenticating user’s fingerprint. Biometric authentication is used merely for internal 
users, i.e. bank personnel. The bank is very serious about its information systems security 
and pays particular attention to security technology. The followings are some of the 
bank’s security technologies: 
 Technologies to preserve authenticity: these technologies are intended to 
authenticate users. Common applications are ones that use user ID and password. 
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o Electronic token device (see figure 6.4): This device generates dynamic 
password (i.e., single-use password). 
o Biometric (e.g., fingerprint scanning): This technology has been around 
since 1996 and is for branch supervisors to approve any teller transaction 
that is over the limit (e.g., a deposit of over US $2500 and a withdrawal of 
over US $5850). 
o External applications: These applications are used by customers such as 
ones using web banking, requiring PIN or dynamic passwords generated 
by the electronic token device.  
 Security infrastructure: Technologies and applications which are for network use. 
o Firewall. 
o Host intrusion prevention system: Works in a similar way to a firewall 
operation but is used on a personal desktop or a personnel’s terminal. The 
goal is to limit online access to the desktop. 
o Network segmentation: The concept of dividing network security based on 
priority and critical impacts on the bank. 
o Tripwire: An integrity checker tool that continuously monitors a server to 
prevent unauthorized changes in the server’s content. 
o Fraud monitoring system: A system that alerts staff about any unusual 
transaction. 
o Antivirus application. 
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Tools are also used to monitor the bank’s ATMs. In addition, the bank uses 
surveillance cameras in ATM vestibules and is attempting to migrate its debit card from a 
magnetic strip to a chip card; a feature found in credit cards. Of BSB’s 6000 ATMs, only 
200 ATMs do not have the capability to read chip cards. Another tool used, Hewlett 
Packard® Open View, does not relate to security functionality, however, and is used to 
monitor and detect the life of the bank’s servers and applications. 
 
6.3.1.5. Case: Automated-Teller Machine (ATM) Skimming: This subsection 
provides a similar overview as the same subsection in the previous chapter, pertaining to 
the Centro Metropolitan Bank. Since the emphasis is on security breach incident, this 
section draws upon an incident of script revision resulting from an exogenous event 
rather than script replication. An automated-teller-machine (ATM) skimming incident is 
presented in this section. 
A. The Incident: The ATM skimming case can be used to describe the 
information-security institutionalization at Blue Sequoia Bank. The case involved 
installing equipment on an ATM to steal card’s identity. Similar to the incidental case of 
Centro Metropolitan Bank, the perpetrator of this ATM skimming at BSB case is a 
syndicate or an organized group of criminals. Episodes of this case were detected in 
January 2009 when there were instances of unauthorized debit from Bulgaria and 
Canada. More than ten customers complained that their accounts were debited without 
their knowledge. 
Once these unauthorized debits were identified, the bank discovered skimming 
equipments (the skimmer and disguised surveillance cameras) mounted in ATM 
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vestibules in 13 locations in Bali. The bank immediately blocked international 
transactions for debit cards that had been used in ATMs in Bali during the period from 
August to September 2008. 
In January 2010, a huge increase in complaints by customers was addressed to Blue 
Sequoia Bank. The complaints came from customers whose debit cards were not 
debarred from initiating international transactions. The incidents showed unauthorized 
debits from Bali and Australia. The bank then immediately terminated all debit cards that 
had been used in ATMs in Bali during the period of August to September 2008 and 
replaced these cards with new debit cards for the customers whose debit cards were 
terminated. 
The bank immediately performed an investigation and discovered the following 
patterns: 
 The victims had transactions in Bali. 
 Unauthorized transactions (i.e., debits) always occurred abroad, 
specifically in Bulgaria and Canada. The authentic customers were able to 
provide evidence that they had never been abroad when the transactions 
occurred. 
 
Based on these facts, the bank inferred that there was a syndicate that installed 
ATM skimming equipments in several ATM vestibules active in Bali in 2008. The 
syndicate was a team of Indonesians who are capable of using skimming technology from 
Eastern Europe. The bank initiated preventive action, which concerned mainly securing 
the PIN pad of ATMs. The ATMs were then equipped with a PIN pad cover so that the 
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disguised camera installed by the perpetrator would not be able to capture the PIN 
numbers which were fed in by the genuine card holder. Another measure taken by the 
bank to combat skimming was to install anti-skimming equipment such as jitter 
technology. 
 
Figure 6.5 – An ATM Equipped with Jitter Technology 
 
In addition to the technical prevention, the bank issued new procedures for use of 
ATMs: improving ATM installation standards and procedures especially in remote areas, 
the use of PIN pad cover for all ATMs, and installing surveillance cameras in ATM 
vestibules and ensuring that these cameras functioned properly. 
When the case first came to light in 2009, Blue Sequoia Bank immediately reported 
the incidents to Earl Capita Bank and sought advice and assistance. The case was 
reported as an ATM-transaction fraud. The bank initiated meetings with the Central Bank 
personnel to discuss reports and complaints from the bank’s customers. Meetings were 
conducted mainly with the Central Bank’s Accounting and Payment System Department. 
This resulted in a complaint from the Central Bank’s supervisor, which is the subdivision 
of the Private National Banks Supervisors (i.e., the Earl Capita Bank’s bank supervisory 
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department subdivision 3), citing that the report should have been addressed to the 
Central Bank’s Supervisory Department. This complaint, however, showed up the lack of 
communication among departments within the Central Bank. In March 2010, when the 
incidents became more prevalent, Earl Capita Bank dispatched an auditory team to study 
and investigate the ATM skimming incidents in Blue Sequoia Bank. 
B. The Aftermath: Contrary to what Centro Metropolitan Bank experienced, 
Blue Sequoia Bank suffered from reputational damage due to ATM skimming incident. 
While there was no sizeable financial damage, the bank experienced significant loss of 
customers’ trust in terms of using ATM machines for card transactions. The Head of the 
Enterprise Security Group mentions about the reputational damage as follows: 
“To be honest, there wasn’t that much financial damage caused by this skimming 
incident. The biggest impact is on our reputation though. This is why we actually wanted 
to use control. By this I don’t mean controlling our reputation, but we want to better 
manage our reputation so there won’t be any negative impact on our reputation. For a 
bank like us, the financial loss caused by this kind of incident is absolutely nothing 
compared to the larger impact that could haunt us every year to come. So if you pay 
attention to the larger impact, which could lead to reputational risk, it’s like we are 
getting huge attacks. Why?..Because in the long run people will never trust our ATM 
transactions. They are scared of using their debit cards on our ATM machines. This is by 
far our biggest fear when it comes to security breach incidents such as this one. Not just 
us, but I believe also all other banks in Indonesia.” 
 
The extent to which the ATM-skimming incident impaired Blue Sequoia Bank is 
delineated by its effort to undo damages caused by the incident. Similar to Centro 
Metropolitan Bank, Blue Sequoia Bank has been forced to form a task force to handle the 
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ATM-skimming incident. This task force consists of the bank’s personnel representing 
divisions involved in the otherwise normal operational conduct of debit card transactions 
as well as ATM support and maintenance. The main objective of this task force is to 
investigate these incidents. The task force consists of personnel from the following 
business units:  
 The Enterprise Security Group, which acted as the task-force coordinator.  
 The Technology Division of the Operation Strategy and Design Group.  
 The Operation and Service Support Group, whose primary task was to inform 
customers who were victims of the incidents of disputed transactions. 
 The Public Relation Division. 
 The Information Technology Group, whose task was to investigate transaction 
pattern. 
 The Legal and Compliance Group, who communicated the incidents and any 
recovery-act progress to Earl Capita Bank. 
 The Risk Management Committee, which ensured that all recovery acts had 
minimum risk impacts. 
 Division management and the Board of Directors. 
 
Several steps that the bank undertook to prevent similar incidents from occurring in 
the future are: 
 Improving standards for ATM installation. 
 Implementing the use of PIN pad cover. 
 Distributing and installing surveillance cameras in every ATM vestibule.  
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 Most importantly, migrating debit cards from magnetic strip to chip card.  
 
In addition to such steps, the bank conducted a massive campaign to educate its 
customers on the importance of secured ATM transactions. The objective is to raise 
security awareness in general and to educate customers on how to securely use ATM 
cards and make transactions on ATM machines or EDC machines. For doing so, the bank 
distributed educative brochures and pamphlets, announced messages of information 
security and debit card transactions on television commercials, and even conveyed the 
same messages via the bank’s biweekly television program called “Gebyar BSB4.” Figure 
6.6 depicts a sample of an online brochure that educates customers on how to securely 
use their debit cards in ATMs. The Head of the Electronic Banking Operation Group 
says: 
“We are making every effort to raise our customers’ awareness about secured electronic 
transactions, especially in the aftermath of the ATM skimming incident. This is one of 
our efforts to gain back our customers’ trust and to show them that we are very serious 
about this. We distributed pamphlets and brochures that tell customers how to use their 
debit cards in ATM machines and EDC machines when they visit one of our branches or 
when they do grocery shopping at one of our partnered local stores. Oh, did you watch 
‘Gebyar BSB’? We educated our customers using our show. The audience nationwide 
can benefit from this free entertainment show as well.” 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “Gebyrar BSB” is a national television program run by Blue Sequoia Bank to communicate with its 
primary stakeholders (i.e., customers). The program is run every other week and is intended to be 
entertaining and educative. 
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Figure 6.6 – Online Customer Education about Debit Card Transaction 
 
Blue Sequoia Bank has set a long-term objective to prevent a similar incident from 
occurring in the future. The bank has developed a chip-card enabled debit card for ATM 
and EDC transactions. As the bank adds more ATMs throughout the country, the ATMs 
are enabled with the capacity to read chip cards. As already mentioned, out of 6000 
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ATMs, only 200 ATMs of the bank do not have the capacity to process chip-based debit 
cards. EDC machines on the other hand are able to read chip cards since these machines 
were originally designed to accommodate credit cards, which are chip cards. 
 
6.3.1.6. Discussion: Blue Sequoia Bank is of the view that technology can only be 
harmful if it is misused by the human actor (i.e., the agent). Technology is regarded as an 
artifact that aids personnel in their works but it is understood that it can also be harmful 
for the bank and may even tarnish the bank’s reputation. Information security risk is often 
attributed to the ignorance of the bank’s customers about the usage of the technology 
provided by the bank. This unfamiliarity is often used by criminals to swindle money 
from the customers. Hence securing technology at the customer’s end is the bank’s 
priority in order to maintain its security. The Head of the Electronic Banking Operation 
Group states: 
“From the customers’ point of view, security is a must. What I meant was the security 
feature for customers’ transactions. Once we fail to secure their transactions, our 
reputation is damaged. This is because customers will never want to use our products due 
to the mistrust issue.” 
 
The bank therefore regulates the use of technology and the dissemination of data 
and information as an important asset. The belief is that the regulated interaction between 
bank personnel as the agent and technology creates a structured implementation and 
practice of information security which is an attempt to safeguard the bank’s data and 
information. As stated earlier, the bank mandates the Enterprise Security Group, which is 
a subdivision of the Information Technology and Operation Strategy Division. The 
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structured implementation and practices of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank 
leads to the creation of the institution of information security in the bank, which is 
governed centrally by the Enterprise Security Group. 
Despite the seemingly technology-centric orientation of the bank, Blue Sequoia 
Bank believes that information security is an organizational issue, involving people, 
organization, and technology. The Enterprise Security Group therefore handles 
information security issues from the technological, people, and organizational perspective 
as well. Similar to the practices and implementation of information security in Centro 
Metropolitan Bank, the practices and implementation of information security in Blue 
Sequoia Bank are a quasi privilege assumed by the Enterprise Security Group. The 
Enterprise Security Group, however, is given exclusive responsibility to govern the 
technical control of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank. As such, some forms of 
information-security governance acts are shared between the Enterprise Security Group 
and other groups (e.g., the Operation and Service Support Group). The Enterprise 
Security Group therefore has the privilege to direct the three information-security 
controls- which are the Technical control, Formal control, and Informal control. The 
formal and informal controls are shared with other groups within the bank while the 
Enterprise Security Group retains the right to direct the technical controls. Specifically, 
the formal control and the informal control are shared with other groups or departments 
that own and direct the non-automated format of a banking product. An example of such 
responsibility sharing is the customers’ security education and awareness which is shared 
between the Enterprise Security Group and another division depending on the product 
(e.g., Electronic Banking Operation Group for ATM transaction).  
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Legend: 
 P1: request for 
data access. 
 P2: request for 
security and 
data access to 
enterprise 
security group. 
 P3:  self-request 
of owned data 
to IT & 
operational 
strategy 
division. 
 P4 and P5: IT 
department and 
its sub-
department’s 
authority to 
grant security 
and data access. 
 
Figure 6.7 – The Flow of Information Security Authority and Responsibility in Blue Sequoia Bank 
 
Only the technical form is governed solely by the Enterprise Security Group. 
Similar to Centro Metropolitan Bank, the governance of information security in Blue 
Sequoia Bank is therefore centralized. Figure 6.7 depicts the practice of information 
security in Blue Sequoia Bank. The BSB’s implementation of information security bears 
a total resemblance to security implementation in Centro Metropolitan Bank, with one 
division requesting access to information being required to send such a request to the 
information-steward division before the actual access is granted by the Enterprise 
Security Group. If a group wants to request an access to electronic banking data and 
obtain such data, as depicted by process P1, then the group has to make a formal request 
to the Electronic Banking Operation Group. If the group permits such a request, the 
Electronic Banking Operation Group creates a request to the Enterprise Security Group to 
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unlock access to the requested data, depicted by process P2. Similar to the situation in 
Centro Metropolitan Bank, all access requests for the data5 need to be addressed to the 
Information Technology and Operational Strategy Division, as depicted by process P3. 
Finally, P4 and P5 denote access to data by the Information Technology and Operational 
Strategy Division and access privilege by the Enterprise Security Group respectively. 
The institutionalization of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank consists of the 
following three situations: T1 depicts the condition before the ATM skimming incident 
took place, T2 depicts the situation when the ATM skimming incident occurs, and T3 
refers to an episode after the incident occurs and the social order has been reinstalled. In 
episode T1, Blue Sequoia Bank adopts and implements the security guidelines formulated 
and issued by the central bank by creating a set of regulations marking the script 
encoding, the bank’s personnel begin to internalize such regulations which denote the 
principles enactment, and implement them. This implementation finally becomes a habit 
which demonstrates the patterned-actions objectification and externalization. Similar to 
the case of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the implementation of regulations and principles 
in episode T1 denotes the script replication, signifying a normal practice when social 
order is in place. Episode T2 depicts the situation during the occurrence of the skimming 
incident: the latter processes (processes principles enactment, script revision, and 
patterned-actions objectification and externalization) are preceded by the ATM skimming 
incident and draw the bank’s attention towards reprimanding the perpetrators and 
reinstating order after the incident. Since episode T2 depicts security practice during a 
breach incident, script revision takes into effect instead as personnel seek to improve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The data is stored in the server owned and operated by the Information Technology and Operational 
Strategy Division. 
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security governance and practices. Finally, episode T3 depicts processes that are similar 
to processes episode T1. This is because episode T3 aims to recreate a momentum of 
maintaining social order and stability. The difference is that episode T3 depicts processes 
of maintaining social order and stability post a security breach incident. 
Most cases in security breach are caused by external factors (e.g., the ATM 
skimming case in 2010). Internal security-breach cases are rare, and are usually 
attributable to improper conduct of employees, and are not directly related to technology 
misuse. As such, these cases always involve human actors in addition to technology 
artifacts. In general, the bank regards that incidental cases arise due to the ability of agent 
(i.e., stakeholders) to exploit weaknesses in the technology. The bank believes that the 
well being of its information security depends on the harmony between its people, 
process, external factors, and system. The BSB appoints the Enterprise Security Group to 
secure the interaction between the vital elements of the people, process, external factors, 
and system. Similarly, as incidental cases are attributable to actions of the agent, only the 
group is exclusively responsible for the technical control of information security. It has to 
share, however, the formal control and informal control with other groups or divisions. 
Unlike Earl Capita Bank and Centro Metropolitan Bank, user privilege and data access 
are exclusive responsibilities of Blue Sequoia Bank’s Enterprise Security Group. Issues 
of user privilege and data access are considered technical aspects of information security 
and hence are some of the main tasks of the Enterprise Security Group. 
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6.3.2. Relationship with the Central Bank 
6.3.2.1. The Macro-Prudential Supervision of Information Security 
Governance: Earl Capita Bank regards BSB as the most cooperative commercial bank 
under its purview. BSB views Earl Capita Bank as a partner and consultant rather than a 
supervisor. The BSB consults and reports any progress without Earl Capita Bank having 
to request such a report or progress. As a commercial bank, the bank has to abide by the 
regulations of regularly reporting activities and progresses, immediately reporting 
incidents and offering solutions to such incidents, and proposals to launch any new 
banking product to Earl Capita Bank.  
Similar to that of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the reporting activity at BSB is a 
responsibility of the Legal and Compliance Group. Hence, during reporting cycle, each of 
the other departments develops reports that are submitted to the Legal and Compliance 
Group. These reports are delivered by the Legal and Compliance Group to Earl Capita 
Bank. The Head of the Enterprise Security Group expounds on the responsibility of the 
Legal and Compliance Group as follows: 
“Our door to the central bank is the Legal and Compliance Group. They take care of any 
matters regarding the central bank. If there is any problem that we want to address to the 
Central Bank, we go to the Legal and Compliance Group. This includes problems in 
information security and technology. We formally create a report and give it to the Legal 
and Compliance People. And then they forward the report to the Central Bank. If the 
Central Bank people come to visit us for any purpose, the Legal and Compliance People 
will have to assist them. So no, our institutional relationship in information security is not 
initiated by my division. We’re involved though, but not directly.” 
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When Earl Capita Bank issues new regulations, each department within BSB will 
study the new regulations that correspond to the department’s functionality. The Legal 
and Compliance Group helps in reviewing the new regulations if a department faces any 
ambiguity with the new regulations. On the 15th of every month, BSB, as well as other 
commercial banks, deliver monthly reports online to Earl Capita Bank. These reports 
include issues with and maintenance of IT security systems. Through its Bank 
Supervisory Department, Earl Capita Bank conducts an auditory visit to BSB and sends 
its findings to the bank for further confirmation. Auditory visit also includes auditing the 
bank’s firewall, server location, password reliability, etc. The Compliance Advisor states 
that: 
“You know what- we are actually being audited by Earl Capita Bank, right here, right 
now. Their auditory team is just a couple of floors above where we are now. In addition 
to card-payment products which is an area belonging to the accounting and payment 
systems, they’re auditing just about everything. Yesterday, they audited our IT systems, 
including our IT security systems such as our server location, antivirus software, server 
location, and all other such IT security related stuff. But I’m not sure exactly what they 
did since it’s not my area.” 
 
Since auditing IT security systems is a separate task, the responsible host is the 
Enterprise Security Group. This is in accordance with Earl Capita Bank’s regulation that 
it may determine a specific department to provide reports to Earl Capita Bank. Therefore, 
such department will be the host during Central Bank’s auditory visit or be it’s primary 
reporter. The Legal and Compliance Group will only supervise the institutional 
relationship between Earl Capita Bank and the hosting department that essentially 
represents the BSB. The Legal and Compliance Group, however, may assist the hosting 
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department if materials requested by Central Bank are deemed ambiguous or 
complicated. The institutional relationship of auditing security systems of card payment, 
however, is managed by the Legal and Compliance Group since card-payment auditing 
and reporting are handled by the Legal and Compliance Group. 
As stated earlier, electronic banking and accounting payment systems are audited 
by an auditory team consisting of personnel of both the Bank Supervisory Department 
and the Accounting and Payment Systems Department of Earl Capita Bank. Audit is 
committed via two forms: a random, special audit and a regular audit. Regular audit is an 
annual routine audit that is holistic in nature and may be performed randomly at any 
branch. IT audit is, however, a case of random audit, and so is the IT security systems 
audit. 
 
6.3.2.2. Discussion: Similar to that of the case of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the 
institutionalization of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank cannot be sufficiently 
illustrated without elucidating the institutional relationship between Earl Capita Bank and 
Blue Sequoia Bank. This relationship describes the institutional view of the information 
security governance of Blue Sequoia Bank as governed and controlled by Earl Capita 
Bank. Similarly, the relationship is described using the multi institutional process6 (Scott 
2008). While the top-down process denotes the governance and control act by Earl Capita 
Bank to Blue Sequoia Bank, as well as to other commercial banks, the reciprocity action 
by Blue Sequoia Bank signifies the information security conformity and reporting by 
Blue Sequoia Bank, which is mediated by its Legal and Compliance Group. Similar to 
that of Centro Metropolitan Bank, the institutional relationship of information security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See figure 3.3 and figure 5.6 for illustration. 
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between Blue Sequoia Bank and Earl Capita Bank is a form of a micro-prudential 
supervision of information security, which connotes a one-to-one institutional 
relationship between the central bank and a commercial bank focusing on the 
implementation of information security. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
Blue Sequoia Bank is a large private commercial bank in Indonesia. The bank 
boasts of the most branch offices and ATMs distributed across the nation. The BSB 
originated as a commercial bank specializing in financing textile and garment industry in 
the nation. The 1997 economic crisis that hit the nation severely damaged the bank 
whereby a panic rush caused significant financial damage to the bank. The loss prompted 
it to seek government assistance for restructuring and reorganizing. Today, the bank is 
one of the strongest and most financially influential commercial banks in the nation. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide comprehensive empirical description of 
practices and governance of information security in Blue Sequoia Bank. Blue Sequoia 
Bank is the financial institution in the nation with the most advanced technology and well 
diffused and adopted technology. Similar to the governance of information security in 
Centro Metropolitan Bank, the governance in Blue Sequoia Bank is undertaken by a 
department that functions only to direct the security practices and its implementation in 
the bank.  
The difference, however, is that the three security dimensional controls at BSB 
are almost exclusively maintained by the Enterprise Security Group. The security of the 
debit card provides an example of how the three dimensional controls are maintained by 
	   183 
the group with the formal and informal controls being shared with the Operation and 
Service Support Group. The highlighted difference is that, rather than completely 
surrendering the formal and informal controls to other groups or divisions like the 
responsibility-sharing which is common in Centro Metropolitan Bank, Blue Sequoia 
Bank opines that the Enterprise Security Group maintain the formal control and the 
informal control altogether with another group or division. 
The incidental case of ATM-skimming of information security breach provides an 
example that lead to immediate investigations and actions. The case demonstrates the 
bank’s effort to resolve the incidents while preserving customers’ trust and convenience. 
Similar to the incidental case in Centro Metropolitan Bank, the ATM skimming case 
demonstrates that safeguarding information and implementing information security are 
important responsibilities shared by all stakeholders, including the bank’s customers. Not 
only did the bank form a task force comprising of various business units which were 
involved in the crisis to deal with the incidents, but the bank also reestablished its trust 
with its customers. 
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7  SYNTHESIS 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous three chapters have covered the implementation aspects of 
information security governance in the central bank and in two commercial banks. These 
three chapters, each of which acts as an intensive study of a single information security 
practice and governance case, observe “the entire configuration of individuals, groups, 
and social structure in the setting of an organization” (Lee 1989, pp. 119-120). By 
pondering on the inferences of the last three chapters, the objective of this chapter is to 
synthesize important concepts which have emerged from the three chapters and to apply 
these concepts to reformulate the proposed theory. The emerging concepts are divided 
into two broad categories: the inter level of security institutionalization and the intra level 
of security institutionalization.  The intra level aims to demonstrate the focal theme of 
information stewardship, which is a concept that embodies and encompasses the three 
security controls. Another emerging theme within the intra level is the habitualized 
security routine. For the purpose of this study, all these topics are visited from the 
security-control-dimension angle: technical controls, formal controls, and informal 
controls. 
The only theme that emerges based on the intra-level empirical observation is the 
institutional relationship. Each Bank’s institutional relationship with the central bank is a 
notion of the micro-prudential supervision of information security (Khoury 2009; 
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Krauskopf and Steven 2009). Therefore, the notion of the macro-prudential supervision 
superficially comprises a collection of micro-prudential supervisions.  
To recapitulate, this chapter undertakes a comprehensive discussion on emerging 
themes, which are institutional authority, habitualized security routines, information 
stewardship, and institutional relationship. The discussion begins by revisiting concepts 
and theories, wherein particular focus is on the theoretical framework. This chapter is 
organized as follows: section 7.2 discusses the inter-level institutionalization, provides 
details on script encoding (section 7.2.2), principles enactment (section 7.2.3), script 
revision and script replication (section 7.2.4), and patterned-actions objectification and 
externalization (section 7.2.5). Section 7.3 looks at the macro-prudential supervision of 
information security practices, covering governance and control (7.3.2) and conformity 
and report (7.3.3). Section 7.4 focuses on elaborating upon the emerging themes: 
Habitualized security routines (7.4.1), information stewardship (7.4.2), and institutional 
relationship (7.4.3). Section 7.5 discusses important concepts which have come to the 
fore in the earlier section. It also  closes this chapter, and provides a summary of the 
earlier sections. 
 
7.2. The Synthesis: Inter-Level Institutionalization 
7.2.1. Overview 
Institutionalization is a process of instilling values and creating a social structure 
(Scott 1987). As a process, an institutionalization depicts sequential and logical steps, and 
delineates a scenario in each step. In the context of this study, the underlying institutional 
theory borrows the regulative pillar as institutionalization depicts situations of rule 
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setting, monitoring, and sanctioning (Scott 2008). This study is built upon the regulative 
pillar based on Scott’s institutional pillars and carriers. Scott (2008, p. 52) cited the work 
of Douglas North to depict a regulatory institution in the following words: 
“[Institutions] are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive 
team sport. That is, they consist of formal written rules as well as typically 
unwritten codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules… the 
rules and informal codes are sometimes violated and punishment is enacted. 
Therefore, an essential part of the function of institutions is the practice of 
ascertaining violations and the severity of punishment.” 
 
The four avenues of institutional reproduction, the exercise of power, complex 
interdependencies, taken-for-granted assumptions, and path-dependent development 
process (Powell and DiMaggio 1991), are implicit to the four steps of institutionalization 
in this study. The framework for institutionalization used in this dissertation borrows the 
one introduced by Barley and Tolbert (1997), depicting the following processes: script 
encoding, principles enactment, script revision and script replication, and patterned-
actions objectification and externalization. In this study, these processes are used to 
demonstrate information security governance and implementation in banking sector. In 
general, the institutionalization of information security is intended to build formal 
security structures and to depict actual security behavior (Björck 2004). 
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Figure 7.1 – The Information Security Institutionalization in Banking Sector – Theoretical 
Framework 
 
Moreover, the Central Bank lessens the rigid nature of regulatory compliance to 
allow a certain degree of freedom to commercial banks to apply the information security 
guidelines according to their specific organizational culture. The Central Bank very well 
understands that regulations and policies need to correspond with organizational culture 
to allow for effective acceptance (Hone and Eloff 2002). While the drives for security 
rules adoption and implementation among commercial banks are compliance and 
conformity, such adoption and implementation in the Central Bank are driven by 
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narcissism or survival need. As a strategic-change drive, narcissism places an entity as a 
confident rival to its counterparts (Nana et al. 2010). ,  In this case, narcissism stems from 
the Central Bank’s desire to become a leading and exemplary institution in the banking 
sector, including in the arena of information security. An empirical example of this drive 
is the implementation of Earl Capita Bank’s disaster recovery plans and its desire to 
possess and demonstrate exemplary Business Continuity Plans. The need for survival, 
which is an exogenous drive, emerges in the form of efforts to remedy security 
management inefficiency in the central bank. This exogenous drive is similar to the drive 
to re-institutionalize information security among commercial banks when they are hit by 
any security breach. An empirical example of this drive is the move to improve employee 
productivity by using firewalls to prevent access to social network sites (e.g., 
Facebook.com and Twitter.com) during office hours. 
 
7.2.2. Revisiting Script Encoding: The Creation of Security Culture 
The first process that partially portrays the institutionalization of information 
security is the script encoding. As the first process to occur in an institutionalization 
episode, script encoding entails socialization and “involves an individual internalizing 
rules and interpretations of behavior appropriate for particular settings” (Barley and 
Tolbert 1997, p. 100). Barley (1986, pp. 83 – 84) explains that a script can be used as a 
primer for action and behavior and formal organization serves as “the grammar of a set of 
scripts.” Scripts, however, are not necessarily rules and regulations. Rather scripts are a 
set of guidelines for patterned behavior which have been formulated according to recently 
adopted rules. 
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The security policies and rules formulation is initiated by the management 
commitment to advance and safeguard information asset (Chandra 2008). As with any 
other set of rules and regulations, security policies and rules are formulated to 
institutionalize “a kind of order and a kind of social order” (Selznick 1969, pp. 8 – 9) that 
maintains information security. This study has demonstrated that each institution assigns 
an IT security subdivision to oversee and control the implementation of security policies 
and rules. Except for the Blue Sequoia Bank case, the other cases show that rules 
enforcement affects the organizational culture of the other two institutions. The data 
ownership issue in the central bank leads to a deviation towards a more centralized and 
integrated information security management. While ensuring the technical security 
remains the privilege and responsibility of the IT division, such a deviation towards 
integration leads to the creation of information stewardship amongst divisions owning 
data and information. The Centro Metropolitan Bank case shows that implementing 
security rules needs to be implimented with reference to  the innate organizational 
culture, which allows leverage for implementation and security maintenance on banking 
products that are unique to Centro Metropolitan Bank (e.g., the SMS/text-messaging 
banking). 
Any conduct that causes the script to be revised has its origins in incidents (e.g., 
security breach, economic downturn, technology change, etc.) that deviate from routines 
(Barley and Tolbert 1997). Script encoding starts the moment social actors begin to 
accept socialized institutional principles such as hiring personnel, evaluating 
performance, or offering goods or services to customers (Barley and Tolbert 1997). In the 
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context of this study, the script encoding1 may also begin during the moment when the 
Central Bank decrees information security rules and commercial banks adopt the rules. 
Commercial banks readily accept such guidelines that are formulated along with adopted 
frameworks and strategic information systems plan. Commercial banks understand that 
the effectiveness of their information security culture depends upon how well aligned the 
formulated security rules are with their own strategic information systems plan (Doherty 
and Fulford 2006). 
To enforce the adoption and implementation of security rules, the Central Bank 
utilizes its powers: both deontic and constitutive. The information security guidelines 
formulated by the Central Bank are to be adopted and implemented by commercial banks. 
This process therefore serves to underline the importance of power and institutional 
relationship as well as regulations and compliance, which comprise the regulative pillar 
of the underlying institutional theory (Scott 2008). The regulative pillar emphasizes the 
use of rules and laws as symbolic systems of governance and control. As an attempt to 
adhere to rules and laws enacted by the Central Bank, managements of commercial banks 
are aware of the fact that if they do not support information security, then this lack of 
support can inhibit information security practices (Khalfan and Alshawaf 2004). On the 
other hand, management support has proven to be crucial for the enforcement of security 
policies and for enhancing the organizational culture’s tolerance with good security 
practices in commercial banks (Knapp et al. 2006). 
According to scholars, policies and regulations as sanctioning modalities are one of 
the three modalities that social actors (e.g., bank personnel and customers) use to produce 
institution (i.e., structure) (Giddens 1984; Walsham and Han 1991; Walsham 1993). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As shown by processes a, e, and i in figure 7.1 
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Policies and regulations are created by social actors to preserve social order (Selznick 
1969) and are, as such, an artifact used in structuration/institutionalization. Scripts that 
contain institutional principles of information security emerge as a result of meaningful 
and continuous interactions between social actors and security artifacts and rules. These 
institutional principles are a set of patterned actions that have been previously objectified 
and externalized in a previous episode (TN-1) of an institutional realm. As such, these 
institutional principles are more than mere policies and regulations, which are only a 
notion of formal controls. The institutional principles of information security constitute 
the experiences of the social actors’ which arise out of their use of (security) artifacts and 
from their knowledge of using such artifacts (Orlikowski 2000). Examples include a set 
of principles to secure the use of ATM machines and a set of principles to secure the use 
of SMS (text- messaging-service) banking.  
How do these institutional principles of information security emerge? A necessary 
factor for their emergence is that technical security systems should be augmented by 
adequate organizational support (formal controls) as well as by good information-security 
governance and security culture (informal controls). Only by maintaining the integrity of 
the three security-control dimensions shall information security prevail and become 
institutionalized (Dhillon 2007). Once it becomes institutionalized, all information 
security practices, originating from patterned-actions objectification and externalization 
from a previous episode, manifest as a habit that may serve as principles that 
continuously guide social actors’ security behavior. Drawing on institutional principles of 
information security, bank personnel and customers will always encode these scripts as a 
behavioral script prior to performing their action. In order to do so, bank personnel and 
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customers own a set of institutional principles of information security that are embedded 
in the institutional realm, built upon (habitualized) courses of actions drawn from 
previous episodes. 
The habitualized security actions that result compose a corporate security culture 
which is unique to formal organization. A corporate information security culture supports 
security rules, procedures, methods, and responsibilities, and becomes a natural habit or a 
routine that is performed by personnel (Von Solms 2000; Chang and Lin 2007). The 
objective of information security culture is to assist and guide stakeholders to think about, 
act upon, and experiment with information security in their organization (Chang and Lin 
2007). The major obstacle that hinders the creation of information security culture is 
often the clash between security rules and the customary ways in which the social actors 
have conducted their tasks over time (Chang and Lin 2007). Social actors are therefore 
questioned in terms of their ethical conducts (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000) which form 
the norm, to adjust to security rules and culture. 
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Figure 7.2 – A Framework for Script Encoding at any Given Episode 
	   194 
 
All institutions in the three case studies agree that effective and efficient 
information security can only be achieved when controls are implemented simultaneously 
on technical, organizational, and behavioral aspects (Dutta and Roy 2008). Based on 
figure 7.2, three security-control dimensions form the corporate security culture and are 
interchangeable. For example, experience (i.e., cumulative history of actions) of using 
security artifacts is determined by patterned security behavior according to the already 
prescribed security policies and procedures. Each dimension is triggered by a 
combination of endogenous drive, exogenous drive, or both.  
The 2008 ATM skimming incident at Blue Sequoia Bank, for example, has afflicted 
the way customers use ATM machines and their debit cards, changed security policies 
and procedures at ATM machines and the use of debit cards, and motivated  the bank to 
educate its customers through mass media campaigns. Therefore, bank personnel and 
customers as the social actors readily accept the institutional principles that already linger 
and encode these into scripts that guide their security behavior. The act of encoding 
creates a boundary for social actors to behave according to the scripts, thus constraining 
their actions. 
 
7.2.3. Revisiting Principles Enactment: Intentional Versus Unintentional Actions 
The principles enactment2 starts from successful adoption of rules and encoded 
scripts among social actors. At this stage, social actors readily accept regulations and 
begin to socialize these regulations into their activities in the organization, attempting to 
make these newly regulated activities a routine or a habit. The acceptance and adoption 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As shown by processes b, f, and j in figure 7.1 
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of these regulations and institutional principles, or script enactment by social actors, 
ideally does not involve awareness (Barley and Tolbert 1997). The prescribed behavior is 
viewed as rational by social actors and is the only acceptable way to conform to the social 
structure. When formalized actions become embedded in a collective organizational 
behavior, social actors voluntarily behave according to prescribed institutional principles 
and rules as a routine rationale (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; 
Scott 2008). Social actors adjust their behavior, whether or not they are aware of 
behaving in such a way, when interacting with artifacts and facilities (Barley 1986; 
Barley and Tolbert 1997; Giddens 1984). 
This stage sees the implementation of rules set by the Central Bank, which are 
formed as institutional principles after repeated institutionalizations. The 
implementations of the institutional principles in different organizations depend upon the 
individualized modes of action and organizational culture. Centro Metropolitan Bank, for 
example, develops a framework for managing fraud, which is an implementation of 
Information Security Guidelines. On the other hand, Blue Sequoia Bank focuses more on 
technology. This bank implements the information security guidelines by deploying state-
of-the-art security technologies system and investing in technology, most evidently by its 
use of electronic token device as a complimentary security authentication for electronic 
banking and transactions. This in turn forces Blue Sequoia Bank to develop standards of 
procedure for personnel using its security technologies and also adopt measures to raise 
its customers’ awareness about the importance of security. 
While there are scripts that serve as a prescription for behavior, social actors often 
do not consciously follow the scripts (Barley and Tolbert 1997). Social actors behave 
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unintentionally, simply according to the scripts. When they realize that their behavior is 
according to the scripts, social actors reinstate their rationale in doing so. Bank personnel 
(e.g., management and staff members) and customers maintain their Organizational 
Information Security when they are restricted in their organization’s institutional realm 
(Hazari et al. 2008). Managing security behavior can be achieved through the 
enforcement of security rules, culture, and value system (Dhillon 2001). Security 
behavior is determined by information security awareness and hence drives actors’ 
compliance with security rules (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). 
The prescribed behavior comes with a set of penalties for compliance failure. 
Penalty as an attribute of law is fundamental for the preservation of social order (Selznick 
1969). This study believes that security behavior is a result of compliance with security 
rules and information security awareness (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). For example, as a 
governmental public institution, Earl Capita Bank has announced that personnel misusing 
data or using data for a purpose other than that originally proposed will commit a felony. 
To avoid misconduct, Centro Metropolitan Bank creates and implements a dual control 
and approval procedure for its data access request whereby a staff member from one 
division needs to create a formal request to the data-owning department. The data-owner 
department in turn forwards the request to the IT department for the actual data. These 
implementations demonstrate security management control, or institutional authority, of 
all the three dimensions: technical, formal, and informal. While Blue Sequoia Bank 
seems to pay more attention to technical control, the other two institutions have imbibed 
a more balanced focus on the issue of security-control dimensions. 
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The success of institutional principles of information security enactment is 
generally based on sanctioning, awareness, and habitualized routine. Studies have 
pinpointed the importance of sanctioning employees to perpetuate security rules in order 
to enforce information security (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Hong et al. 
2006; Moulton and Coles 2003; Straub and Welke 1998; Von Solms and Von Solms 
2009). Such principles enactment can therefore be classified into two general categories: 
1. Intentional/aware: In this category, social actors safeguard their information 
asset with the awareness that they are under authority supervision and they feel 
responsible to the social system (i.e., institution) they belong to. While 
institutional and structuration scholars argue that institutionalization/structuration 
emerges from habitualized actions, this study is based upon formal institutions 
where regulations and bureaucracy are rigid and apparent. The rigidity of 
regulations and bureaucracy among these institutions is a result of the multilevel 
governance initiated by the Central Bank at the highest level. Not only do bank 
personnel feel responsible and obligated to support information security in their 
institution, bank personnel are threatened by the sanctioning of security rules. 
Principles Enactment = Security Behavior 
 
 
++++ 
Figure 7.3 – Intentional Principles Enactment 
 
Compliance 
 
 Power exercise. 
 Sanctioning. 
Responsibility 
 
 Ethics in security. 
 Security awareness. 
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Compliance emerges as an effect of power exercised by institutional authority 
(see previous section and chapters on deontic power and constitutive power) and 
sanctioning. Responsibility is an effect of social actors’ awareness about their 
obligation towards information security and the need for engaging in ethical 
conduct to safeguard information asset (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000). 
 
2. Unintentional/unaware: In this category, social actors safeguard their 
information asset simply because this action has become their daily, natural 
habit/routine. They are no longer consciously aware of their obligation to secure 
the information asset of their social system. As the scripts (or corporate security 
culture) linger in the institutional realm, social actors perform their routine tasks 
which include actions by which they are also preserving the security of their 
institution’s information asset. Only when information security has become the 
norm and a culture, should social actors voluntarily preserve it (Vroom and Von 
Solms 2004). Institutional scholars such as Scott (1987; 2008) and Barley (1986) 
are strong proponents of this principles-enactment mode, as they believe that 
social actors unintentionally perform routines that are considered as rational by 
the members of the social system. 
 
As they interact with information systems, depicted in the realm of action, social 
actors incorporate the two modes of principles enactment. Guided by scripts containing 
corporate security culture, social actors manage and maintain information security in their 
institution according to their conscience, the sense of responsibility that they feel towards 
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the security of their information asset, and the fear of penalties and reprimand by their 
fellows and/or institutional authority. Due to the formal nature of the institution, the 
Central Bank and Commercial Banks demonstrate institutionalization as a regulative 
pillar as proposed by Scott (2008). Despite these actions becoming a natural habit 
amongst bank personnel during the phase of information security institutionalization, 
these actions which are done for the management and maintenance of information 
security are strongly governed and controlled by institutional authority which has the 
overall objective of preserving social order and stability. 
 
7.2.4. Revisiting Script Revision and Script Replication 
In this study, script revision and script replication3 are used to depict certain 
moments during the occurrence of security breach incident. This process is actually 
intended to highlight institutional change due to extraordinary drives (e.g., technological 
change, economic downturns, or security breach) that cause social actors to purposely 
alter the institution. Script replication, however, is a connotation of a replication of 
patterned behavior that has become a habit. In Earl Capita Bank, the relatively non-
existent case of security breach places the emphasis on script replication instead. This 
phase depicts an instance of regulatory adoption and acceptance of regulated behavior. 
The two cases pertaining to commercial banks which have been analyzed and discussed 
in the previous chapters depict how security breach incidents force personnel to alter the 
institutionalized information security and hence delineate script revision. The intricacy 
and danger of unidentified breach cases, which have the potential to seriously damage the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Figure 7.1 shows two processes for each script revision and script replication. Processes c, g, and k denote 
script revision while processes c’, g’, and k’ denote script replication. 
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reputation of both banks, are the drive and the objective for the banks to improve their 
information security. 
In a formal organization, particularly one that exhibits a strong vertical hierarchy, 
script revision and replication proceed from the highest level to the lowest level in the 
hierarchy. The three case studies outlined in the previous chapters depict how social 
actors enforce the scripts, act according to the scripts, or modify the scripts. This process 
is common to all stakeholders, beginning from institutional authority to bank tellers and 
customers at a local branch. Bureaucratization creates the chain of command illusion, 
which relies particularly on rules and is in turn, is highly utilized for formal governance 
and control by institutional authority (Selznick 1969).  
Script revision and replication are therefore a result of information security 
governance and control, with the objective to accomplish strategic objective, manage and 
prevent risks, and control and direct actions (see chapter 2). The two modes of script 
sustainability represent how rules and institutional principles are replicated and further 
sustained in a normal condition or altered and improved in the aftermath of a security 
breach incident. Despite these two modes being considered a collective action, script 
revision and replication occur under the watchful eyes of institutional authority. The 
institutional authority ensures security control and governance, and it oversees behavior 
that revises and deviates from security rules and institutional principles or behavior that 
naturally and voluntarily adheres to these rules and principles. 
Now, we arrive at another facet of the issue. Had the breach incidents not occurred, 
the banks would have been under a wrong impression that their information security was 
adequate and rigorous (Rhee et al. 2005). One might argue that a security breach should 
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be considered a ramification and a parasite that needs to be terminated. As a drive 
towards institutional change, however, security breach represents an exogenous 
environmental shock that thwarts “the successful completion of reproductive procedures” 
of information security governance and implementation in these two banks (Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991, p. 153). As such, security breach incidents are considered a focal 
starting point of re-institutionalization. Re-institutionalization signifies an “exit from one 
institutionalization, and entry into another institutional form, organized around different 
principles or rules” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 152).   
A study by Ryan and Bordoloi (1997) identify the most prevalent security threats in 
medium to large organizations, including access to data/system by outsiders, natural 
disaster, loss due to inadequate backups, and inadequate or nonexistent logon processes.  
The breach case at Centro Metropolitan Bank demonstrates a weak physical control by 
another commercial bank. The Electronic Data Capture (EDC) fraud case of Centro 
Metropolitan Bank is a hard hit for the bank. However, the incident did not hurt the 
bank’s financial performance. Knowing that the incident may damage its reputation for 
issuing a debit card that is easily manipulated, Centro Metropolitan Bank immediately 
pronounced the case to be a serious one that could tarnish the bank’s reputation in the 
long run and the bank paid serious attention to the case.  
The ATM skimming case at Blue Sequoia Bank had caused the bank to lose 
customers’ trust. This case is an example of access of data/system by outsiders and the 
lapse forced the bank to figure out ways to improve their debit card transactions and 
ATM transactions. All mitigating and preventive measures involving technical upgrades 
and formal-control modification are a form of security policies improvement. As the two 
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commercial banks alter and improve the security of their electronic-banking transactions, 
scripts containing security rules and institutional principles for the electronic-banking 
transactions change and hence are revised. Script revision requires conscious actions, 
through which social actors aim to improve certain procedures or to survive from a 
mishap. As an institutional change, re-institutionalization is a result of such modification. 
The institutional change in Earl Capita Bank is however slightly different from that 
in the two commercial banks. Earl Capita Bank is progressing toward centralizing its 
information security into two information systems divisions: In	   addition	   to	   the	   two	  departments	   sharing	   responsibility	   for	   technical	   controls,	   the	   Information	  Technology	   Department	   is	   responsible	   for	   technical	   controls	   and	   the	   Information	  Management	  Division	   is	   responsible	   for	   formal	   controls. The institutional force was 
an endogenous drive that could have forced rapid changes within Earl Capita Bank’s 
internal security rules. These instances instead have caused a gradual change in Earl 
Capita Bank. Such institutional change represents the institutional development of 
information security in Earl Capita Bank as the Central Bank, progressing towards 
centralization and elimination of data ownership while encouraging information 
stewardship. This is an instance of script replication. 
While re-institutionalization of information security causes script modification, 
script replication represents institutional development. As introduced by Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991), institutions during institutional development are nowhere close to 
abolishment (i.e., de-institutionalization) but instead they become more complex. During 
institutional development, corporate security culture becomes more complex and more 
embedded in institutional realm as social actors become more familiar with and more 
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accustomed to such a culture. As a subset of organizational culture, corporate security 
culture contains some of the attributes of organizational culture. Not only does it need to 
be shared among members of a social system, corporate security culture needs to have 
sufficiently functioned in order to become valid and capable of being taught to new 
members of the social system. The scripts replicate as social actors become more familiar 
with the culture and principles. 
While script revision requires conscious actions, script revision is a natural 
occurrence as social actors continue to pursue their routines. Barley and Tolbert (1997) 
have signified that only contextual and exogenous changes contribute to script revision 
since social actors tend to resist changes and maintain status quo. Social actors “simply 
behave according to their perception of the way things are” (Barley and Tolbert 1997, p. 
102). In this study, as more and more bank personnel voluntarily perform their routines, 
scripts that contain security rules and principles become more apparent and are replicated 
among bank personnel. Scripts based on secure procedures to use ATM, for example, are 
enforced and implemented by everyone, right from the top-level management at the 
central headquarters down to customers at a local ATM vestibule. 
 
7.2.5. Revisiting Patterned-Actions Objectification and Externalization 
As they become a habit, actions achieve patterns and start dwelling in the 
institutional realm over time. All collective security institutional principles and rules 
become a distinct culture in a formal organization. As part of the effects of action on 
structure, patterned-actions objectification and externalization exhibit how patterned 
actions accumulate into such a culture that is ready to be used as scripts in a subsequent 
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institutionalization episode. The objectification and externalization of actions into the 
institutional realm require abstraction of habitualized actions and behavior until the new 
actions and behavior are considered rational and natural. 
Only when patterned actions become a habit can they be habitualized and 
institutionalized. Social actors need to be acquainted with and socialized to these actions 
before such actions can be institutionalized (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The 
abstraction of patterned actions into the institutional realm is also termed as objectivated 
sedimentation (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 69). After a while, the habitualized 
activities become taken for granted. Social actors become unaware and unconscious and 
accept the rationality of behaving according to the prescribed script. The concept of 
rationale conduct serves as a foundation for agreement and acceptance among social 
actors, or an attribute of a social system (Selznick 1969). This study focuses on how bank 
personnel’s interaction with security artifacts settles intoa habit and a rationale among 
amongst personnel belonging to the same institution. Prior to having their interactions 
institutionalized, bank personnel need to understand the information and security risk as 
well as the importance of information security. 
This study demonstrates how personnel of the Central Bank are introduced to 
information risk and how such a risk can be harmful for the institution’s reputation. Such 
introduction and socialization entails the imparting of information security education in 
order to raise personnel’s awareness of information security. As institutional authority 
develops and enforces security rules, social actors are forced to adhere to these security 
rules and behave accordingly. This process requires extensive policy awareness and 
training, which can be used to reinforce security culture in the institution (Knapp et al. 
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2009). Security awareness and policy education are also important procedures to build up 
strong information security policies, which create a security culture when these are 
integrated into a strategic information systems plan (Doherty and Fulford 2006). 
The objective of organizing and directing actions into natural and voluntary 
patterned actions of safeguarding information assets is to prevent similar incidents from 
occurring and to minimize any risk that has been previously overlooked. In the two 
commercial-bank case studies, this study divides the patterned-actions objectification and 
externalization into two schemes: Institutionalized patterned actions in a normal 
condition and Institutionalized patterned actions in the aftermath of a security breach 
incident.  
In the aftermath of the EDC fraud, Centro Metropolitan Bank immediately formed a 
task force that heightened all three security-control dimensions. The ATM skimming case 
at Blue Sequoia Bank forced the bank to upgrade its online debit-card transaction process 
and the corresponding technologies. In addition to doing so, the bank also started to 
educate its customers on the importance of secure debit-card transactions and raised their 
awareness about information security. 
The two cases of commercial banks cover an extensive array of security 
technologies, which portray the routine interactions between bank personnel and such 
technologies. Both commercial banks realize the necessity of increasing information 
security awareness among bank personnel in order to have successful interactions 
between bank personnel and security technologies. While they draw on their knowledge 
and experience to interact with technologies, bank personnel as social actors require more 
than awareness to initiate such interactions. Successful interactions require all resources 
	   206 
and rules to dictate such interactions (Orlikowski 2000) and “sediment” these interactions 
into the social structure (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Barley 1986; Barley and Tolbert 
1997). 
According to Orlikowski (2000), the following are requirements which form the 
prerequisites to enact social structure based on sustaining social actors’ interactions with 
technology artifacts: 
 Knowledge of using technology artifacts. 
 Experience with using technology artifacts. 
 Formal rules and regulations about the use of technology artifacts. 
 Power to enforce such rules and regulations. 
 Communication between social actors on the use of technology artifacts. 
 Organizational structure as a basis to reflect changes in social structure 
due to the use of technology artifacts. 
 
These requirements in time accumulate into scripts for social actors to draw upon 
when interacting with security artifacts in subsequent institutionalization episodes. Built 
on the concept of actions upon the institutional properties of an organization as 
introduced by Orlikowski (1992), these requirements become scripts containing 
institutional principles of information security that are reinforced through interactions 
with security artifacts and are less likely to be altered. Using this view, information 
security is therefore an “enacted environment” that is built and strengthened upon by the 
conditioning of the three social structures: signification, domination, and legitimation 
(Orlikowski 1992, p. 411). 
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When institutional principles are altered due to institutional changes, behavior 
deviates and social actors become conscious of any such deviation and alteration. The 
different way social actors interact with security artifacts accumulates and slowly 
integrates with the existing security culture, creating new scripts to be used in the next 
security institutionalization episode. The subsequent episode depicts new, and expectedly 
improved, information security practices and governance. In the two commercial-bank 
cases, the commercial banks form a special task force that acts as a temporary 
institutional authority, overseeing improvement in security behavior and technology 
artifacts. The two commercial banks improve their respective technical controls by 
upgrading their security technologies, formal controls (e.g., Centro Metropolitan Bank 
creates a special unit that oversees debit-card transaction), and informal controls by 
educating their personnel (particularly customers) about changes in security technologies 
and new procedures for the use of such technologies. 
Patterned-actions objectification and externalization serves as the basis for 
accumulating security culture in the institutional realm of information security practices 
and governance. Institutional changes such as a security breach incident (e.g., the ATM 
skimming incident or the EDC machine fraud incident) force script revision that in turn 
causes a deviation in actions. These new ways of interacting with security artifacts are 
conscious actions that require changes in technical controls, formal controls, and informal 
controls of information security. These new changes integrate with the existing security 
culture, creating new scripts. Routine actions, on the other hand, are natural occurrences 
that slowly accumulate into a security culture unique to the institution. Social actors 
unconsciously externalize and naturally objectify their security behavior. Regardless of 
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such unconscious actions, social actors are still constrained by institutional authority, 
particularly by formal controls and informal controls. As such, while they naturally and 
voluntarily interact with security artifacts, social actors’ security behavior is watched 
over by institutional authority through security rules and efforts to raise security 
awareness. 
 
7.3. The Synthesis: Intra-Level Institutionalization 
7.3.1. Overview 
Unlike the previous framework, the framework for intra-level institutionalization 
focuses on formal interactions between two entities. This framework borrows the one 
introduced by Scott (2008), drawing on multilevel institutional processes. The foundation 
is built upon two types of institutionalization: 
 Top-down institutionalization whereby an entity enjoying a higher 
authority has the capacity to sanction its actions to the other entity which 
has a lower authority. This process is recognized as the governance and 
control process in this study. 
 Bottom-up institutionalization whereby an entity with a lower authority 
negotiates its actions with the other entity which possesses a higher 
authority. This process is termed as the conformity and report process in 
this study. 
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7.3.2. Governance and Control 
 An outstanding feature of this framework is the apparent use of power particularly 
by an entity possessing a higher authority, and acting as the central governance body. 
This entity, due to its high status in the social system, instantly assumes deontic power 
that it uses to sanction its actions (Hall 2008). While this power is prescribed to the 
governing entity, the deontic power’s creation and ascription are artificially crafted by 
actors of a social system (Smith and Searle 2003). This study shows that, due to its 
deontic power, Earl Capita Bank, which is the Central Bank, assumes the authority to 
govern all banking operations in Centro Metropolitan Bank and Blue Sequoia Bank (as 
well as other commercial banks), including information security practices. This concept 
reinforces the fact that Earl Capita Bank behaves as such simply because of its 
authoritative status in the banking sector.  
According to Hall (2008), deontic power directly renders the entity (i.e., the Central 
Bank) with constitutive power, which this entity uses to formulate and enforce rules for 
itself to adhere to. Hall (2008) states that social relations based on constitutive power can 
produce particular kinds of actors who behave accordingly in a social system. The central 
governing body such as the Central Bank that assumes this power has the privilege and 
authority to direct social relations and thus control behaviors of social actors. Constitutive 
power is one such powerful tool in the hands of the Central Bank to affect governance of 
practices in commercial banks and financial institutions alike (Larner and Le Heron 
2005). 
Equipped with these two types of power, can Earl Capita Bank play its significant 
role in banking sector (Quaglia 2008), including its role in information security 
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governance and practices?  These powers empower Earl Capita Bank to be the authority 
of investigation if the information assurance of each commercial bank is according to the 
prescribed information security guidelines. These powers enable Earl Capita Bank to 
summon a representative of a commercial bank should a security breach incident be 
caused by the commercial bank’s own failure to safeguard its information asset or failure 
to comply with the prescribed guidelines. This allows Earl Capita Bank to penalize a 
commercial bank for such failures.  
Moreover, Earl Capita Bank also owns the authority to prevent the massive impact 
that a security breach incident might have (i.e., systemic impact) by formulating and 
enforcing new, abstract/general rules4. The Bank-Indonesia case study has depicted the 
Central Bank to have developed an information-security guideline for commercial banks 
and financial institutions operating in Indonesia. The formulation and enforcement of this 
guideline demonstrates that Earl Capita Bank, acting as the authority, indicates 
information risks, particularly the levels of each risk and the mitigation plan. This 
participation is an essential part of information security governance (Brotby 2009; Von 
Solms and Von Solms 2009). Earl Capita Bank can also dispatch a team to undertake 
random inspections and conduct audit of information systems (including their security 
features) of a commercial bank. The EDC fraud case shows how Earl Capita Bank 
exercised its powers to ensure that all EDC machines were being used for online 
transactions only so as to prevent similar EDC fraud cases from reoccurring. 
The impact of power in institutionalization is significant. Silva and Backhouse 
(2003) have addressed how power helps routinize (i.e., habitualize) actions so as to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A respondent from the Central Bank opts for the use of guideline in lieu of rule. The reason is to provide 
liberty and creativity to commercial banks in accordance with each bank’s organizational culture. 
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become institutionalized. Lapke (2008) demonstrates how management utilizes power to 
force subordinates to comply with security policy to the point where security actions 
become institutionalized. According to Silva and Backhouse (2003), two types of power, 
namely dispositional power and facilitative power, are utilized by a social actor or an 
organizational actor to cause another social actor to do what he/she would not do 
otherwise. The dispositional power is similar to the concept of deontic power described in 
this study in that it equips a social actor with the power to enforce behavior due to his 
capacity in the social system. This type of power emerges due to social conditioning. The 
facilitative power is concerned with the systemic approach to control. This type of power 
equips a social actor with various techniques to discipline other social actors. As such, the 
use of these powers to repetitively, as well as routinely, enforce a desirable behavior 
causes such behavior to be institutionalized. Unlike that proposed by Lapke (2008), 
however, social actors that are subordinates are not able to resist the enforcement due to 
the strong sense of deontic power of Earl Capita Bank that forces commercial banks, 
including Centro Metropolitan Bank and Blue Sequoia Bank, to comply. In this study, 
Earl Capita Bank uses the deontic power (or facilitative power) and has the power to use 
various techniques (e.g., penalty, auditory visit, etc.) to force Centro Metropolitan Bank 
and Blue Sequoia Bank to implement information security practices and governance. 
Figure 7.4 shows the use of these power types on the intra-level institutionalization of 
information security whereas social actor A denotes Earl Capita Bank and social actor B 
denotes commercial banks, including Centro Metropolitan Bank and Blue Sequoia Bank. 
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Figure 7.4 – A Reproduced Model of Circuit of Power and Institutionalization by Silva and 
Backhouse (2003) 
 
In general, the objective of governance and control that the Central Bank practices 
is to maintain price stability by keeping the inflation rate low and stable (Ising 2009; 
Ullrich 2007). The macro-prudential supervision is a distinct feature and privilege owned 
by the Central Bank due to its status (i.e., deontic) in banking sector. The macro-
prudential supervision is the governance and control tool that is used to direct and 
oversee commercial banks and financial institutions, to ensure that risks are minimized in 
order to sustain financial stability (Krauskopf and Steven 2009). The information security 
governance and control by Earl Capita Bank is simply a smaller, minor part of the larger 
macro-prudential supervision that Earl Capita Bank implements to help commercial 
banks mitigate their operational risk, which comprises information risk. Earl Capita Bank 
is as such an essential key player whose participation and involvement are significant for 
the successful management of operational risk (Van Greuning and Brajovic Bratanovic 
2000; Fragniere et al. 2010). 
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7.3.3. Conformity and Report 
Due to the strong deontic power as well as other types of power (e.g., constitutive 
and facilitative), commercial banks and financial institutions are required to adhere and 
conform to rules enforced by Earl Capita Bank. Herein, the top-down institutionalization 
and the bottom-up institutionalization in intra-level institutionalization are established 
due to the strong implication of institutional relationship. The Centro Metropolitan Bank 
case study and the Blue Sequoia Bank case study have shown the significance of 
institutional relationship by creating a Compliance Division. As a special business unit in 
a commercial bank, the Compliance Division is assigned with the responsibility to 
communicate with the Central Bank on behalf of its institution, to monitor compliance 
with the Central Bank’s regulations, and to assist other business units and divisions to 
achieve objectives that are regulated by the Central Bank. 
There are two types of implementations of prudential bank supervision: off-site 
surveillance and on-site examinations (Van Greuning and Bratanovic 2000). The on-site 
examinations require the central bank to dispatch auditory teams to examine the 
appropriateness of banking operations. These inspections may also be triggered by 
problems identified by the off-site surveillance reports (Van Greuning and Bratanovic 
2000). The case studies have witnessed Earl Capita Bank as sending its auditory teams 
regularly to commercial banks in normal circumstances. The case studies show that Earl 
Capita Bank investigated a commercial bank’s security policies and regulations, server 
location and physical IT infrastructure, the security of a commercial bank’s Electronic 
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Banking Services, Business Continuity plans, etc. Earl Capita Bank may also send its 
auditory teams for unannounced auditory visits after a security breach incident occurs.  
The reciprocity actions by commercial banks aim to induce the Central Bank to 
perform further actions which are necessary to maintain stability in banking sector (Hall 
2008). The reporting practice is an extended obligation of commercial banks, as 
commercial banks are required to conform to a set of guidelines. This practice is an 
example of off-site surveillance as the Central Bank collects data from reports issued by a 
commercial bank (Van Greuning and Bratanovic 2000). The policy competencies of the 
Central Bank affect the supervisory arrangements as these are monitored by the Central 
Bank (Quaglia 2008).  
The Central Bank requires such reporting to be able to monitor individual 
commercial banks, compare an individual commercial bank’s performance among its 
peer group, and detect any significant deviation from its peer group (Van Greuning and 
Bratanovic 2000). In the context of this study, commercial banks submit their reports 
through their Compliance Divisions, depicting institutional development needs, financial 
sector and regulation, risk management culture, corporate governance, and various risk 
management practices that include managing operational and information risks. The 
Central Bank also uses collective reports from commercial banks to determine a 
benchmark and best practices. The Centro Metropolitan Bank case study delineates Earl 
Capita Bank conducting unannounced inspections of EDC machines to ascertain that 
there was no offline feature on EDC machines in use and allowing only the use of online 
transaction for EDC machines. A commercial bank requires a license not only to operate, 
but also to provide services such as Electronic-Banking Services. This license, issued by 
	   215 
the Central Bank, protects a commercial bank’s financial safety net and consumers, and 
provides a barrier to entry of institutions that do not meet the stringent criteria to operate 
as a bank (Schooner and Taylor 2009). Figure 7.5 depicts the details of prudential 
banking supervision context. 
 
Figure 7.5 – A Reproduced Prudential Banking Supervision Context by Van Greuning and 
Bratanovic (2000) 
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7.4. Emergent Themes 
This study has discovered three important themes that explain the unique context of 
institutionalizing information security in the banking sector. The themes emerge due to 
the strong nuance of an institution. The three themes are habitualized security routines, 
information stewardship, and institutional relationship. 
 
7.4.1. Habitualized Security Routines 
Central to the structuration of an information system is the interaction between a 
social actor and technologies (i.e., the artifact), that allows technologies to manifest as a 
meaningful variable in the organization (Orlikowski 1992). In the context of information 
security, the aim of institutionalization is to create a secure social structure in an 
information system through interactions between social actors and security technologies. 
Each of the three cases delineates the regulated and structured interactions between 
stakeholders and security technologies. In addition to the security technologies, additional 
modalities include the social actor’s experience and knowledge of using technologies as 
well as procedures and regulations of information security. As such, social actors use 
their knowledge and interpreting ability to interact with security technologies and 
sanction such interactions vis-à-vis` security policies or regulations. These modalities lay 
a foundation that links structure and social actions committed by social actors (Walsham 
1993). This study has conceptualized an information security culture that embodies 
security rules, procedures, methods, and responsibilities, and becomes a natural habit or a 
routine that is performed by personnel (Von Solms 2000; Chang and Lin 2007). As one 
of such abstractions, habitualized security routines are a manifestation of the principles 
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enactment which social actors readily and unconsciously use to act. Therefore, while 
script encoding entails encoding security culture from institutional realm to create the 
script, principles enactment transforms the script into habitualized security routines that 
linger in any social actors’ conscience. 
Researchers have denoted that a social structure contains a signification structure, a 
domination structure, and a legitimation structure (Giddens 1994; Walsham and Han 
1991; Walsham 1993). The institutional realm that embodies these three structures also 
contains institutional properties of social actions in a technology usage context (Barley 
and Tolbert 1991; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski et al. 1995; Orlikowski 2000). In the 
context of this study, the institutional properties are prescribed in the corporate 
information security culture, offering detailed elucidations of the practice of security 
technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls. Institutionalization of 
information security is best approached using these three dimensions (Dhillon 2007). 
These security-control dimensions provide a foundation for other aspects that serve the 
enactment of the three social structures and include security responsibility and modalities 
(e.g., technologies or regulations). Furthermore, once these security-control dimensions 
have become a routine within an organization, they produce and shall continuously 
reproduce the habitualized security routines. The habitualized security routines help resist 
any attempt to dissolve the information-security institution5. 
The three security-control dimensions do not simply appear as an abstraction of 
routines. Once they are adopted through principles enactment, these dimensions become 
visible and tangible in the form of actions. Technical controls are implemented as social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The notion of habitualized routines is conceptualized under the notion of ‘taken-for-grantedness’ 
proposed by sociologists (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2008). 
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actors start to use security artifacts such as PIN number as in the case of Centro 
Metropolitan Bank’s SMS banking, Electronic Token Device to use Internet banking 
features as in the case of Blue Sequoia Bank. Technical controls are also about 
procedures or formal methods to protect data and software. For example, encryption, 
hash totals, reuse prevention, and check bits are all formal methods and procedures that 
are commonly used in addition to the use of security technologies (Dhillon 2007, pp. 20-
21). The three case studies have noted the significant and necessary use of formal 
controls. Not only formal controls need to be enforced in the intra organizational level, 
but formal controls are also implemented directly by the Central Bank on a intra level. 
Lastly, the two commercial-bank case studies have depicted the importance of informal 
controls for the purpose of communicating security rules and procedures to customers 
and branch offices. For example, Centro Metropolitan Bank communicates the 
mechanisms of its dual-approval procedure to all branch offices while Blue Sequoia Bank 
releases its branch offices from adhering to a strict predefined conduct so as to provide 
freedom to implement information security according to each branch’s culture.  
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Figure 7.6 – A Close-Up View of Realm of Action 
 
Such visible and tangible appearances of the three security-control dimensions 
manifest as behavior and actions represented at the realm of action. Such 
conceptualization is in line with that by Barley (1986) and Orlikowski (2000) whereas the 
realm of action is a continuous interaction between social actors and modalities 
(interpretive scheme, artifacts, and norm) in an ordered manner. Empirical analysis of the 
three case studies confirms the order of the interrelation of security-control dimensions as 
proposed by Dhillon (2007). While the three are said to be intertwined and interrelated, 
conceptually and evidently, the technical controls are directed by formal controls, which 
are communicated through informal controls (see figure 7.6). 
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The fundamental conceptualization of habitualized security routines is devised by 
the unintentional/unaware principles enactment. Institutional and structuration scholars 
have acknowledged key concepts such as habit, routine, unintentional, natural, rational, 
unaware, or unconscious as directing behavior in the long term. The objective of building 
such conceptualization is to understand the transformation of such complex script into an 
abstraction of daily chores of information security practices and governance. When a 
social actor is informed of the script that contains the corporate information security 
culture, she is naturally translating the script using her experience in and knowledge 
about information security. Such a natural or unconscious translation cannot occur unless 
her experience and knowledge of information security has previously “sedimented” 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966) in the institutional realm as part of the security culture. 
Therefore, a social actor that is a member of the institution is said to have habitualized all 
security routines to direct her security behavior. These routines in turn transform into an 
abstraction (Berger and Luckmann 1966) that originates from a habit of using artifacts 
(Orlikowski 1992; 2000) and remains as such in the institutional realm (Barley 1986; 
Barley and Tolbert 1997). 
On the other hand, intentional/aware principles enactment cannot contribute to the 
creation of habitualized security routines. This is because social actors are aware of their 
routines and may be inclined to object to the performance of such routines. In this sense, 
power and regulations become a required tool for enforcing ‘habitualizing’ security 
routines. The three case studies demonstrate a rigorous enforcement of information 
security technical controls. The case of Earl Capita Bank depicts the dual technical 
controls of information security by its IT division and it’s Information Management 
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Division. The two departments oversee the implementation of the physical and logical 
aspects of security technical controls. The IT Division manages and maintains the 
institution’s IT systems and security systems (i.e., the physical aspect) while the 
Information Management Division focuses on protecting the information resource of the 
institution (i.e., the logical aspect). While the IT Division enjoys exclusive privilege to 
govern the physical aspect of technical controls (e.g., enforcing the use of username and 
password), the Information Management Division has to share the logical aspect with 
other departments within the institution. The two divisions also formulate regulations on 
securely using information systems and communicate such controls (i.e., formal controls 
and informal controls). As a consequence, personnel of Earl Capita Bank are forced to 
comply with these controls in order to subsequently form the habitualized security 
routines in the long run. 
 
7.4.2. Information Stewardship 
Dhillon and Moores (2001) suggest that technical controls are not sufficient to 
provide sound secured information systems. They state that: 
“Merely establishing a password is not enough. What is really needed is an understanding 
of the organizational structures and business processes and identifying a range of checks 
and balances that could be established. These could then be incorporated into the systems 
development processes.” 
 
Their argument is based on the assumption that security is an organizational 
problem. Central to the study of organizations is the stakeholder. Post et al. (2002, p. 19) 
formally define stakeholders of any organization as “the individuals and constituencies 
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that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity and 
activities, and that are therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers.” While not 
all of them have direct obligations to the institution, such individuals and constituencies 
bear the impact of information risk. This study identifies and portrays the assigning of 
each division or each business unit as an information steward, which generally functions 
to protect the institution’s information assets. An information steward “develops a sound 
architecture, motivates and develops IT staff, aligns IT plans with business plans, and 
protects the organization’s information assets” (Chen and Preston 2007). The information 
stewardship is therefore synonymous with the three security-control dimensions: 
technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls. In the case of the Indonesian 
banks, the role of an information steward is assumed by all divisions that own 
information systems and generate information, as demonstrated by the three case studies.  
The case of Earl Capita Bank, for instance, depicts the dual control of information 
security with technical controls being an exclusive privilege of the institution’s IT 
department. The IT department assumes the sole responsibility of controlling the 
technical aspects of the institution’s information security. The Information Management 
Division however defines the role of information stewardship for all other divisions that 
own information systems. This assignment is an attempt to reduce the strong data 
ownership that hinders IT-governance centralization as well as security-governance 
centralization. The data-ownership issue in Earl Capita Bank is a major stumbling block 
for the Information Management Division to assume the logical-aspect primary 
leadership. For instance, the IT department has the full authority to announce and 
implement a new security patch for the institution’s local area network and maintain its 
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implementation. The Information Management Division, however, needs to discuss and 
request permission to reestablish the confidentiality context of a document published by 
another department within the institution. 
In the three case studies, IT division as well as Information Security Division 
manages technical controls. The central theme of technical controls is technologies. 
Technologies are inscribed with particular symbols and material properties (Orlikowski 
2000) and become a meaningful variable only when their use can be manipulated to assist 
any social actor in his work (Orlikowski et al. 1995). Technologies, particularly IT 
artifacts, are socially and cognitively altered by the social actors, and are always 
embedded in a fragment of an instance (e.g., time and place), consisting of interconnected 
components, emerging from continuous social and economic interactions, and are 
dynamic (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001). Many information systems lack security features 
which can be attributed to security underestimation during the systems analysis and 
design (Dhillon and Moores 2001). Such underestimation is due to the irrational 
optimism of management about the security features of an information system (Rhee et 
al. 2005). All respondents of the three case studies agree that information security is an 
organizational issue. Hence successful information risk management and control depends 
on sound information-security governance. 
The Centro Metropolitan Bank case study and the Blue Sequoia Bank case study 
demonstrate the possession of formal controls and informal controls by divisions that 
process and disseminate information, and own information systems. These divisions, 
which act as information stewards, filter personnel who can access their information, how 
the information is accessed, and what information can be accessed. Information steward 
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is the executor of information security governance since it seeks to accomplish the same 
objective as that of security governance. The emphasis is therefore on executives, 
controls, and information risk (Brotby 2009; Von Solms and Von Solms 2009). 
Information stewardship differs from information security governance in that stewardship 
focuses on data and information using the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
concepts (Baldwin et al. 2012). While the three case studies have shown the existence of 
such a concept, the notion of information stewardship has been somewhat leaning 
towards the stronger notion of data ownership as apparent in the Earl Capita Bank case 
study. The concept of data ownership regards an entity as not only the protector of data, 
but also the owner of data, while the concept of information stewardship implies the 
steward as a data-security service provider (Baldwin et al. 2011). The data ownership has 
created small kingdoms of many information owners among divisions in Earl Capita 
Bank. A beginning is being made to eradicate this status quo now as a means to achieving  
data and information centralization. 
Information stewardship, particularly as implemented in Earl Capita Bank, is an 
impeccable example of the interrelatedness of technical controls, formal controls, and 
informal controls. An institution’s IT division uses its authority to regulate stakeholders 
of other divisions, including customers and the public, on the kind of data and 
information they are allowed to access and use, the method of such access (e.g., online 
access, hardcopy, etc.), and the purpose of such access. Despite each division owning the 
authority as an information steward, the IT division, or the Information Security Division, 
assumes the technical controls for data and information access in the institution. As such, 
divisions consult the IT division for technical access such as user privilege assignment. 
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7.4.3. Institutional Relationship 
Institutional relationship is closely related to prudential supervision, is a 
functionality that aims to “preserve the safety and soundness of an institution,” (Schooner 
and Taylor 2009, p. 261). This is in line with the objective of preserving social order and 
stability. Institutional relationship is created due to the manifestation of the Central 
Bank’s powers to govern, monitor, and control the commercial banks and the commercial 
banks compliance, conformity, and adherence with the Central Bank. Institutional 
relationship emerges when there is a need for changing conditions that depend on the 
levels of individualism, power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance which 
are exhibited by the parties in the relationship (Shankarmahesh et al. 2003). An 
institutional relationship can be viewed as a relationship that involves two or more formal 
organizations bound by regulations and power. The Central Bank in general implements 
two types of power: deontic and constitutive (Hall 2008). These powers can be extended 
to include facilitative power (Silva and Backhouse 2003). Using these powers, the 
Central Bank formulates information security guidelines that are adopted by commercial 
banks and expanded according to each bank’s specific needs and organizational culture.  
During adoption through implementation of security rules, the Central Bank 
exercises its deontic power (i.e., a power bestowed upon an entity due to its status in its 
social community) to govern and monitor the implementation. Deontic power also allows 
the Central Bank to exercise its constitutive power for formulating and enforcing 
regulations, including the information security guidelines. While such powers are 
undermined in developed countries to allow for creative implementation of such rules 
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among commercial banks in developed countries, commercial banks in developing 
countries (e.g., Indonesia) endure sanctioning and penalties for failure to comply with 
regulatory adoption (Schooner and Taylor 2009). In developing countries, centralized, 
concentrated power exercised by the Central Bank serves “to compel a change in the 
culture of regulation” (Schooner and Taylor 2009, p. 272). 
The core of institutional relationship is institutional authority. Institutional authority 
appears as a direct response to identify risks and to implement information security 
controls (Parrish 2000). Merely controlling critical infrastructures (i.e., technical 
controls) is inefficient and is beyond the direct control of organizations (Dutta and 
McCrohan 2002). Therefore the control of all security-control dimensions (i.e., technical, 
formal, and informal) is necessary to achieve efficiency. Due to the intricate nature of 
security-control dimensions, an internal control system is required to ensure security 
control. In general, the objective of an internal control is “to cover the aspects of quality 
and security as key control objectives in order to take care of ICT controls” (Omoteso et 
al. 2010, p. 160). Such internal control follows what is prescribed by the Central Bank. 
The internal control hence serves as a compliance authority in a commercial bank. 
Furthermore, the internal control manifests as an impact of the institutional relationship. 
The Compliance Division initiates this internal control to be implemented by all other 
divisions. While technical controls belong almost exclusively to IT division, formal 
controls and informal controls are implemented by all other divisions, particularly 
divisions that act as Information Stewards. 
As discussed previously, each commercial bank assigns its Compliance Division to 
act as a single door for communication with the Central Bank. This division is a 
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representative of its institution in matters related to the institutional relationship between 
a commercial bank and the Central Bank. All operational reports of a commercial bank 
are submitted to the Central Bank by the Compliance Division, including reports on 
Information Security and infrastructure. On the other hand, the Central Bank uses the 
Bank Supervision Division and the Accounting and Payment System Division to 
communicate with commercial banks. While the latter focuses on governing and 
controlling accounting and financial matters, the first deals with governing and 
controlling all matters other than accounting and finance. While technology and security 
infrastructure as well as information and communication issues are the responsibility of 
the Bank Supervision Division, the Accounting and Payment System Division assumes 
the responsibility to govern information systems that are used for accounting and 
financial issues. 
 
7.5. Summary and Discussion 
The final but important stage of this study is to review how synthesized concepts 
and emergent themes are used to answer research questions. The extent to which this 
study contributes  to the body of literature depends on the interwoven concepts and 
themes. For example, this study has suggested that habitualized security routines emerge 
when social actors continue their daily, natural, activities involving information security 
governance and practices and strive to resist the impact of security breach as it is deemed 
to deviate from their routines. 
The first issue that begs a response is the internalization of information security 
governance and practices in institutions. The key concept of security internalization is 
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habitualization or ‘being accustomed to’. This study shows that there are two realms of 
security institutionalization based on Barley and Tolbert’s framework (1997). When 
implementing security governance and practices, social actors draw on the corporate 
information security culture through various processes. In addition, social actors also 
store their routines that involve information security governance and practices in the form 
of a conceptualized security culture6. Performing these activities creates a continuous 
internalization of information security governance and practices. The result of 
internalizing information security governance and practices is the formation of 
habitualized security routines. Vice versa, the habitualized security routines are an 
abstract component of information security culture since these presuppose knowledge and 
experience of information security as well as incorporate formal regulations about 
information security among others (Orlikowski 2000). This study demonstrates that 
security routines become security culture through script replication and patterned-actions 
objectification and externalization. 
In a formal organizational setting, simply relying on unintentional principles 
enactment is not sufficient. Management that also acts as an authority is required to 
ensure that principles enactment of information security governance and practices is 
successful. While personnel are in general trustworthy, some may be unreliable and pose 
an internal threat (Dhillon and Moores 2001). In addition, management plays an 
important role in sound information security (Von Solms and Von Solms 2009). 
Information stewardship is assigned to each division management so as to safeguard 
information assets (Chen and Preston 2007) by enforcing all three security-control 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This instance is the objectification and externalization of information security practices and governance 
into the institutional realm. 
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dimensions. This is also true in the context of the intra-level institutionalization. The 
Central Bank as the central governance body overlooks minor aspects of information 
security governance and practices in commercial banks to ascertain the successful 
formation of habitualized security routines in these institutions. 
The second issue looks at how the Central Bank affects the institutionalization of 
information security. In banking sector, the Central Bank plays a major and critical role. 
This role includes governing and controlling the implementation of information security 
governance and practices in commercial banks and other financial institutions. The 
fundamental concept behind this issue is the institutional relationship. This study 
demonstrates that institutional relationship stands on Scott’s framework of multilevel 
institutional processes (Scott 2008). There are two processes in the institutional 
relationship: a top-down process from the Central Bank to commercial banks and a 
bottom-up process from a commercial bank to the Central Bank. 
 
    Research Thematic   
  
Security Internalization Central Governance Impact 
Security Re-
institutionalization 
Habitualized 
Security 
Routines 
Routines are built from a 
collection of security culture 
through principles 
enactment. Actors reproduce 
routines during script 
replication and store routines 
during objectification and 
externalization. 
The Central Bank 
ensures that routines 
are well implemented 
in commercial banks 
and become a habit. 
Routines help prevent 
security breach as these 
serve as a basis for 
resistance to re-
institutionalization. 
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Information 
Stewardship 
Intentional principles 
enactment is used to 
implement technical 
controls, formal controls, 
and informal controls by 
management. 
The Compliance 
Division acts as an 
intermediary of the 
Central Bank to assist 
information stewards in 
their attempt to 
implement the three 
security-control 
dimensions. 
Security breach changes 
how information security 
is implemented as the 
victim institution assigns 
each division to improve 
its security controls. 
Institutional 
Relationship 
The Central Bank oversees 
the implementation of 
habitualized security 
routines through regular 
audit and requires regular 
reports from commercial 
banks. 
The Central Bank 
governs and controls 
the implementation of 
information security 
while individual 
commercial bank 
reciprocates through 
conformity and 
reporting. 
The Central Bank regularly 
audits security controls in 
each commercial bank and 
may conduct surprise audit 
when security breach hits. 
Similarly, commercial 
banks regularly report their 
security governance and 
practices to the central 
bank and implement any 
regulatory changes decreed 
by the central bank. 
 
Table 7.1 – An Interpretive Framework for Information Security Institutionalization 
 
The impact of the central bank’s intervention and participation in security practices 
and governance in each commercial bank becomes obvious when security breach occurs. 
The central bank uses its power to change security rules and conduct surprise auditory 
visits to the premises of commercial banks, particularly any commercial bank which is 
the victim of the security breach. In doing so, the Central Bank manages the systemic risk 
(Van Greuning and Bratanovic 2000) that is caused by security failure in one commercial 
bank. During a normal condition, the Central Bank undertakes a regular, or annual, 
auditory visit to commercial banks and requires commercial banks to report their 
information security governance and practices. This study shows that the Compliance 
Division serves as a single door for communicating with the Central Bank and as an 
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intermediary of the Central Bank. As an intermediary, this division assists each division 
that acts as an information steward to implement the three security-control dimensions. 
The issue regarding information security re-institutionalization after a security 
breach relies on the very fundamental concept of an institution. Institutions never emerge 
from nothing and resist changes (Scott 2008) in order to retain social order and stability 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979). In an inter-level institutionalization, information stewardship 
proves to be a powerful tool in preventing security breaches. Institutional relationship is 
another safety feature from a intra-level institutionalization perspective. 
The important issue in re-institutionalization is, however, the fact that security 
breach is merely an instance in information security. While it is viewed as a nuisance by 
most scholars and practitioners, security breach is a major incident that drastically 
changes and impacts how information security is handled and implemented in an 
institution. Computer crimes are considered subversive acts (Dhillon and Moores 2001) 
rather than an episode of information security institutionalization. In this study, security 
breach re-institutionalizes information security through script revision whereby social 
actors improve their information security governance and practices. Such improvement, 
for example, includes changes in technical controls (e.g., technologies and procedural 
upgrade), formal controls (e.g., new and improved security rules), and informal controls 
(e.g., increased security awareness). The objective of doing so is to prevent similar 
breach incidents from occurring and causing a damaging impact on the bank and on other 
commercial banks (i.e., systemic impact). Information stewardship in this study manifests 
through formal controls and informal controls in which each division controls the logical 
	   232 
aspect of security and communicates information concerning such controls to personnel 
of other divisions. 
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8  CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1. Overview 
This study has explored the internalization of information security governance and 
practices, involving collective individuals placed in a form of formal organization. Such a 
phenomenon is termed as the institutionalization of information security. Using 
theoretical frameworks by Barley and Tolbert (1997) as well as by Scott (2008), this 
study has demonstrated that there are many drives and considerations that affect security 
institutionalization. In this chapter, all previously discussed concepts and emergent 
themes are summarized and reviewed. Several important concepts are revisited: 
specifically- information security institutionalization and re-institutionalization, and the 
impact of a central governance body. 
 
8.1.1. Information Security Institutionalization and Re-institutionalization 
Central to this study is the institutionalization of information security. The 
argument presented in this study is that information security governance elucidates the 
interaction between knowledgeable human agents and the wider social system within 
which they exist. Another argument that merits consideration is that information security 
governance becomes institutionalized through social integration of routines and system 
integration of relevant technologies. This study conducts an overview of two commercial 
banks and the Central Bank of Indonesia as the unit of analysis. 
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The fundamental conception of this study is built on standard information security 
practices and information security governance. Kawaura (2004) has demonstrated a 
failure in corporate governance among Japanese banks, leading to systemic damage in the 
Japanese banking sector in the 1990s. Information security governance is a vital 
requirement, required to direct information security practices and to ensure sound 
information security. This study has shown how information security governance directs 
the following aspects in information security: Strategic and Risk Management, Resource 
Management and Business Process Management (Brotby 2009), which embody the 
strategic, tactical, and operational aspects of information security (Von Solms and Von 
Solms 2006a). Information security governance therefore redirects not only the human 
resources and formal organizational structure, but also the technical resources by virtue 
of managing the operational and environment aspects of security technical resources and 
ensuring business continuity (Da Veiga and Eloff 2007). Scholars have also recognized 
the importance of the role of executive and top management in information security 
governance (Dutta and McCrohan 2002; Khalfan and Alshawaf 2004; Knapp et al. 2006). 
This study has depicted the significant impact of enforcing and adhering to 
information security policy. Information security policy as a set of regulations directing 
security behavior is necessary to promote sound information security (Cuppens and 
Cuppens-Boulahia 2008). Top management support is also a key factor that sustains good 
practices of information security (Hong et al. 2006; Fulford and Doherty 2003). In this 
study, key players such as the Central Bank, the Board of Directors, and the Bank 
Management are assuming the authority to formulate, enforce, and communicate 
Information Security Policy. The concept of principles enactment introduces the 
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intentional, or consious, enactment, by which the bank’s key players and personnel are 
coerced into complying with security policy, whether  they are motivated or not,  to do  
so (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Scholars have denoted such phenomena as an impact of 
structuration sanctioning (Giddens 1984; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski 2000; Orlikowski 
et al. 1995; Walsham 1993; Walsham and Han 1991) whereby bank stakeholders face the 
consequences of compliance and compliance failure (Selznick 1969). 
All such phenomena embody the three security-control dimensions: technical 
controls, formal controls, and informal controls (Dhillon and Moores 2001; Dhillon 
2007). The institutionalization of information security depends on the intertwining of the 
three security-control dimensions (Dhillon 2007), that manifest into behavior and actions 
aimed at safeguarding information assets. In this study, security governance and practices 
that become a habit and a routine over time are internalized by members of an institution 
and get transformed into information security culture, which is built on experience and 
knowledge (Orlikowski 2000). 
One of the highlights of this study is the impact of security breach on security 
institutionalization. The majority of scholars and practitioners regard security breach as a 
plight that results from unethical conduct (Dhillon and Moores 2001). This study 
contends that security breach is another episode in information security 
institutionalization. Security breach drives such institutionalization into a different 
direction through script revision that changes how technical controls, formal controls, and 
informal controls are implemented. Security breach forces an institution to upgrade its 
technologies and resources (i.e., changes in technical controls), improve security 
regulations (i.e., changes in formal controls), and increase security awareness (i.e., 
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changes in informal controls). Security breach draws the attention of the Central Bank, 
which aims to mitigate systemic risk. Security breach is hence a variant mask of security 
institutionalization. 
 
Figure 8.1 – A Simplified View of Different Episodes of Information Security Institutionalization 
Depicting Technical Controls, Formal Controls and Informal Controls 
 
In this study, the institutionalization and re-institutionalization of information 
security in an institution are introduced as micro-level institutionalization. Each of the 
three case studies has brought forth a unique instantiation of information security 
institutionalization. Such an instantiation denotes the institution’s unique identity in terms 
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of information security governance and practices. Despite the intervention by the Central 
Bank, each commercial bank has proceeded to create its own unique security culture 
through different security features and procedures, different security rules, and different 
methods of security education. Except when an institution is intentionally disbanded, 
institutions in general do not emerge from nothing, do not disappear, and instead change 
facets (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2008).  The occurrence of such episodes 
resembles the concept of recursive structuration as introduced by Barley (1986), Barley 
and Tolbert (1997), Giddens (1984), Orlikowski (1992; 2000), Walsham (1993), and 
Walsham and Han (1991). 
The emergent themes suggest that the different episodes of information security 
institutionalization are attributed to the habitualized security routines, which depict how 
information security governance and practices become a natural routine or habit and 
transform into security culture. In addition, such varying episodes can also be attributed 
to the Information Stewardship, which explains how an institution preserves its 
information assets by assigning each of its divisions to control such an asset technically, 
formally, and informally. While figure 8.1 depicts a simplified representation of 
information security institutionalization depicting the three security-control dimensions, 
figure 7.1 shows the synthesis of institutionalization concepts showing the 
comprehensive four processes: script encoding, principles enactment, script revision and 
script replication, and patterned-actions objectification and externalization. 
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8.1.2. Impact of Central Governance Body 
The impact of the central governance body is another highlight of this study. The 
Central Bank that acts as the central governance body has been shown to have significant 
influences on every operational aspect of a commercial bank, including information 
security. As such, the Central Bank is one of the key bank players as portrayed in this 
study. The role of the Central Bank has been delineated to be very important in shaping 
and conditioning information security governance and practices in banking sector. 
An essential concept of the Central Bank’s involvement is power. This study has 
elucidated the use and the impact of power on the institutionalization of information 
security. There are three types of power: deontic power, constitutive power (Hall 2008), 
and facilitative power (Silva and Backhouse 2003). The Central Bank uses this power to 
position itself as the highest authority in the banking sector. Such intervention, as has 
been delineated in this study, includes formulating security guidelines, enforcing the 
implementation of security guidelines among commercial banks and financial 
institutions, and controlling and auditing information security governance and practices 
in commercial banks and financial institutions. 
From a constitutive-power perspective, this study has supported Hall’s (2008) 
assertion of the ways by which the Central Bank uses constitutive power to formulate 
security rules. In addition, the Central Bank also has the capacity to force commercial 
banks and financial institutions to implement such security rules using facilitative power 
as denoted by Silva and Backhouse (2003). The Central Bank utilizes these types of 
power due to its social status in banking sector, referring to the deontic power as 
introduced by Hall (2008). These types of power are used to sanction and reward  
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commercial banks and financial institutions to comply with information security policy. 
Regulations are needed to maintain social order and stability (Berger and Luckmann 
1966), which are the ultimate objective of safeguarding information asset. Figure 7.4 
shows how these power types are placed to render the Central Bank the authority to 
govern and control information security in banking sector. 
Equipped with these types of power, the Central Bank conducts the governance and 
control of information security in banking sector. Commercial banks and financial 
institutions reciprocate these actions by conforming to such actions and reporting their 
operational activities to the Central Bank. Such bidirectional relationships represent a 
top-down process and a bottom-up process of the multilevel institutional processes 
proposed by Scott (2008). Institutional relationship reflects this theoretical framework, 
embodying these two processes. In this study, institutional relationship is the basis for the 
prudential supervision, which is an authoritative privilege owned by the central bank. The 
core concepts of institutional relationship are relationships among formal organizations 
(i.e., institutions), power utilization, rules implementation and control, and regulatory 
conformity. Using this concept, the Central Bank is positioned as the highest authority 
that represents the government in banking sector, defined as the institutional authority. 
Figure 3.5 depicts the macro-level institutionalization that adopts Scott’s (2008) 
multilevel institutional processes. 
 
8.2. Implications for Theory 
Despite the adoption of a descriptive framework to develop a theoretical framework 
for this study, this study highlights several major implications. Firstly, previous studies 
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have singled out security breach as merely a plight and therefore do not consider it a 
factor that can improve the implementation aspects of information security. This study 
presents a radical position by introducing security breach as a driving force in 
institutionalizing information security governance and practices. This argument is built 
on one that is presented by Rhee et al. (2005). Information security is not taken seriously 
when all is safe, but gains attention when a security breach hits. As such, rather than 
fussing about security breach and various counteractions to it, this study suggests the 
acceptance of security breach as part of the implementation and governance of 
information security. Organizations put tremendous efforts into improving technical 
controls, formal controls, and informal controls once a security breach hits since 
organizations strive to resist changes (Scott 2008) and maintain stability and social order 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979). 
Secondly, this study highlights how information security becomes internalized in 
organizations. Such an internalization cannot escape the interplay between technical 
controls, formal controls, and informal controls. This study is developed from a social 
science perspective. While the fundamental idea is the interaction between social actors 
and artifacts such as security artifacts and technologies, such an interaction requires 
complicated processes that explain how such interaction becomes internalized. 
Borrowing Barley and Tolbert’s (1997) framework for institutionalization and 
structuration, this study portrays various formats of such interactions in an 
institutionalization as a process. Such interaction appears as an abstraction in some 
phases such as script encoding and emerges in its literal form when principles are 
successfully enacted. Furthermore, such interaction occurs for the attainment of certain 
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objectives that are unique, and depend on the organization’s objectives and culture. To 
conceptualize and simplify the various formats of such interaction, a terminology of 
habitualized security routines is introduced, focusing on how such an interaction becomes 
routine. Such phenomena are in line with the concept proposed by Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) that the interaction between social actors and artifacts is socially constructed and 
hence a social construction of reality. This study also supports socio-organizational 
security scholars who opine that information security is not a technical problem but rather 
a managerial issue. Moreover, this finding is a support for the argument that information 
security governance and practices become institutionalized through social integration of 
routines and system integration of relevant technologies. 
Thirdly, this study supports the significant impact of power on information security 
governance and practices. Built on the structuration concept, this study shows how power 
can be used to facilitate the interaction between social actors and artifacts as well as to 
sanction such interactions. While some higher authority key players in an internal 
organization possess the power to govern and control information security 
implementation, a central governance body is required to explain different types of power 
needed to govern and control information security implementation. Such organization 
requires a valid admission in a social system in order to obtain the deontic power (Hall 
2008) or dispositional power (Silva and Backhouse 2003), which finally endows the 
organization with the constitutive power that is used to formulate rules (Hall 2008) and 
facilitative power that is used to control and force such rules (Silva and Backhouse 2003). 
Fourthly, this study provides a major implication for the theoretical lens, 
particularly the institutionalization and the structuration framework by Barley and Tolbert 
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(1997). In the context of information security, this study extends the notion of script and 
differentiates the application of and the causes for script replication and script revision. 
Barley and Tolbert (1997) and Barley (1986) have denoted a script as merely a link 
between actions and institutions and that a script contains patternized interactions. This 
study goes beyond such conceptualization by stating that the script contains information 
security culture formed over time through accumulated knowledge and experience of 
social actors pertaining to information security. In addition, this study combines 
institutionalization concepts from scholars such as Berger and Luckmann (1966), Scott 
(1987; 2008), and Powell and DiMaggio (1991). This study distinguishes script 
replication as one that represents a normal condition, from script revision that emerges as 
a result of attempts to survive after a security breach. The script revision is shown to 
ignite re-institutionalization as introduced by Powell and DiMaggio (1991). Last but not 
least, this study embeds the three security-control dimensions in the realm of action. The 
interrelated implementation of formal controls, technical controls, and informal controls 
has been proved to serve as the basis for organization’s resilience against the impact of 
security breach. 
Finally, another major highlight is the institutional relationship that depicts the 
interaction among organizations engaged in implementing information security. 
Information security studies have mostly placed emphasis on internal management issues, 
reiterating the importance of executives and top management in the successful 
implementation of information security.  
This study moves beyond the internal management view by proposing that an 
organization plays the role and acts as an authority. This study has shown the importance 
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of such an organization which can direct, govern, and control information security 
through certain key players placed in another organization which acts as a subordinate. 
Rather than looking at how groups of key players influence each other, this study 
proposes that formal collections of key players have the power to influence. Such a 
finding is a positive response to the argument that information security governance 
elucidates the interaction between knowledgeable human agents and the wider social 
system within which they are situated. 
 
8.3. Implications for Practice 
The findings of this study point towards several implications for practice, which are 
presented below.  Information security is a managerial issue that requires commitment by 
not only the internal key players such as executives, top management, middle 
management, and employees, but also other similar organizations and the central 
governance body operating in the sector. This study has depicted the relationship between 
information security, information risk, and systemic risk, which resembles a domino 
effect. The central governance body and subordinate organizations need to maintain a 
mutually trusting institutional relationship in order to sustain sound information security. 
In this sense, the central governance body might benefit from an assessment of how much 
of its power is used to control and govern subordinate organizations into implementing 
sound information security governance and practices. Vice versa, practitioners at 
subordinate organizations might also benefit from carefully assessing the degree of 
control and governance by the central governance body. 
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Practitioners may also benefit from evaluating the importance of giving equal 
treatment to technical controls, formal controls, and informal controls of information 
security. Practitioners should realize that a routine implementation of these controls has 
the potential to transform into a corporate security culture unique to an organization, 
given the successful internalization of such controls in security implementation. While 
security breach has been said to be just another phase in information security 
implementation, any practitioner as a member of a social system should always be aware 
of any threat of information risk and make every effort to mitigate such a risk. This study 
has depicted that even when an organization is prepared, a security breach can affect that 
organization indirectly due to security failure in another organization. This is an example 
of the damaging impact of systemic risk. 
Finally, information security should be made available to not only internal key 
players, but also to customers and other similar organizations in the sector. Hence, 
informal controls such as security education and awareness are as important as technical 
controls and formal controls of information security. This study has shown how 
customers can be gullible and may fall into a trap by perpetrators of unethical practices. 
Furthermore, this study has demonstrated that these unethical perpetrators are very 
creative and in fact do not even use state-of-the-art technology artifacts to breach security 
(Dhillon 2007). Perpetrators simply prey on customers in the hope of duping them on the 
basis of their gullibility and lack of security awareness of such customers. While 
customers need to be constantly educated about the importance of information security 
and the procedures for safeguarding information assets, other similar organizations in the 
sector also need to understand the security culture and procedures of an organization. The 
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EDC machine fraud has highlighted the lack of understanding and clarity of each other’s 
security features, security artifacts and procedures amongst two banks. 
 
8.4. Limitations and Future Research Avenues 
Like any other scientific product, this study unfortunately does not come free from 
limitations. By presenting these limitations, exciting research avenues become available 
for exploration to other scholars. Firstly, this study is conducted in a developing country. 
An extant piece of literature by Schooner and Taylor (2009) has stated that too much 
power and control by the Central Bank may actually limit the freedom of commercial 
banks in exercising their information security governance and practices. Another similar 
study in a developed country such as the United States should be conducted to present an 
interesting parallel or comparison with this study. 
Secondly, security policy and risk management are considered simply a component 
in the institutionalization of information security. Security policy and risk management 
are positioned as part of the formal controls of security that are automatically internalized 
along with technical controls and informal controls during information security 
institutionalization. A future study that places emphasis on the impact of internalizing 
security policy on information security institutionalization could throw up interesting 
findings. In addition, another study that focuses on risk management should be conducted 
to see how mitigating information risk and information assurance can re-institutionalize 
information security. 
Thirdly, the commercial banks in the case studies are all large commercial banks 
that boast of strong information systems from among their counterparts in Indonesia. 
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There are in fact many other smaller commercial banks in rural areas using non-
automated information systems. Hence there is a tendency that this study favors 
computerized information security that supports information security as a whole. Another 
study should be conducted for the purpose of comparing information security governance 
between commercial banks with automated information security, other commercial banks 
with weak automated information security, and commercial banks with non-automated 
information security. Furthermore, such a study needs to emphasize on the internalization 
of information security governance and practices when drawing such a comparison. 
Finally, this study has introduced several important concepts such as systemic risk 
and micro-prudential supervision borrowed from the banking theory. This study however 
focuses on the internal information security institutionalization in each commercial bank 
and the Central Bank and also takes note of the relationship between the Central Bank 
and all commercial banks. The latter is a subject that merits a closer examination and 
another study should be conducted to focus mainly on the institutional relationship 
between the central bank and a commercial bank in terms of information security and 
highlight the impact of such relationship on other commercial banks using the systemic 
risk concept. 
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A  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
Theoretical Element Research Question Interview Question 
    What is your position in your company? 
    Briefly describe your task and duties. 
Inter-Level: Script Encoding 
Internalization of 
security governance and 
practices by an 
organization 
Describe what you know about risk. 
    
Who is in charge of constituting risk 
policies and regulations in your 
company? 
    Describe the policies and regulations of using your company’s IT system. 
    
Is there any specific reference or 
guidance for risk policies and 
regulations? 
  Impact of external governing body 
Does your company devise risk-
management policies and procedures to 
other commercial banks? 
  Impact of security breaches 
Describe what you know about a 
security breach. 
Inter-Level: Principles Enactment 
Internalization of 
security governance and 
practices by an 
organization 
How is your company’s IT security 
system maintained or enhanced? 
    How are these practices reflected in a branch level? 
    
What action do management/controller 
personnel take to enforce security 
culture in your company? 
    Who is in charge of enforcing and controlling risk policies and regulations? 
  Impact of external governing body 
What is the institutional relationship 
between your company and the central 
bank? 
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  Impact of security breaches 
Has there been any security-breach 
incident in your company or its 
branches? 
    To whom do you report any security breach incident? 
Inter-Level: Script Replication and 
Revision 
Internalization of 
security governance and 
practices by an 
organization 
Are risk policies and regulations in your 
company periodically revised? How 
often? 
    To whom are the risk policies and regulations revision reported? 
    Who is in charge of receiving report and revision from your company’s branches? 
    Who is in charge of receiving report and revision in a branch level? 
    Who is in charge of revising risk policies and regulations? 
    
Do branch personnel have the authority 
to constitute and revise risk policies and 
regulations? Why? 
Inter-Level: Patterned-Actions 
Objectification and 
Externalization 
Internalization of 
security governance and 
practices by an 
organization 
Is your company’s IT security system 
periodically maintained or enhanced? 
How often? 
    Who is in charge of the IT security system maintenance? 
    
Who are the key players that enforce and 
control risk policies and regulations in a 
branch level? 
    
How are these policies and regulations 
enforced and governed in your 
company’s branches? 
    What are the penalties for security-breach incidents for employees? 
    What are the penalties for compliance failure? 
    What is the practice of information security governance in your company? 
    
What are the frameworks used for 
practicing information security 
governance in your company? 
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Describe the implementation of 
information security in your company 
and what your contributions are for such 
implementations? 
  Impact of security breaches 
How do you handle any security-breach 
incident? 
    How does/would your company handle security-breach incident? 
Intra-Level: Governance and 
Control 
Impact of external 
governing body How do commercial banks comply? 
    How do you expect commercial banks to comply? 
    
What penalties does your company 
implement for any security-breach 
incident in commercial banks? 
    
How often do you expect commercial 
banks to report their information-
security practices? 
    How do commercial banks report such practices? 
Intra-Level: Governance and 
Control 
Internalization of 
security governance and 
practices by an 
organization 
How does your organization comply 
with the central bank's risk policies and 
regulations? 
    
How does your company report a 
security-breach incident to the central 
bank? 
    
How does your company report its 
information-security practices to the 
central bank? 
    
Has the central bank ever imposed any 
penalty over any incident or compliance 
failure? Examples? 
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B DATA COLLECTION: RECORDS AND 
SCHEDULE 
 
 
Legend: EM: Executive Management 
  A: Authority 	  	  
  M: Management 	  	  
  OP: Operational Personnel 
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Date Organization Subject Time Start 
Time 
End Duration Interview? EM? A? M? OP? Focus Area 
05/24/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Vice 
President of 
IT Security 
Dept. 
12:10 PM 2:25 PM 1:15 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Organizational 
background 
briefing and 
preliminary 
interview. 
Electronic 
copies of 
organizational 
structure 
obtained. 
05/26/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
IT Dept. 
Manager 
(Directorate 
of 
Information 
Technology) 
2:00 PM 4:00 PM 2:00 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Research 
presentation and 
preliminary 
interview. 
05/31/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Head of Risk 
Management 
Team (Office 
of Governor) 
8:10 AM 9:35 AM 1:25 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
organizational 
structure (script 
encoding and 
principles 
enactment). 
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Senior 
Analysts 
(Special Unit 
for 
Information 
Management) 
2:20 PM 4:00 PM 1:40 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Introduction and 
preliminary 
interview. 
06/01/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Special Unit 
for 
Information 
Management 
2:00 PM 3:35 PM 1:35 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sharing session 
with the UKMI's 
personnel: 
Dissertation-
proposal 
presentation 
06/02/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Senior 
Analysts 
(Special Unit 
for 
Information 
Management) 
11:35 
AM 1:45 PM 2:10 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
technical control 
and 
organizational 
structure (script 
encoding and 
principles 
enactment). 
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Head of 
Payment 
Information 
Systems 
Regulator 
(Directorate 
of 
Accounting 
and Payment 
System) 
3:40 PM 4:35 PM 55 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
governance and 
control of 
macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
    
Head of 
Payment 
Information 
Systems 
Supervisor 
(Directorate 
of 
Accounting 
and Payment 
System) 
5:20 PM 5:45 PM 25 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
governance and 
control of 
macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
06/03/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Head of 
Payment 
Information 
Systems 
Licensing 
(Directorate 
of 
Accounting 
and Payment 
System) 
8:25 AM 9:10 AM 45 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
governance and 
control of 
macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
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Senior IT 
Researcher 
(Directorate 
of 
Information 
Technology) 
9:30 AM 10:50 AM 1:20 Yes No No Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
technical control 
(principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
    
Analysts 
(Special Unit 
fot 
Information 
Management) 
2:00 PM 4:08 PM 2:08 Yes No No No Yes 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
information 
stewardship 
(principles 
enactment and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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Senior 
Analyst 
(Special Unit 
for 
Information 
Management) 
4:10 PM 4:20 PM 10 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
information 
stewardship 
(principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
06/04/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Senior 
Analyst, 
Analyst, 
Junior 
Analyst 
(Directorate 
of Bank 
Licensing 
and Banking 
Information) 
2:25 PM 3:25 PM 1:00 Yes No No Yes Yes 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
information 
systems 
management 
and use (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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06/07/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Head of Risk 
Management 
Team (Office 
of Governor) 
9:00 AM 10:05 AM 1:05 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
risk policies 
(script encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
    
Senior 
Analyst of 
Public 
Relation 
Buerau 
(Office of 
Governor) 
10:35 
AM 
10:45 
AM 10 min. Yes No No No Yes 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
risk policies and 
management 
(script 
encoding). 
    
Head of 
Strategic 
Planning 
Bureau 
(Office of 
Governor) 
10:50 
AM 
11:50 
AM 1:00 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
risk mitigation 
and 
implementation 
(principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
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and 
externalization). 
    
Senior 
Researcher 
(Directorate 
of Banking 
Research and 
Regulation) 
1:45 PM 2:55 PM 1:10 Yes No No Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
policies 
formulation, 
control, and 
implementation 
(script encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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06/08/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Analyst 
(Directorate 
of Bank 
Licensing 
and Banking 
Information) 
11:10 
AM 
11:45 
AM 35 min. Yes No No No Yes 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
information 
systems 
management 
and use (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
    
Senior 
Analysts 
(Special Unit 
for 
Information 
Management) 
2:10 PM 3:20 PM 1:10 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
interview on 
information 
stewardship and 
security access 
and control 
(principles 
enactment and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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06/09/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Head of IT 
Operational 
and Senior IT 
Researcher 
(Directorate 
of 
Information 
Technology) 
8:00 AM 9:02 AM 1:02 Yes No No Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
data recovery 
plan (script 
revision). 
    
Senior Bank 
Supervisor 
(Directorate 
of Bank 
Supervision 
3: Private 
Banks) 
11:00 
AM 
11:45 
AM 45 min. Yes No Yes No No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
governance and 
control of 
macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
06/10/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Head of Risk 
Management 
Team and 
Analyst 
(Office of 
Governor) 
9:00 AM 10:17 AM 1:17 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
risk 
management 
information 
systems (script 
encoding and 
principles 
enactment). 
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Senior Bank 
Supervisor 
(Directorate 
of Bank 
Supervision 
3: Private 
Banks) 
2:00 PM 2:35 PM 35 min. Yes No Yes No No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
governance and 
control of 
macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
06/14/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Head of 
Payment 
Information 
Systems 
Supervisor 
(Directorate 
of 
Accounting 
and Payment 
System) 
9:15 AM 9:25 AM 10 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
interview on 
governance and 
control of 
macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
    
Head of 
Payment 
Information 
Systems 
Regulator 
(Directorate 
of 
Accounting 
and Payment 
System) 
12:00 PM 12:18 PM 18 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
governance and 
control of 
macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
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06/15/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Bank 
Supervisors 
(Directorate 
of Bank 
Supervision 
1: State 
Banks) 
9:40 AM 11:30 AM 1:50 Yes No Yes No No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
governance and 
control of 
macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
  Blue Sequoia Bank 
Head of 
Compliance, 
IT Analyst, 
and Head of 
Human 
Resource 
2:45 PM 3:40 PM 55 min. No No Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational 
background 
briefing and 
dissertation-
proposal 
presentation. 
06/18/2010 Earl Capita Bank 
Senior IT 
Researcher 
(Directorate 
of 
Information 
Technology) 
3:25 PM 3:35 PM 10 min. Yes No No Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security for 
intranet, 
internet, and 
email (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script revision 
and replication, 
and patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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06/21/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Operational 
Group Head, 
Business 
Operation 
Improvement 
Dept. Head, 
and Domestic 
Payment 
Dept. Head 
(Central 
Operation) 
11:10 
AM 
11:35 
AM 25 min. Yes No No Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
information 
systems 
management 
and use (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
    
IT Audit Unit 
Head 
(Internal 
Audit Dept.) 
4:43 PM 5:45 PM 1:02 Yes No No Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security 
implementation 
(script encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
 	  
274 
06/22/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Assistent of 
Mass 
Banking Vice 
President 
16:00 16:11 11 min. No No Yes Yes No Research introduction. 
06/24/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Vice 
President of 
IT Security 
Dept. 
2:08 PM 3:15 PM 1:07 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security for 
debit card and 
ATM 
infrastructure, 
hardware, and 
software 
(principles 
enactment and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
06/25/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Operational 
Risk 
Management 
Team Leader 
9:05 AM 9:25 AM 20 min. No No Yes Yes No Research introduction. 
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Assistent of 
Mass 
Banking Vice 
President 
3:35 PM 4:40 PM 1:05 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on on 
security for 
debit card and 
ATM 
infrastructure, 
hardware, and 
software (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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06/29/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
IT Audit Unit 
Head 
(Internal 
Audit Dept.) 
8:50 AM 9:38 AM 48 min. Yes No No Yes No 
Data collection: 
interview on 
conformity and 
report of macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory and on 
security for 
debit card and 
ATM 
infrastructure, 
hardware, and 
software 
(principles 
enactment, 
script replication 
and revision, 
and patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
06/30/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Operational 
Risk 
Management 
Team Leader 
4:15 PM 5:15 PM 1:00 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
interview on 
information risk 
management 
(script encoding, 
principles 
enactment, and 
script revision 
and replication). 
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07/01/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Assistent of 
Mass 
Banking Vice 
President 
5:33 PM 6:10 PM 37 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
debit-card 
transaction and 
security 
(principles 
enactment, 
script revision, 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
07/05/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Vice 
President of 
IT Security 
Dept. 
4:00 PM 4:53 PM 53 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security policies 
(script encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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07/08/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
E-Banking 
Product 
Manager 
8:15 AM 9:26 AM 1:11 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
electronic and 
card payment 
(principles 
enactment and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
07/09/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
IT Audit Unit 
Head 
(Internal 
Audit Dept.) 
9:18 AM 10:15 AM 57 min. Yes No No Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security policies 
formulation and 
implementation 
(script encoding 
and script 
replication and 
revision) and 
conformity and 
report of macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
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07/12/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Operational 
Risk 
Management 
Team Leader 
4:18 PM 4:56 PM 38 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
conformity and 
report of macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
07/13/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Vice 
President of 
Head 
Corporate 
Center Audit 
9:13 AM 9:40 AM 27 min. Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
confidential data 
(principles 
enactment and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
07/15/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Vice 
President of 
Compliance 
Group 
10:18 
AM 
11:25 
AM 1:07 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
conformity and 
report of macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
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IT Audit Unit 
Head 
(Internal 
Audit Dept.) 
2:10 PM 2:50 PM 40 min. Yes No No Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security breach 
and incidental 
case (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script revision, 
and patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
    
Operational 
Risk 
Management 
Team Leader 
4:20 PM 4:35 PM 15 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security breach 
and incidental 
case (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script revision, 
and patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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07/16/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Vice 
President of 
IT Security 
Dept. 
2:23 PM 3:33 PM 1:10 Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security breach 
and incidental 
case (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script revision, 
and patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
07/19/2010 
Centro 
Metropolitan 
Bank 
Assistent of 
Mass 
Banking Vice 
President 
5:53 PM 6:25 PM 32 min. Yes No Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security breach 
and incidental 
case (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script revision, 
and patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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07/20/2010 Blue Sequoia Bank 
Head of 
Enterprise 
Security 
Group 
10:15 
AM 
11:23 
AM 1:08 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
information risk, 
control, and 
security policy 
(script encoding, 
principles 
enactment, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
07/29/2010 Blue Sequoia Bank 
Head of 
Enterprise 
Security 
Group 
10:08 
AM 
11:12 
AM 1:04 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security 
implementation 
and security 
policies (script 
encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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08/02/2010 Blue Sequoia Bank 
Head of 
Electronic 
Banking 
Operation 
Group 
3:32 PM 4:26 PM 1:06 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
debit-card and 
electronic 
payment 
(principles 
enactment, 
script 
replication, and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
08/10/2010 Blue Sequoia Bank 
Head of 
Enterprise 
Security 
Group 
2:13 PM 3:48 PM 1:35 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security 
implementation 
and security 
breach incident 
(script encoding, 
principles 
enactment, 
script replication 
and revision, 
and patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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08/12/2010 Blue Sequoia Bank 
Head of 
Enterprise 
Security 
Group 
2:13 PM 2:48 PM 35 min. Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
technical 
controls and 
security 
technologies 
(principles 
enactment and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
08/16/2010 Blue Sequoia Bank 
Compliance 
Advisor 1:35 PM 2:28 PM 53 min. Yes No Yes No Yes 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
security policies 
formulation 
(script 
encoding) and 
conformity and 
report of macro-
prudential 
supervision 
theory. 
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08/16/2010 Blue Sequoia Bank 
Head of 
Electronic 
Banking 
Operation 
Group 
3:05 PM 3:40 PM 35 min. Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Data collection: 
Interview on 
debit-card 
payment 
(principles 
enactment and 
patterned-
actions 
objectification 
and 
externalization). 
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graduate assistantship that covered his tuition costs and stipend. Employed as an adjunct 
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